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Part 1 HYPER-SURVEILLANCE,  
CONTROL MECHANISMS,  
AND DIGITAL POLITICS

ALGORITHMIC MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY:  
POWER AND RESISTANCE UNDER DATAFICATION
Dimitra L. Milioni1 
Introduction
Much has changed since Time magazine designat-
ed “You” (the average social media user) as Person 
of the Year in 2006 and composed in 2010 a paean to 
Facebook’s creator and owner Mark Zuckerberg and 
his invention (Facebook) for changing the world from a 
“lonely, antisocial world of random chance into a friend-
ly world”, where one “will never have to be alone again” 
(Grossman, 2010). In March 2018, the “Cambridge 
Analytica” scandal is the latest case in a series of rev-
elations about the dubious role of Facebook, and the 
corporate web more generally, in core democratic pro-
cesses. At the time of writing, Facebook is reproached 
for leaving hundreds of millions of its users exposed to 
harvesting of their private data and political manipu-
lation with so far unknown consequences (Greenfield, 
2018). Users’ anger and disillusionment expressed at 
the growing #DeleteFacebook movement on Twitter has 
many sources besides the latest data breach: targeting 
of Palestinian accounts critical of Israeli government 
policy (McKernan, 2016); marking the Rohingya activist 
group Arsa as a “dangerous organisation” in Myanmar; 
changing Facebook’s news algorithm to deprioritize 
content shared by businesses in favor of that produced 
by friends and family, treating at the same time “fragile 
democracies as laboratories” (Bell, 2018) to experiment 
1.  Cyprus University of Technology.
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on user behavior and news organizations depending on news to reach 
their audiences as “unfortunate lab rats” (Dojcinovic, 2017). A while back, 
Zuckerberg’s Internet.org project aiming at bringing internet access, along 
with basic connection to Facebook, to billions of people in developing coun-
tries also faced criticism: Wired magazine blatantly dismissed Zuckerberg’s 
rhetoric about being on a “mission to connect the world”, seeing instead a 
business strategy to “placate skeptical shareholders who worry the number 
of Facebook users is reaching a saturation point” (Tate, 2013).
This chapter attempts to tap into the relation between “algorithmic media” 
(McKelvey, 2014) and democracy under datafication, the fundamental par-
adigm shift brought about by big data (Milan and van der Velden, 2016). In 
particular, I seek to dissect some core modalities of algorithmic power and 
point out the major effects of big data and algorithms on governance, reality 
construction, culture and social identities – in short, on democracy at large. 
The chapter concludes by offering some reflections on the prospects of re-
sistance or agency of datafied subjects.
Key concepts: Big Data and Algorithmic Media
Skepticism toward big data and algorithms is growing and is not confined 
to academic thinking. Besides news reporting that increasingly scrutinizes 
internet moguls’ policies and strategies, questions are raised also by pop-
ular culture products. The Netflix science fiction series Black Mirror and 
a series of novels popular among teens (such as the Matched trilogy, The 
Maze Runner or the Hunger Games series) capture the zeitgeist and shape 
a new wave of neo-dystopian popular discourse (Miller, 2010). In these 
fictional worlds, every imaginable aspect of everyday life – and death 
– is algorithmically defined and human actors are involved in a struggle 
against emerging technologies (e.g. artificial intelligence, robotics, machine 
learning) that reap unintended consequences while undermining common 
values, long-established social structures and democratic institutions. At 
the same time, they feed a stream of public commentary around issues 
such the loss of human agency as free will and decision-making capacity 
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(Bassil-Mozorow, 2018) and the “corporate authoritarianism” of big data 
corporations, urging for “asserting public oversight of the Silicon Valley 
companies whose policies are dictating the future shape of our societies – 
as well as our personal lives” (Hussain, 2018). 
The relevant scholarly discussion is centered around what has come to be 
known as datafication, “the process of rendering into data aspects of the 
world not previously quantified” (Kennedy et al., 2015: 1) or “the transforma-
tion of part, if not most, of our lives into computable data” (Cheney-Lippold, 
2017: 276-278 [e-book]). Datafication entails the increasing collection of very 
large datasets of non-traditional data such as data about users’ logged be-
havior, social interactions, and preferences or cultural tastes (Rieder, 2016). 
In simple terms, big data is about “what people are, do and say” online 
(Couldry & Powell, 2014: 1). Both market actors and governments engage 
in continuous data-mining of enormous corpuses of amassed datasets at 
high speeds for various purposes. These vast datasets are processed by 
the use of algorithmic techniques, which are usually probabilistic and ca-
pable of learning by statistical induction (machine learning) (Rieder, 2016). 
Algorithms structure and sort people, relations, places and things (Beer, 
2009). More importantly, algorithms make decisions that are instantly pre-
sented to users, defining a given reality. An example is differential pricing 
online: a user’s location, her/his demographic characteristics and browsing 
behavior is compared to million other users’ shopping behavior to calculate 
an individualized price for a product “at the highest level the user has been 
estimated to support” (Rieder, 2016: 42); this occurs in the fraction of a sec-
ond and without human intervention besides the design and control stages. 
At the heart of algorithmic media, then, is the “computational generation 
of knowledge or decisions” by configuring computationally both problems 
and solutions of social phenomena (Gillespie, 2016: 26). Most of the media 
we use everyday are algorithmic media, in the sense that they are based 
on computational routines that make decisions and “dynamically adjust 
outputs and inputs” (McKelvey, 2014: 598). Algorithmic power (Bucher, 
2012) refers to the mediation of algorithms that is virtually ubiquitous; it 
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literally constitutes and enacts everyday life (Willson, 2017). Algorithms 
mediate access to knowledge (what can be found by search engines/crawl-
ers, filtering, and aggregation applications); evaluation of knowledge (what 
is considered relevant through search, scoring and ranking applications 
e.g. sorting in search engines and news feeds); and production of knowledge, 
through applications for the production of algorithmic journalism, cultural 
content (Hallinan & Striphas, 2016), even academic writing (Introna, 2016a). 
Algorithms also anticipate, through forecast applications that deduce our 
personal preferences and desires or inform our choices about how to dress 
based on weather forecasts (Roberge & Seyfert, 2016) or, more seriously, 
predict criminal behaviour (“predictive policing”) and inform decisions on 
offenders’ sentences (Angwin, Larson, Mattu & Kirchner, 2016) or predict 
“deadbeats” and inform decisions about who gets a loan. In other cases, 
algorithms can act as law enforcers: YouTube’s ContentID system identifies 
copyrighted works uploaded by users and flags them – an “algorithmic 
cop” able to “handle 72 hours of video material every minute” (McKelvey, 
2014: 598). They mediate preferences about the selection and consumption of 
products and services, through recommendation and scoring applications of 
commercial goods (Just & Latzer, 2017) e.g. the calculations of the shortest 
or more desirable path in our navigational devices (Roberge & Seyfert, 2016) 
or microtargeting advertising. Last but not least, algorithms mediate our 
social experience e.g. recommendations about professional and social con-
nections like colleagues, friends and partners or recommendations about 
who we will date via dating apps. 
But how do internet algorithms govern (Just & Latzer, 2017)? What does it 
mean that “power is increasingly in the algorithm”, as Scott Lash (2007: 71) 
has argued? What are the implications of algorithmic governance and why 
is it at odds with democracy? These questions were taken up recently by the 
so-called “soft sciences”, namely social sciences, humanities and cultural 
studies (Roberge & Seyfert, 2016). In what follows, I will discuss three key 
modalities of algorithmic power drawing on recent critical analysis in the 
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field: opaqueness, claims to epistemic superiority and post-hegemonic or 
ontological power.
Modalities of algorithmic power
I. Opaqueness or algorithms’ “blackbox” nature: accountability deficit
The “black box” metaphor (Pasquale, 2015), is often used to signify two 
features of algorithmic processes: first, that every action online that is 
translated into data is recorded and stored, like a black box in an airplane; 
second, that the algorithms themselves remain typically hidden, as they 
are valuable trade secrets and are thus protected by law as such. The fact 
that algorithms are “deliberately obfuscated” (Gillespie, 2014: 192) has two 
implications for democracy. First, it establishes a new and fundamental 
form of “digital inequality in algorithmic reality production” (Just & Latzer, 
2017: 251) between companies and users. Only some privileged users of 
corporate social media, such as commercial partners and advertisers, are 
offered preferential access to the inner workings of these systems and get 
a “glimpse under the hood”; at the same time, they are bound with nondis-
closure agreements (Gillespie, 2014: 185). Second, democratic control and 
accountability are rendered difficult, if not impossible, because the evalua-
tive criteria by which algorithmic decision-making occurs remain elusive. 
Algorithms act as delegates, as Latour would say, much like news editors 
or parliamentarians (Just & Latzer, 2017), but with reduced transparency, 
accountability or moral obligations. An example is the #amazonfail event, 
when all gay-themed books had been removed by search pages because 
they had been classed as “adult” so that the search pages would be more 
“family-friendly”. As Gillespie points out (2016: 24), blaming the algorithm 
is a convenient means for warding off criticism when companies must 
justify their services, explaining away errors and unwanted outcomes by 
pointing to “the algorithm” as responsible for particular results or conclu-
sions (Morozov, 2014: 142).
An additional problem is the diffusion of responsibility, an intrinsic char-
acteristic of algorithmic systems. Although we tend to treat algorithms as 
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single artifacts, in reality they are very messy systems in which many dif-
ferent people are involved (designers, owners, operators, users) – so messy 
that even programmers and software engineers are increasingly unable to 
grasp them in their entirety. In light of this complexity, even measures such 
as the release of source codes might not be a sufficient solution for more 
democratic control over algorithmic processes (Just & Latzer, 2017).
II. Claims to Epistemic Superiority: Objectivity as ideology
This deficit in accountability is counterbalanced by an explicitly ideological 
claim, often put forth by algorithms: the claim of their epistemic superiori-
ty as objective arbiters and decision-makers. An example of such claims is 
Tewell’s (2016) critical semiotic analysis of the Google’s legendary search 
landing page. As he writes (p. 297): 
Upon visiting Google’s homepage, users find a white, mostly blank page, 
containing a cheerful logo and a single search box. The white back-
ground is an important design choice, signifying a type of neutralized 
blank slate, seemingly open to locating whatever the searcher wishes to 
find and passing no judgment.
The white background and the simplicity of the interface conveys the “ap-
pearance of stark objectivity” (ibid), combined with notions of playfulness 
and fun. And while Google intervenes to omit results associated with por-
nography or copyrighted material, it refrains from doing the same when 
its autocomplete function unintentionally reproduces stereotypes through 
suggested terms that are racist, sexist, and homophobic or enable users to 
flag those suggestions as offensive, as other websites do2 (Tewell, 2016: 299; 
Baker & Potts, 20133). As web companies actively construct the articula-
2.   This has changed, as now (April 2018) Google offers the option to “report inappropriate prediction” 
in the main Google search interface, selecting a reason from a list (hateful, sexually explicit, violent, 
dangerous and harmful activity”. To request content changes for legal reasons, the user is directed to 
Google’s legal help page (https://support.google.com/legal/answer/3110420). 
3.   Baker & Potts (2013) examined the autocomplete facility of Google search, which suggests search 
certain keywords or phrases when a user types a query. The study investigated auto-completed 
questions about particular identity groups and found that certain groups were linked to particular 
stereotypes or qualities e.g. gay and black identities were associated with negative stereotypes more 
often than other groups. Although these questions appeared because users had typed them in Google 
search, auto-completion algorithms feature them prominently and it is likely that they will be clicked 
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tion of algorithms as impartial and objective through their design choices 
(Gillespie 2014), most users tend to place blind faith in the quality of search 
results, as relevant studies show (Pan et al., 2007; Hannak et al., 2013). 
Algorithmic objectivity is evoked in other crucial areas of decision-making, 
for example judgments about who gets employed, who is granted a loan or 
welfare benefits, even for judicial decisions about offenders’ sentences. In 
2016, in a now well-known investigation, ProPublica published an analysis 
of algorithms used by US courts to predict criminal behaviour and deter-
mine offenders’ sentences, which was found to be prejudiced against blacks 
(Angwin, Larson, Mattu & Kirchner, 2016). Algorithmic bias in terms of 
race (the “coded gaze”) was found in facial recognition software, as dark-
-skinned people were not consistently detected and photos of people of 
Asian descent were not validated by an automated passport renewal sys-
tem4 (Buolamwini, 2016). Sweeney (2013) looked at online advertisements 
and found that advertisements for public records on a person and adver-
tisements suggesting arrest appeared more often for black-sounding names 
than for white-sounding names on Google.com and Reuters.com. Similarly, 
Ananny (2011) observed the Android Market recommending a sex-offender 
location app to users who downloaded Grindr, a social networking tool for 
gay men, associating homosexuality with predatory behaviour. The prob-
lem with these incidents is not so much their bias (after all, all systems 
of knowledge production are biased), but the claim of objectivity put forth 
by commercial and state actors to justify decisions. Rieder (2016) speaks 
of “empiricism on steroids” to criticize the epistemic character of big data, 
which privilege an “economic morality [as a] guiding logic that conditions 
and directs our daily lives” (Allen, 2012: 19, cited in Rieder, 2016: 41). In pol-
itics, especially when traditional institutions and modes of authority suffer 
from legitimation crisis (Habermas, 1973) and are perceived as “inefficient, 
on more often, further enhancing their visibility. Baker & Potts (2013) hypothesize that these questions 
have the capacity to induce effects e.g. they can cause offence, they can validate stereotypes for users 
already holding prejudiced opinions or they can increase the likelihood of adoption of these prejudices 
for users who have not critically engaged with issues for stereotyping (e.g. very young users).
4.   While this is an unintentional racial bias, this classification still “reifies whiteness as normal 
and blackness as abnormal”, possibly rooted in real-world inequalities in the computer engineering 
industry (Cheney-Lippold, 2017: 387-389 [e-book]). 
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partial, paternalistic, corrupt, or illegitimate” (Rieder, 2016: 43), fully auto-
mated decisions are posited not only as cost-effective but also as neutral or 
democratic and thus as socially and ethically desirable (ibid). Yet, despite 
being framed as disinterested readings of reality, algorithms represent a 
particular “knowledge logic”, yet one that is rarely identified and critiqued 
as such. As Gillespie (2014: 168) pointedly argues, “that we are now turning 
to algorithms to identify what we need to know is as momentous as hav-
ing relied on credentialed experts, the scientific method, common sense, or 
the word of God”. Therefore, the assertion of algorithmic objectivity plays 
a profound ideological role, “in many ways an equivalent role to the norm 
of objectivity in Western journalism” (Gillespie (2014: 181), which seems to 
maintain (or at least not challenge) the structured and unequal character of 
contemporary societies. 
III. Ontological legitimation: post-hegemonic power
The third point refers to the ontological modality of algorithmic media. 
There is a fundamental difference between traditional and algorithmic 
media in regard to how meaning is constituted. Within traditional media 
(such as the domain of news) a key modality of power was discursive in 
nature, namely it was exerted through the production of content and the 
“closure” of its meaning. In algorithmic media, the main currency is “data”, 
produced by users, often unwittingly. In the words of Couldry & Powell 
(2014: 3), “many everyday activities now produce data without requiring 
human meaning-construction (or even basic consent)”. For instance, when 
interacting with sensor networks, we are not producing “content”, namely 
messages with constructed meaning, but we produce “data” e.g. “temper-
ature readings, status updates, location coordinates, tracks, traces and 
check-ins” (ibid). This data, aggregated and calculated, acquire meaning 
“not semantically (through expression and interpretation) but through pro-
cessing – especially the matching of metadata” (Couldry & Powell, 2014: 3; 
Boellstorf, 2013). Moreover, the meaning of this “content” is available only 
to data owners (corporate platforms), who use them to make profit, produc-
ing a fundamental power asymmetry. Users, typically unaware about this 
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profiling, have no opportunity to “talk back” and challenge this information 
nor use it for their own purposes.
In a similar vein, several researchers have sided with Scott Lash’s view 
about algorithms’ deep embeddedness in the texture of everyday life that 
has changed the nature of hegemony (Beer, 2009; Couldry & Powell, 2014; 
Roberge & Seyfert, 2016). Lash (2007) argued that power is “post-hegemonic” 
in the information era, and domination works ontologically instead of dis-
cursively. The ontological modality of algorithmic power operates at the level 
of everyday routines and mundane use (Roberge & Seyfert, 2016). Social me-
dia affordances reward users’ correct behavior and punish their failure (or 
refusal) to follow the rules. In this sense, algorithms exert a kind of power 
over users, which is neither symbolic nor semiotic but works “through the 
technical structuring of a way of being”, as Bucher (2012: 1170) argues draw-
ing on Foucault (1977). What follows is that the decision-making power of 
algorithms often eludes reflective thinking. To give an example, traditional 
media involve enduring representations (e.g. the masthead of a newspaper 
or the nightly television news broadcast), which allow, under certain cir-
cumstances, reflexive processes by audiences e.g. “oppositional readings” 
of hegemonic texts (see McKelvey, 2014). Algorithmic media, on the other 
hand, lack such enduring representations. An example is the results of a 
Google search or the suggestions of the autocomplete function. The logic 
behind these outputs is not uncovered, representations (texts) do not endure 
and “by default moments of reflection evaporate” (McKelvey, 2014: 603). Due 
to algorithmic media’s “continuous temporality” (McKelvey, 2014) and their 
a-semiotic (namely ontological) character (Langlois 2011), their function is 
experienced rather than consciously ref lected upon, and so are their effects. 
Implications of algorithmic governance
Although the field of critical algorithm research is still young, studies with-
in the broad area of Science and Technology Studies has unearthed some 
implications of algorithmic power that seem antithetical to democracy. In 
what follows, I will briefly examine four issues, namely personalization, 
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microtargeting, construction of algorithmic identities, and affirmation of 
hegemonic values.
I. Personalization: Individuation and polarization
Most algorithmic media such as search engines, corporate social media 
and various other websites (e.g. online news media, amazon) employ selec-
tion mechanisms like recommendations, digests, search results, targeted 
online ads etc. to maximize user satisfaction by personalizing their servic-
es and outputs. Personalization occurs based on user socio-demographics, 
previous user behavior, location, user connectedness but also other users’ 
behavioral patterns. Thus, assumed identity characteristics determine what 
users can see (and cannot see) online. The exact parameters and the extent 
of personalization cannot be known, as algorithms are proprietary secrets. 
Pariser (2011) argued that Google uses 57 signals to personalize search re-
sults, while Facebook is reported using approximately 100,000 factors in 
2013 to algorithmically choose the best stories for News Feed (McGee, 2013; 
Eslami et al., 2015). An experimental study (Hannak et al., 2013) found sig-
nificant personalization on Google search: 11.7% of search results differed 
from user to user, according to whether users were logged in to Google and 
their location (IP address). Notably, personalization was highest for queries 
related to political issues and news.
Personalized results produce “different individual realities” (Just & Latzer, 
2017: 248) and thus amplify “existing audience fragmentation and indi-
vidualization trends” (ibid), which are often seen as curtailing democratic 
processes. Individualization can weaken common societal bonds and erode 
common norms and institutions (Just and Latzer, 2017: 248), resulting in 
what is called “dangerous individuals” (Schroer, 2008). At the same time, it 
produces “endangered individuals” (Schroer, 2008), namely people subjected 
to more effective control, privacy threats and surveillance, and is associated 
with the so-called “filter bubbles” (Pariser, 2011) with echo-chamber effects 
(Sunstein, 2007). Popularized by Eli Pariser, the “filter bubble” refers to the 
diminishing of information diversity and the amplification of political polar-
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ization, as users are enclosed in an endless loop defined by their previous 
actions online and exposed to content tailored especially for them and their 
pre-existing attitudes, interests, and prejudices. In other words, we are led 
into “bubbles” “where we find only the news we expect and the political 
perspectives we already hold dear” (Gillespie, 2014: 188). Another study 
(Epstein & Robertson, 2015) investigated the impact of search results in the 
context of elections, through five experiments of about 4,500 undecided vot-
ers of the United States and India. They found evidence of a “search engine 
manipulation effect”. The study demonstrated that biased search rankings 
of candidates can shift the voting preferences of undecided voters by at least 
20%, with a much higher shift for some demographic groups – a percentage 
more than enough to judge the outcome of elections today in most countries. 
Moreover, the bias in search results ranking can easily be masked so that 
people are not aware of it. Since research results are typically customized, 
we can assume that they are constantly biased, although not (necessarily) 
by deliberate manipulation. 
II. Microtargeting: Creation of “impressionable subjects”
The idea of the filter bubble is taken to its extremes if we consider the 
contemporary techniques applied by platform owners for targeting inter-
net users with specific messages. We consider two examples, one in the 
area of commercial advertising and one in the field of political marketing. 
In contemporary online advertising algorithms are used to produce what 
Introna (2016b) calls “impressionable subjects”, namely subjects that are 
“highly likely to convert” (p. 26) – buy a product or “buy” an idea. This idea 
is based on the Foucaultian concept of subjects being constituted through 
regimes of knowledge (and the power effects knowledge induces) (Foucault, 
1980; 1991). As Introna (2016b) explains, while traditional advertising was 
broadcast to more or less mass audiences, advertising online enacts, al-
gorithmically, “individuated” and ultimately “branded” impressionable 
subjects. “Individuated subjects” are produced by the use of cookies and 
third-party ad-servers, which can “stalk” the user as he or she browses. This 
way, users are profiled in detail: through the “tracks” one leaves behind, 
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“the browser/user can become segmented and produced as an individuat-
ed subject who might be interested in a particular type of advertisement” 
(Introna, 2016b: 36). This profile allows ad-serving companies to engage in 
behavioural targeting by a fine-grained microtargeting of users with adver-
tisements. For example, Google associates users with certain keywords 
and shows “relevant” ads each time a user types these keywords in search, 
Gmail or YouTube (Introna, 2016b: 37). Furthermore, machine learning is 
used to build models of behavior i.e. categorize or classify behavior, match 
and cluster similar behavior and predict future behavior. Through machine 
learning algorithms, the unique, highly individuated subject is produced, 
which is also highly impressionable (Introna, 2016b: 39). In simple terms, 
if my profile (based on my past behavior) matches the profile of a person 
who purchased a product, I will be matched to a brand (tagged as of “high 
brand affinity”) and I will be shown the relevant advertisements. When I 
show up online, a real-time auction is sent and the product with the higher 
bid gets the right to display the ad to me (Introna, 2016b: 41). Even the form 
and content of the ad can be customized to fit my profile. The more data are 
provided, the more subtle the models become. As Introna argues (2016b: 
41), this way, “a subject … has become fully and completely branded” (origi-
nal emphasis).
Given that the web has long been handed over to the market, these corpo-
rate practices have not been met with significant criticism – at least not in 
the domain of public discourse. Yet, it was a matter of time before these 
very practices entered the political field, leading scholars to assume that 
“algorithms considerably affect the way public opinion is formed” and “gov-
ern the public agenda” (Just and Latzer, 2017: 249). A prime example is the 
recent events that marked the 2016 US presidential elections. As was re-
cently revealed, more than 3,000 Russia-linked Facebook ads were bought 
and shown to specific Facebook users, promoting inflammatory messages 
on divisive issues (Shane & Isaac, 2017). Fake news also targeted specific 
individuals with given political opinions. This became possible due to the 
model of behavioural targeting described above, which allows social media 
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owners and other actors purchasing their services to identify subgroups ac-
cording characteristics like religious and political beliefs, taste in TV shows 
and music, as well as emotional traits. Algorithms can also identify users’ 
“hot-button issues” and identify people that are most susceptible to persua-
sion (Calabresi, 2017). 
The work of ideological construction regarding the “like economy” (Gerlitz 
& Helmond, 2013) is revealed if we look at how the US elections incident was 
covered by prominent mainstream media, namely its framing as a “Russia 
vs American democracy story” or a Trump-related story. Journalists and 
government officials tended to frame the event as a major blow to democra-
cy. For instance, Time magazine reports how the “Russian hacking” was able 
to “manipulate public opinion”, being “the most visible battle in an ongoing 
information war against global democracy”5 (Calabresi, 2017, my emphasis) 
and “a threat to the very foundation of our democratic political system”6 (ibid, 
my emphasis), “undermining the credibility of American democracy” (ibid). 
In fact, in a revamped Cold-War spirit, the article stays clear of criticizing 
the data power of corporate platforms, but it does criticize the US govern-
ment for not doing enough “social media propaganda” due to a tight control 
over foreign surveillance programs7.
In this piece of reporting, protection of civil liberties emerges as a problem, 
as an impediment. Although press reports now increasingly criticize the 
role of corporate social media in the process, they rarely go to the heart of 
the problem, namely the political economy of the internet and the rampant 
commercialization of social media, which has allowed corporate practices 
to grow into extremely sophisticated methods of fine-grained surveillance 
and identity construction, exempted from democratic control and trans-
5.   This statement is attributed to officials at the FBI, at the CIA and in Congress.
6.   Attributed to former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper.
7.   The relevant passage is as follows: “But if Russia is clearly moving forward, it’s less clear how 
active the U.S. has been [in information-warfare] […] There are signs that the U.S. may be playing in 
this field, however. From 2010 to 2012, the U.S. Agency for International Development established and 
ran a ‘Cuban Twitter’ network designed to undermine communist control on the island […] the U.S. 
government hired a contractor to profile Cuban cell phone users, categorizing them as ‘pro-revolution,’ 
‘apolitical’ or ‘antirevolutionary’ […] In the U.S., public scrutiny of such programs is usually enough to 
shut them down […]” (Calabresi, 2017).
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parency obligations. This idea is compatible with a fundamental ideology 
permeating the data industry, the idea of the “sovereign interactive consum-
er” (Gehl, 2014). As Gehl argues, the ideology of self-regulation, pushed by 
advertising and marketing companies, is based on an imagined user who is 
conceived as a free and powerful subject, a “master of digital flows” (2014: 
110), able to make informed choices and take on the risks related to her/
his activity online. What follows is the shifting of responsibility from data 
industries and regulatory agencies to the “enlightened” user, doing away 
with demands for accountability placed on the companies themselves and 
constraining regulatory frameworks that limit the operation of “networked 
new media capitalism” (Gehl, 2014: 113).
III. Algorithmic identity construction: production of user subjectivities
From a culturalist perspective, a substantial challenge for democratic poli-
tics is related to algorithmic profiling and the production of specific subject 
positions or user subjectivities. Social media infer and assign to users (and 
non-users) categories of identity (such as gender, race or class), based on 
profiles that are created for them from information about their web-surfing 
habits. Cheney-Lippold (2011) calls it “algorithmic identity” and data activ-
ists call it “digital shadows”8. Algorithmic identities or “measurable types” 
are “actionable analytical constructs of classificatory meaning” (Cheney- 
-Lippold, 2017: 493-494 [e-book]). A crucial question is whether these identi-
ty representations constitute digital subjects, namely “produce” or reinforce 
identity perceptions of users and further dictate their online behaviour. In 
other words, how does algorithmic profiling perceive or construct its sub-
jects? How does the construction of algorithmic identity affect users’ sense 
of self? As Bucher (2017: 35) put it, “to what extent [do] we come to see and 
identify ourselves through the ‘eyes’ of the algorithm”? Algorithmic identity 
construction is problematic for two reasons. First, these inferred identities 
increasingly condition which content we are exposed to online, based on our 
assumed identity characteristics. Recommendations are a usual form, as are 
8.   See the data activism project Me and My Shadow (http://myshadow.org/).
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targeted advertisements and all sorts of personalized content, but also inter-
faces in general. To give an example, if a user is assigned a gendered male 
identity, it is more likely to be exposed to content that has been related to 
a “typical” male user (Weber and Castillo, 2010). These identifications have 
the potential to determine “real” identities. Recommendations online can 
softly persuade users towards normalized behaviour as they “tell us who 
we are, what we want, and who we should be” (Cheney-Lippold, 2011: 177). 
For instance, as gender categorizations condition user experiences online 
and determine to which content they are exposed, there is a risk of further 
consolidating and solidifying those identities and their meaning – a kind of 
“disciplinary normalization” that speaks to “some perceived naturality of 
gendered performance” (Cheney-Lippold, 2017: 1106-1112 [e-book]). Friz & 
Gehl (2016) identified “gender scripts” in the sign-up process of Pinterest, 
“a script that hails an idealized, feminized user” (p. 688) and seeks to in-
scribe hegemonic performances of femininity into the use of the platform 
i.e. passivity is favored over activity, curation over creation, image over text, 
collaboration over competition (p. 700). 
Second, algorithms define the actual meaning of these identities, namely 
what “maleness”, “whiteness” or “working class” is or should be online; 
which interests, tastes, habits algorithmically categorized users have or 
should have. To be sure, the construction of social identities in the public 
discourse has always been embedded in power relations (and struggles); 
what is novel here is that the algorithmic construction of identity, opaque as 
it is within proprietary algorithms, is insulated from civil and critical dis-
course and the conventional mechanisms of political intervention (Becker & 
Stalder, 2009). As Cheney-Lippold (2011: 178) argues, “we are effectively los-
ing control in defining who we are online, or more specifically we are losing 
ownership over the meaning of the categories that constitute our identities”. 
In terms of cultural theory, algorithmic identities may operate as a “closure” 
that defines subject positions and stabilizes hegemony (albeit temporarily). 
As Cheney-Lippold (2017: 1156-1162 [e-book]) puts it, “arbitrary closure is 
[…] a conceptual stop to space and time in order to analyze and make as-
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sertions about who we are. Not limited to an algorithm’s output, digital 
computers produce arbitrary closures every time they calculate a function”. 
While users can resist this “hailing”, in Althusserian terms, “power […] is 
asymmetrically produced. The algorithms have intimate knowledge of the 
subject, yet the subject is quite ignorant of them” (Introna, 2016b: 46). On 
the other hand, Cheney-Lippold (2017) makes the compelling argument that 
algorithmic identities, fluid and unstable as they are, can de-essentialize 
traditional conventions and rigid established referents of identity and thus 
can be liberating. At the same time, however, our identities lose their history 
and thus lose their politics, as “algorithmically produced categories replace 
the politicized language of race, gender, and class” (p. 116-118 [e-book]). To 
quote the novelist Tom Robbins, “you can’t tilt windmills when they won’t 
stand still”9.
IV. Affirmation of hegemonic (capitalist) values
The process of subjectivation described above is often related to hegemon-
ic, capitalist-asserting values. To begin with, the development of web 2.0 
has intensified the logic of commodification. Commodification concerns 
not only the data and the content produced by social media users, but also 
social relations themselves, as almost all kinds of sociality are coded into 
proprietary algorithms and are moved from public to corporate space (van 
Dijck, 2013; Cheney-Lippold, 2017). Users of digital communities also be-
come commodities, especially when they represent an attractive, sellable 
demographic profile (Olsson, 2014). This is related also to biopolitical forms 
of control, as shown by Karppi’s (2013) interesting analysis of memorial-
ized accounts of deceased Facebook users. Facebook implicitly promotes 
the conversion of deceased users into memorial accounts, instead of their 
removal, which acquire use-value and exchange-value (ibid; see also Lash & 
Lury, 2007: 8). Second, the content in the social web becomes standardized 
so that it becomes manageable and sellable (van Dijck, 2013). An example 
is what Hallinan and Striphas (2016) call “algorithmic culture” to describe 
9.   Tom Robbins (1980). Still Life with Woodpecker. New York: Bantam Books.
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how Netflix produces cultural content (hugely popular movies) based on al-
gorithms that determine what audiences want. This results in people being 
exposed to more of the same, based on what algorithms infer they already 
like. A third concern is the promotion of neoliberal economic norms and 
values. For instance, a social norm that is being created and reproduced by 
corporate networks is a constant prompt to consume and keep consuming 
at a frenzy rate (Mager, 2012), legitimizing consumer culture and constitut-
ing citizens as capitalist subjects (Dahlberg, 2010). Other prevailing norms 
of online sociality are hierarchy, competition, and a winner-takes-all mind-
set (van Dijck, 2013). An example is the function of Facebook metrics: as 
users are constantly told how many friends they have, how many messag-
es are pending, how many likes a post has, are being compelled to exceed 
their own metrics and produce more content for the company to monetize 
(Grosser, 2014). As Gehl (2014: 15) pointedly argues, “because hegemonic 
social media is produced within informational capitalism, the inherent ine-
qualities of that system are translated, ported, or simply replicated within 
new media software”. Furthermore, 
“ […] new media capitalism as practiced by such sites as Facebook, 
Google, and Twitter has had terrible consequences: it reduces online 
interaction to binary declarations of like-it-or-not consumer choices; it 
hides and inures us to the surveillance systems operating underneath 
its surface; it relies on the free labor of its users to build its content while 
the site owners make billions by selling user data and stock in their 
companies; […] and it promotes a culture of anxiety and immediacy over 
depth. In short, contemporary social media hardly seems compatible 
with democracy […]” (ibid).
The (hazy) face of resistance in the age of big data
Critical algorithm research is a new but especially prolific field, with a sig-
nificant volume of research work being published at an increasing rate10 
10.   A non-exhaustive list of recent works includes: Amoore, & Piotukh, 2016; Berry & Fagerjord, 2017; 
Bucher, 2018; Chun, 2016; Hargittai & Christian, 2015; Kennedy, 2016; Lanier, 2017; Noble, 2018; 
Schäfer & van Es, 2017; Srinivasan & Fish, 2017; Tung-Hui, 2016.
Algorithmic media and democracy: 
power and resistance under datafication28
theorizing algorithmic processes and uncovering their implications. Yet, 
thus far much less attention has been paid to the prospects of resistance 
or agency of datafied citizens. In the face of the ramifications of data power 
for democracy, we urgently need critical research on algorithmic power, 
which will investigate, on the one hand, “whose interests are being served 
and whose interests are being denied or made invisible” (Langlois & Elmer, 
2013: 7-8) in the operation of algorithmic systems, and on the other hand, 
what are the alternatives and the prospects for users’ oppositional action. 
Regarding the latter, a host of intriguing questions emerges. For instance, 
how will user resistance look like in the age of big data? If Lash is right 
in that power is “more sinister in a post-hegemonic age” and “works from 
within” (p. 59), through performativity, at level of being, how can it be 
unmasked? Will the “battle” be fought discursively, institutionally or algo-
rithmically, through the use of applications? Is the answer more regulation, 
setting limits on how corporate algorithms are being used by political and 
commercial actors, copying the regulatory frameworks of traditional me-
dia? Will alternative social media, based on a different political economy, be 
built, and will they be viable and able to confront the corporate social media 
giants? Or will resistance flourish at the fringes of civil society, in the form 
of “drifting” instead of discursive contestation (Lash, 2007)? Or, maybe, da-
tafied users are less vulnerable and powerless than usually assumed. What 
Cheney-Lippold (2017) calls “the else” is composed of instances in which we 
sense, if not outright acknowledge, that “something is askew and affected” 
(p. 3096-3099 [e-book]) with the output of algorithms such as “getting an 
advertisement for baby formula when you’re past menopause”; “the else 
serves as the procedural moment when human reflexivity enters into this 
new datafied subject relation” (p. 2960-2968 [e-book]) and can serve as the 
basis for a subject position of resistance and nonincorporation.
In the emerging field of data activism, opposition becomes more explicit. 
Data activism projects attempt to oppose corporate data power by using he-
gemony’s own weapons, namely code that creates oppositional affordances. 
A recent study of eight data activism projects (Papa & Milioni, 2017; Milioni 
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& Papa, 2018) showed that data activists expose the fallacies of existing 
systems and endorse oppositional use positions (see Shaw, 2017), either by 
providing a counter-hegemonic “reading” of social media or by facilitating 
user actions that can modify designed affordances and encompass a sub-
versive potential. For example, Data Selfie11 is an application that tracks a 
user’s actions on Facebook and offer her an aggregated visualization of her 
Facebook usage in real time e.g. the amount of time she spends daily on 
Facebook, her top preferences in terms of pages and posts, and a personality 
prediction based on her engagement with Facebook content. More impor-
tantly, users are offered a reconstruction of their algorithmic identities that 
are inferred by their data i.e. demographic features, emotional traits, con-
sumption habits, cultural preferences, and political or religious orientation. 
Milioni & Papa (2018) argue that applications such as Data Selfie offer users 
oppositional meta-affordances; as they reconstruct users’ Facebook-related 
algorithmic identities, they “render user data meaning-ful also for ordinary 
users, before or while Facebook makes them meaningful, malleable, and 
open to manipulation for advertisers” (ibid). Other data activism tools get in 
the way of corporate media, by hindering or distorting their operation, usu-
ally by obfuscation. An example of such “anti-affordances” is Ben Grosser’s 
Go Rando application12, which randomizes the six emotions that Facebook 
allows users to select when clicking the ‘Like’ button. The purpose of this 
application is to obfuscate a user’s emotional profile on Facebook, filling 
it with noise, as a means of users’ opposition to “emotional manipulation” 
and “surveillance and algorithmic decision-making” (Grosser, 2018). By en-
gaging in a public display of emotional play, a kind of prank, users suspend 
the authorization they have given to Facebook to mediate their emotions13 
and at the same time signal to other users the possibility for playful subver-
sion. Milioni & Papa (2018) argue that “ordinary” users, by embracing the 
11.   http://dataselfie.it/#/.
12.   http://bengrosser.com/projects/go-rando/.
13.   The mediating role of Facebook regarding user emotions assumed here can be best understood 
through Latour’s (2005) concept of the “mediators”, which, contrary to mere intermediaries, 
“transform, translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry” 
(p. 39).
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oppositional affordances created by data activism projects, are offered the 
possibility to reflexively modify their behaviour online and affect the very 
algorithms that produce them as datafied subjects. However, despite its po-
tential, data activism is constituted more as “personalized acts of defiance 
that do not seem to be weaved into a collective representation of ‘we-ness’” 
(Milioni & Papa, 2018). Is it possible that such ordinary users’ “ruses” (De 
Certeau, 1984), acquire a collective dimension and compose a “network 
of an antidiscipline” (ibid), which will erode dominant order from within? 
These are some crucial and fascinating questions for students of critical re-
search in the years to come.
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TRUTH WITHOUT DEPTH, HOPE WITHOUT  
A HORIZON – THE DYSTOPIA OF DISCOURSE  
IN “WITHOUT SKY”
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Abstract: On March 12, 2014, the short story “Without Sky”, 
signed by Natan Dubovitsky was published in the Russian 
magazine Russky Pionner. This dystopian story, probably 
influenced by Edwyn Abbot’s Flatland, and H.G. Wells’ The 
Sleeper Awakens, is generally attributed to Vladislav Surkov, 
one of Vladimir Putin’s most trusted advisors.
In this narrative, we discover a future after the 5th World 
War, when large parts of the population suffered brain dam-
ages that only allow them to see in two dimensions and 
understand dicotomic discourse. In a world dominated by 
perpetual mobilization for non-linear wars, fear and technol-
ogy flatten perceptions and language, until the bidimensional 
villages rise against the cities, whose inhabitants still remem-
ber that there are other words beyond “yes” and “no”, “good” 
and “evil”.
Drawing from this mysterious story, and the current debates 
on the nature of fact and truth, I will attempt to decode the 
portrait of political speech in this short fiction, and how it 
correlates with the endless problem of facts and political dis-
course, that goes from Gorgias, who prided himself on his 
ability of arguing in favor of anything, until the problems of 
political action of Michel Foucault and Jürgen Habermas.
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Truth without depth, hope without a horizon – 
The dystopia of discourse in “Without Sky”40
Language and Dimension
Language is a three-dimensional being. It lives precariously on the balance 
of three different elements: a speaker, a listener, and something they have 
in common – something the first two consider to be true, or at least credi-
ble, at the moment of communication.
This third element is what gives meaning to language. Without it, words are 
little more than sounds possibly pleasing to the ear. This third dimension 
of meaning is what establishes language as a means of communication and 
expression. Meaning is the abyss, or the wall or the plateau, upon which 
both speakers can jump over, or avoid, or thread upon, to fulfill their com-
municational journey. It is the solid element that gives thickness to words 
and sentences.
Yet, like depth, like walls, like abysses, meaning is also what brings 
shadow and uncertainty to communication. Nothing is clearer and more 
unambiguous than a meaningless word, because everyone can agree on its 
meaninglessness. However, a meaningful sentence entails negotiating what 
is that meaning and what meaning can bring to the circumstances of the 
persons involved in communication.
The problem of three-dimensionality in communication is what caught my 
interest on the short story “Without Sky” by Vladislav Surkov.
Obviously, a significant part of the meaning of the story draws from who its 
author is. Although the impact of autobiography in literature is an ambigu-
ous element, since all fiction is and isn’t, simultaneously, autobiographical 
– at the very least, the writing of fiction is, by itself, a life event – it is una-
voidable considering the political background of Vladimir Surkov story in 
understanding the political fiction he wrote.
Surkov, born in 1964, is a Russian author and politician, whose political life 
has been closely entwined with the government of Vladimir Putin in Russia. 
Surkov has been Putin’s deputy chief, deputy prime-minister, personal ad-
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visor, and is sometimes credited by some to be the inventor of the term 
“managed democracy” to describe the political system of Russia.
In parallel with his political career, Surkov has also worked as a writer, and 
occasionally as a theatre director. 
“Without Sky”, published on the magazine for scouts, Russky Pionner, nr. 46, 
on May 2014, is probably his most well-known work outside of Russia, and 
it was published under the pseudonym “Natan Dubovitsky”, the typical pen 
name of Surkov to write Science Fiction.
A world without sky
There was no sky over our village. That’s why we went to the city to watch 
the moon and birds (…) On one of the hills, where the brick church stood, 
they even built an observation platform. (Surkov, 2004)
“Without Sky” describes a world where a series of “non linear wars” have 
taken place. These wars are different from conventional wars due to the fact 
of being multiform and continuous, depending on an endless conflict – tak-
ing shape on different levels and fronts, not among clear groups of countries 
but inside a maelstrom of forces.
This was the first non-linear war. In the primitive wars of the nineteenth, 
twentieth and other middle centuries, the fight was usually between two 
sides (…) But now, (…) It was all against all. (…) Hundreds of thousands of 
airplanes, helicopters and rockets destroyed each other throughout the day 
in the silence of the tomb. Even falling, they were silent. Sometimes dying 
pilots screamed out, but rarely, because almost all of the machines were 
pilotless. (Surkov, 2004)
Connecting the concept of “war” with the concept of “adventure”, by Georg 
Simmel (2004), by assuming that both these concepts address particularly 
momentous events, the fact that these wars have no specific space, time, 
methodology or even authors, reframes these wars not as “adventure”, not 
as something that breaks with the conventions of everyday reality, but they 
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become everyday reality. That is, these “non linear wars” become undistin-
guishable from ordinary life. In fact, although there is a mention of “after 
the war”, we cannot be totally certain in the story if these wars have end-
ed or not, probably because they became the ordinary life of the fictional 
characters, who are no longer able to be sure if they live at war or in peace. 
Therefore, the “silence of the tomb” can allude to the fact that this is a silent, 
almost invisible war, but it can also mean that the normal noises of war 
have become so normal that people no longer pay attention to them.
The world of this endless war is divided between city-dwellers and 
country-dwellers. These country-dwellers have become victims of the war, 
losing their sense of depth, and starting to experience the world in two 
dimensions.
My brain was just touched by its black and stif ling presence. Something 
boiled out of my brain and evaporated: the third dimension, height. (…) I 
saw a two-dimensional world, endless in length and width, but without 
height. Without sky. (Surkov, 2004)
This two-dimensional perception of the world gradually becomes a way of 
thinking about the world, and country-dwellers lose all idea of ever feeling a 
third dimension, height, or understanding the complexity of reality.
Height, or depth, according to the perspective of the onlooker, is the dimen-
sion of verticality, of individuality. George Lakoff (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) 
points out that height is a dimension symbolically connected with morality 
and hierarchy, so that erasing this dimension of the mind can have the am-
biguous consequence of erasing social differences, but also of erasing any 
ethical concern. However, the story suggests that this “height” is mostly 
connected with a moral dimension, but seen under a positive light. 
our very thoughts lost the concept of height. We became two-dimensional. 
We understood only “yes” and “no”, only “black” and “white”. There was no 
ambiguity, no half-tones, no saving graces. (Surkov, 2004)
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This cognitive difference between country-dwellers and city-dwellers 
makes city-dwellers pity the country-dwellers at first, and they try to find a 
cure, but the reaction of the country-dwellers is to plot revenge against the 
city-dwellers, who they regard as being deceitful and suspicious, and to try 
to impose a flat, bidimensional worldview on them. That is, the ones who 
don’t see the sky, the horizon, rebel against those who are still aware of its 
existence. The suggestion is of those who hold a simpler understanding of 
the world trying to overthrow those who have a more nuanced view, so as 
to impose a more fundamentalistic world order.
The short-story finishes with an open and ominous ending that leaves the 
reader puzzled about the real meaning of the story:
We founded the Society and prepared a revolt of the simple, two-dimensional 
against the complex and sly, against those who do not answer “yes” or “no”, 
who do not say “white” or “black”, who know some third word, many, many 
third words, empty, deceptive, confusing the way, obscuring the truth. (…) 
We will come tomorrow. We will conquer or perish. (Surkov, 2004)
I will be the first to admit that this story has several problems as a work 
of literature: its language is limited, with few suggestive images, an unbal-
anced narrative flow, with some elements very detailed and others which 
feel quite sketchy, even if they are supposed to be central to the story. 
The ending is somehow inconclusive, making this story feel more like the 
rushed synopsis of a longer fiction work than a fully-fledged, balanced and 
evocative short story.
Yet, the story is wide enough to suggest multiple interpretations and lines of 
thought. The “sky” of the title can be seen as a metaphor of paradise, with 
the country-dwellers becoming beings of despair, whose lack of options 
drive them to rebel against the ones who were given the sky. Or it can be 
read as a cautionary tale about the effects of war and conflict on the concept 
of truth, and how belligerency ends up driving honesty and truthfulness out 
of a polarized world.
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However, the notoriety of its author, the fact that the narrator of the story 
is clearly positioned on the side of the country-dwellers, and some specific 
readings of this story, led me into trying to better understand its meaning 
and symbolism.
“Non linear war”
Numerous political experts have read “Without Sky” as a sketchbook of 
the disinformation campaign of Russia in contemporary times. In fact, 
the term “non-linear war” – along with “hybrid war”, “ambiguous war”, or 
“Gerasimov Doctrine” – started being used by political experts to refer to a 
mix of military, political and informational conflict, which seems to be pro-
moted and supported by Russia to achieve its international aims. McKew 
describes it as a “guerrilla, and waged on all fronts with a range of actors 
and tools – for example, hackers, media, businessmen, leaks and, yes, fake 
news, as well as conventional and asymmetric military means”. (McKew, 
2017)
“Without Sky” is actually commonly read by foreign relations experts as a 
coded reference and metaphor for information terrorism.
According to Molly McKew (2018), “information terrorism” is the use of 
information to generation confusion and apathy in certain societies. The 
typical “information terrorism” procedure is to create a narrative involving 
political entities and institutions in some suppressed scandal, and increas-
ingly connect the daily news with this story, spreading such theories on 
social media and letting the scandal gain a life of its own, until it becomes 
a social fact that the flatness of the internet experience cannot clearly deny 
and starts having an impact on real life, through threats, defaming, intimi-
dation, “doxing”, etc.
For McKew, and other experts, “Without Sky” works as a fictional theori-
zation of this informational terrorism or “cognitive warfare”, and they use 
the concept of “non linear war” to describe the informational influence that 
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Russian hackers seem to have had in several recent political upheavals – 
from the election of Donald Trump to Brexit, etc.
This influence relies on the multiplication of information sources that, par-
adoxically, repeat the same distorted information in multiple ways, and the 
existence of multiple commentators and online actors that seductively pres-
ent bizarre theories of political and social events based on picking specific 
details and news. It is a conflict for the control of public opinion, to render 
it more polarized and confusing, therefore paralyzing political actors, by 
using new technologies to blur any connection with the real.
However, I find it hard to believe that this is an entirely new phenomenon 
and regard it more as a return to a pre-centralized information. While 
central states still try to control the information being passed, new tech-
nologies have disrupted this centralized information flow, bringing back a 
delocalized and disseminated version of the tribal information channels, 
where information varies wildly according to the group you belong to.
But, of course, the strategic position of Surkov as a trusted advisor to 
Vladimir Putin, and the persistent rumors about Russian “troll farms” and 
“fake news bots”, can’t help positioning the story in such a light. However, 
“Without Sky” is not just a theoretical artifact, it is a piece of dystopian fic-
tion, and I would like to examine it under such a tradition.
Dystopian influences
One can identify several clear connections of this short story with other 
dystopic literary works. Obviously, the most famous dystopian novel about 
bidimensionality is Flatland, by Edwin Abbott, a teacher and theologian, 
which describes a world of two-dimensional beings unable to perceive 
height, therefore confusing spheres with circles, and unable to grasp an-
ything that escapes width or length. Even when a messenger arrives to 
announce the existence of a third dimension, only one Square listens to it, 
and goes on to consider the possibilities of other dimensions.
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Flatland is usually regarded as a philosophical and mathematical parable 
about geometry, but it also entails a theological reflection about the exist-
ence of hidden dimensions of the human understanding, postulating the 
possibility that the reality we see is not the full reality of the world. It can 
also be read as a critique of the rigid Victorian society of strict class separa-
tion, with its different status for male and female citizens, and with the idea 
that any possibility of change is punished with threats and laws.
The popularity of the book renders it likely that Surkov must have heard 
about it and was counting on the possibility of being an intertextual element 
on the understanding of “Without Sky”.
As Surkov is a regular writer of SF stories, it is more than passable the 
possibility that he was influenced by other dystopias. Brave New World, by 
Aldous Huxley, and 1984, by George Orwell, with its hierarchies of citizens, 
constant warfare, and rigid control, are other possibilities of inspirations for 
the story, but I would argue that “Without Sky” seems to sustain the idea 
that the rural dwellers, with their limited knowledge and lower status, may 
actually have the upper hand, therefore turning their limited world-view 
into a strength. And in this, the story is radically opposed to the stories of 
oppressed citizens that define the works of Orwell and Huxley.
I would prefer to offer another classical dystopia, The Sleeper Awakes, by 
H.G. Wells, as a possible inspiration, or at least, an interesting contrast.
Written in 1910 by socialist and peace activist H.G. Wells, The Sleeper Awakes 
depicts a future world where workers live in misery, without security, and 
are deceived by a demagogical elite. The citizens are dominated by aerial 
warfare – like the one in “Without Sky” – and fooled by “babble machines” 
producing an endless stream of sensational news, designed to affect emo-
tionally and confuse the masses, so that their understanding of the political 
situation is mostly bidimensional, of enthusiastic acceptance or rejection.
The masses of Wells end up rebelling with the awakening of the “Sleeper”, 
the protagonist of the story, but fooled by demagogues, their lives are kept 
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in misery, and only false information keeps the population thinking that 
their lives have improved in any way.
I would argue that both “Without Sky” and The Sleeper Awakes can be under-
stood as dystopias based on possibilities of messianic redemption through 
communication, or language. And in both, the lack of the depth of commu-
nication, that is, the bidimensionality of information, lost of any connection 
with a common ground of truth, is what generates the dystopia.
“Without Sky” proposes a sort of redemption, a rather ambiguous redemp-
tion, where the extremists, those who cannot understand anything but the 
extremities of language, are determined to overthrow any complexity of ex-
istence, towards a new, simpler, bidimensional world, where an elite, who 
supposedly controls knowledge, is destroyed.
The Sleeper Awakes clearly believes that a mass communication that it is not 
rational and honest erases any possibility of a fair and just society, as action 
without a clear discursive frame that enlightens it turns any kind of politi-
cal intervention dubious or outright totalitarian.
Therefore, there is a clear connection between the position of language in 
society, and its political situation, and that leads me to consider the concept 
of “flatness” under a wider societal scope.
A flat mind in a flat world?
I believe flatness is now in fashion, again. I could mention the renewed pop-
ularity of the flat earth hypothesis, that has been vociferously – even if with 
very little scientific validity – defended by the Flat Earth Society. I could 
mention the flatness that cinema now aims for with its luxurious digital 
settings. I could mention the Material Design style, devised by Google, now 
popular in digital interfaces, that flatten virtual objects.
An article, published on The New York Times this year, called “How we 
lost the sky” (Weisbrode & Yeung, 2018) reflected on the occupation of the 
sky, not only with industrial debris, but also with atmospheric pollution 
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and warfaring and surveillance equipment, from satellites to drones, from 
space stations to airplanes, and even to warring electronic bug-like devices. 
Such development constitutes a sort of flattening of the sky, itself, that loses 
its role as mystical place, to become another field of human conflict and 
dispute, spatially confirming the flatness of the contemporary experience.
We could discuss the flatness of economy identified by Thomas L. Friedman 
in his book The World is Flat, that tell us that internet flattened global ex-
changes (Friedman, 2005). Such flatness can be even noticed in social 
relationships, flattened into digital social networks, where a close sibling 
has the same digital weight that a half-forgotten friend.
This assortment of examples – more literal or more metaphorical – serve as 
an introduction to my intuitive belief that “flatness”, as a social concept, is 
something that exists in contemporary society and language, and probably 
has existed for a long time.
Although the concept of tridimensionality, in art, for instance, became the 
holy grail of the West, from the Renaissance until contemporary 3D com-
puter generated graphics, bidimensionality always had an important role. 
In the Middle Ages, for instance, the use of bidimensional painting was 
important to create a sense of the omnipresence of God and of the holy 
dimension and pervaded all instances of human life. Even the geometrical 
representation of the human pilgrimage on earth towards Heaven – rep-
resented by the spiral – was turned into medieval technologies, like the 
spring, the optical lens, and the screw, all of them tools to overcome spatial 
and temporal distance, and flatten the earthly experience: the spring to cre-
ate clocks to measure time, the optical lens to look to distant objects, the 
screw to attach permanently different objects, therefore “flattening” them 
into new entities.
The Middle Ages even promoted the anonymous art, therefore getting rid 
of the author, which is always the depth of the work of art – the one who 
always establishes a subjective, ethical, and hierarchical dimension to the 
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immediacy of the relationship between the work and its receptor – like 
what happens with language, of course, as I mentioned early.
 And the flattening of language is something that it is even more remote, go-
ing back to the emergence of Sophists in ancient Athens, when commercial 
and military success of the city-state brought into its public spaces multiple 
peoples and cultures, that raised the question of the common truth among 
multiple languages, practices and gods.
The Sophists were accused, by Plato (Platão, 2011), Aristotle and others, of 
using speech to hide or abolish the truth. The climax of this idea seems to 
have been Gorgias, who sustained that truth was nothing more than opin-
ion, and no truth was possible or knowable.
For that reason, for centuries the Sophists became the target of prejudice 
and ridicule. To be a sophist was to be a liar or a crook.
However, in a modest attempt to redeem their honor, I would argue that the 
Sophists role in ancient Greece was quite clear: they were trying to bridge 
the previous forms of knowledge – the mythical knowledge of Homer and 
Hesiod, that is, the “mythical knowledge”, with the practical and operative 
knowledge, the sophia, of the rising discipline of philosophy.
Mythical knowledge was largely the knowledge that placed human beings 
in the passive role of understanding how the world is, through narrative 
and poetical devices, while philosophical knowledge was the knowledge 
that told humans how to act on the world, and therefore concerned itself 
with the explaining of the world (Colli, 2000).
The Sophists bridged the two ancient knowledge systems of Ancient Greece 
by developing Rhetorics, the engagement of speech with political action. 
Rhetorics, therefore, became a language that does not reflect reality, but 
attempts to shape it. It is a form of literary creation, and probably a direct 
ancestor of science fiction: the literary genre of Science Fiction tries to 
imagine society reshaped by technology, while Rhetorics tries to imagine 
society reshaped by language.
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This is different from mythical language, that attempts to explain the 
world through metaphor, being purely descriptive, but also different from 
philosophical language, that tries to operate on the world by relying on a 
precondition that language must correspond to a source of truth, that is 
common to all those involved in the social debate.
Or was, until the 20th century, when this connection between language 
and truth, that previously was based on ideas, as in Plato, observation of 
nature, in the case of Aristotle, God, for medieval theologians, and on a 
scientific method, from René Descartes onwards, became problematic in 
itself, and was turned into the main issue of contemporary philosophical 
debate, discussed by thinkers like Ludwig Wittgenstein, Martin Heidegger, 
John Searle, Michel Foucault, Teun Van Dyck, George Lakoff, etc. In a way, 
thinkers that show that language lost its sky, its tridimensionality, its hier-
archy and ethics, its common source of truth. 
Obviously, this loss of a clear source of truth predates the internet. It pre-
dates the cognitive warfare I mentioned before, even if cyberdisinformation 
massified and clarified some of its effects. After all, cyberinformation has 
no definite space, but circulates endlessly; it has no specific time, but it 
can outlast the normal duration of a discredited or old story; it can be con-
firmed by the constant sharing of the same information, through reposting, 
retweeting, etc.; it becomes international in its instant sharing, promoting 
the idea that being shared by people of different backgrounds confirms its 
validity as consensus.
In a way, cyberspace became the Agora of Athens of the 21st century, where 
different identities, in a retribalized society, struggle to define a common 
tridimensionality, before increasingly powerless gatekeepers, institutions 
and governments, whose ethics, hierarchy. “height” are less and less accept-
ed. In the real world there aren’t just city-dwellers and country-dwellers, 
like in “Without Sky”, but different factions with different sources of truth 
fighting for them on a common ground. 
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Habermas quotes C.F. von Weizsäcker, who proposed that truth was a 
matter of adaptability, where beings connect with the surroundings and 
circumstances (Habermas, 2010: 219). In a way, “Without sky” seems to 
propose just that: the possibility of a world of cognitive mutilation, where 
losing the connection with the nuances of truth, which becomes adaptable 
and ever shifting, can become an endless political struggle – a “non-linear 
war”. This cognitive mutilation derives from the possibility of “flattening” 
the knowledge of part of the population, radicalizing it. In opposition to 
Flatland and The Sleeper Awakes, “Without Sky” suggests the possibility that 
those who are denied the truth can be not just powerless, but they can take 
over power – power through ignorance, through the chase of an endlessly 
shifting truth that can lead humanity to the unknowable.
Literarily, this is a dystopia, yet, it can also be our real future.
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THE CONTROL OF SCREENS AND COLLECTIVE 
IMAGINATION. TV NEWS AND CONTEMPORARY 
ACTIVISM IN PORTUGAL
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Abstract: The deep crisis of confidence affecting advanced 
industrial democracies that extends to the new and more re-
cent democracies is creating a fertile ground for the growth 
of “populisms” that can affect significant activist historical 
achievements regarding basic human and civil rights. The 
debates about how social networks are contributing to this 
reality reinforces the need to strengthen the basic institution-
al and democratic functions of traditional media. In Portugal 
and in Europe television remains the most common medium 
used by citizens to access information, so it is important to 
present citizens other possibilities for public participation 
with the capacity to assert a set of social “counter-powers”. 
The production of fictional realities increased by digital en-
vironments can be seriously detrimental to some audiences 
and postmodern PR professionals will necessarily have to 
adopt a critical attitude and vigilant of “meaningless com-
munication” patterns. This article presents preliminary data 
on the representation of contemporary activist movements 
in the television news of the four generalist Portuguese free-
-to-air channels and approaches the possibilities for media 
professionals, as symbolmakers in hyperreality contexts, on 
counteracting the tendencies towards the standardization of 
beliefs in ways that can contribute to help activists, who de-
fend democratic values, to reach the television screens.
Key Words: Democracy; activism; public relations; media
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Introduction
In the history of liberal democracy, and hence of the democratic state, so-
cial movements have been considered as the fundamental intermediaries 
for civic participation. In European history they are directly related to the 
emergence of an open and active “public sphere”. It has been under the pres-
sure of social movements of various kinds that the system of representation 
has been constituted. Free association such as freedom of conscience, dis-
course, industry, religious belief and the press emerged as an invention that 
began to build institutions and practices for the recognition of collective 
identities (Della Porta, 2015: 768-770). Recently, significant social changes 
have taken place because contemporary social movements can become or-
ganized globally and are no longer limited to their places of action (Kunsch 
and Kunsch, 2007: 10).
Activism is an “action in the name of a cause, action that goes beyond what 
is conventional or routine” (Martin, 2007: 19). From a historical point of 
view, activism has played an important role in ending slavery, defying dicta-
torships, protecting workers from exploitation, protecting the environment, 
promoting equality for women, opposing racism and many other impor-
tant issues, however, activism can also be used for other purposes such as 
attacking minorities or promoting war, so activism is not necessarily some-
thing good or bad. It all depends on the cause, actions and appreciation of 
each individual on what “is worth” to defend (Martin, 2007: 19).
In the process of social change in which the media have become increasingly 
influential in the various areas of the public sphere that we call mediatiza-
tion (Esser and Stromback, 2014: 4), debates and concerns are arising about 
the inevitable involvement of media and the emergence of neo-populist 
movements, with sensationalistic media coverage of conflict (Mazzoleni, 
Stewart and Horsfield, 2003: 6-8). The proliferation of debates about how 
social networks are changing societies and the rise of populist leaders are 
now prominent in many countries (Inglehart and Norris, 2016: 2) and rein-
forces the need to strengthen the basic functions of traditional media, as a 
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pillar institution of democratic societies, with several authors pointing out 
the real and inherent dangers of overly optimistic discourse and perception 
about the new media and what they represent for social changes around 
democratic values  (Curran, 2012, Sandoval and Fuchs, 2010, Couldry, 
2004). Since our experience is mediated almost entirely by technical means 
that disseminate content on a global scale, we see a “cognitive dependence 
of individuals on the media in mediated societies” (Biroli, 2011: 85-86) allow-
ing the “controllers” of the screens to significantly influence the collective 
imagination. The cultures of celebrities and consumerism and the economic 
constraints of the media industries lead to practices and representations 
that tend to ignore the agenda of social movements (Hackett, 2000: 62), at a 
global moment in which these voices and “critical spirits” become increas-
ingly pertinent. In this scenario, research that seeks to bring visibility to 
democratic resistance forces that are based on values  of respect and toler-
ance of diversity becomes more relevant.
In Portugal, there has also been significant social changes resulting from 
the era of “network communication” (Cardoso, Costa, Coelho and Pereira, 
2015: 11-12). But despite the fact that the digital environment has brought 
new configurations of political and social involvement and participation, 
as well as new and unexpected forms of collective mobilization and activ-
ism (Campos, Pereira and Simões, 2016: 28), television continues to be the 
privileged mean for the majority of citizens in Portugal to have access to 
information (Burnay and Ribeiro, 2016: 6) and “television news are, by their 
representativeness, one of the main sources for the social construction of 
reality” (Brandão, 2010: 134). Portugal follows an European trend, since, 
according to the Eurobarometer Standard survey (88) in autumn 2017, 
television (watched on TV or on the Internet) remains the most common 
medium used by European citizens: 84% attend every day or almost every 
day, an increase of two percentage points since the same survey in the au-
tumn of 2016 (EB86). 
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This article presents a theoretical approach to contemporary activism in 
democratic and mediated society’s connecting it with the work of sym-
bolmakers in hyperreality contexts (Holtzhausen, 2002: 30-38). It also 
presents preliminary data on the representation of contemporary activist 
movements in the television news of the Portuguese free-to-air television 
channels. In 2015, 2016 and 2017 the news programs of the four Portuguese 
free-to-air channels (RTP1, RTP2, SIC and TVI) mentioned the words “activ-
ism” and “activists” 582 times. In general, the references to these concepts 
have been increasing in the news programs of all channels, with a high 
general increase between 2016 and 2017. This may be related, to a glob-
al tendency, identified by some researchers, that is connected to the 2016 
election of Donald Trump as president of the United States (Marris, 2016; 
Yukich, 2018, Horsford, 2018). But, besides this, the general percentage of 
references on the news programs to these concepts is reduced. 
Media, democracy and contemporary activism 
The results of the Democracy Report of 2018, the second annual report of 
the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem, 2018) project, recently released, posi-
tions Portugal at the 10th position in the ranking of democracies worldwide. 
On the other hand, the researchers alert to the fact that democratic space 
in the main countries on the democracy-autocracy spectrum side is shrink-
ing. A much larger share of the world’s population today is experiencing 
autocratization. 
Meanwhile, Portuguese democracy is also experiencing a certain feeling 
of helplessness in civil society due to the emptiness that exists between 
the certainties given by the previous forms of social organization and the 
embryonic state of the new proposals of social change that are intended to 
bring the meaning of life in a defragmented perspective, for the various are-
as of social reality (Cardoso, Costa, Coelho and Pereira, 2015: 11-13).
As with the appearance of the press, the euphoria of the internet in the 
1990s predicted an opportunity for democracy to march and that dictators 
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would fall because the internet inspired and demanded freedom, but many 
authoritarian governments around the world obtained only the best tools at 
their disposal and are in a better position to censor and alter content than 
what the mid-1990s ‘ cyber utopic’ had predicted (Curran, 2012: 49-51). The 
strongly contested statements by Jair Bolsonaro, a candidate for the pres-
idential elections in Brazil, on October 7, 2018, in a video broadcast live on 
his social networks to comment on the results of the first round of Brazilian 
presidential elections, are indicative of these trends: “Let’s put an end to all 
activism in Brazil” (Folha de São Paulo, 12.10.2018). Regarding the optimis-
tic ‘apocalyptic statements’ about this subject and not detracting from the 
obvious benefits that technological advances have brought to societies, it is 
important to remember that the new and old media are ‘living’ in an articu-
lated way with the new complementing the old (Ribeiro, 2015: 212).
Recognizing that an active civil society and a free press and internet are 
very important hallmarks of liberal or representative democracies, we 
cannot deny that the Internet is increasingly presenting itself as a specific 
territory for public intervention and political and civic participation, particu-
larly among young people. However, this “emancipatory, democratic and 
participatory role “also brings risks and challenges, particularly regarding 
to the balance between the traditional and “virtual” forms of activism and 
its different publics (Campos et al., 2016:42-43). Online activism has been 
criticized for not being followed or complemented by forms of offline par-
ticipation, and often rejected as clicativism or slacktivism (Gladwell, 2011; 
Halupka, 2014; Karpf, 2010; Morozov, 2009; Shulman, 2009) supposedly 
fulfilling only the desire for instantaneous self-satisfaction and having little 
or no impact on the actual political processes and the actual actions of the 
citizens. Some authors have rejected the perspective of digital democracy 
as a myth, with online politics showing more similarities than traditional 
politics differences (Hindman, 2009).
Although there are perspectives that believe that the media reconfiguration 
brought by the digital environment will make television, in the short and 
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medium term, an irrelevant medium of communication, especially among 
the younger demographics, the evidence points to a scenario of complemen-
tarity (Vicente, 2016). The study New Power of Television (2012) indicates 
that television consumption is driven by online, in an increasing multitask-
ing behaviour, with TV content serving as an excuse for interaction, sharing 
and commentary on social networks and blogs. In addition, in Portugal 
there is a preoccupation concerning the younger demographics being little 
involved in civic and political activities (Lobo, Ferreira and Rowland 2015).
In the political field, several studies have shown that the mainstream media 
have passed from mere channels of communication to actors of the elector-
al process itself. However, media discourses do not reflect the plurality of 
perspectives existing in society, significantly affecting the exercise of de-
mocracy and distorting the integration of social diversity (Morais e Sousa, 
2011:4-13). On the other hand, recent research has shown that some kinds 
of youth participation in the digital media sphere representing a new and 
significant form of political activism has been unrecognized or trivialized 
by the public at large (Jenkins et al, 2016). 
The proliferation of debates and studies on how social networks are chang-
ing societies and the “rising phenomenon of populist leaders currently 
prominent in many countries” (Inglehart and Norris, 2016: 2) reinforces the 
need for the “image renewal of protest movements”, associating them with 
a construction that translates social consciousness, responsibility and exer-
cise of citizenship rather than the usual association of common sense with 
“subversion”, “revolution”, “radicalism” and “political exaltation” (Assis, 
2006; Batista, 2012).
What counts as activism depends on what is conventional. In societies where 
freedom of expression is respected and protected, making government com-
plaints is a routine occurrence. But in a dictatorship, such complaints can 
be seen as subversive and those responsible can be punished. It is usually 
those who hold less power in society who resort to activism since those 
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who hold positions of power and influence can usually achieve their goals 
through conventional means (Martin, 2007: 19-20).
In a scenario in which the public debate, online and offline, continues to 
mirror Michel Foucault’s “torture” system of punishment and discipline, 
controlling the population by creating oppositions within them and the 
so-called civilized screens resemble “a furnace that lights up violence” 
(Foucalt, 1999:13), the challenge for contemporary activists in the areas of 
social innovation, protection of the fundamental rights and dignity of all life 
on the planet will be the reconfiguration of their action, between the real 
and the virtual, with the aim of winning a credible voice on mainstream 
screens that “try to resist the forms of dominant power” (Holtzhausen and 
Voto, 2002). 
Symbolmakers in hyperreality contexts 
We’re living in a new sociocommunicational paradigm of great complexity 
in which the capacity to effectively decode and encode information presents 
itself as a “determinant for full social integration” (Lopes, 2011: 02). We live 
the future of Huxley (2002) in this kind of “civilized chaos” that immers-
es us in waves of information, stimuli, acceleration, sensations, emotions 
and possibilities (Ilharco, 2014). Edward Wilson challenges us with the 
statement that we are “drowning in information and thirsty for wisdom” 
(Wilson: 1998: 294).
The illusion of civilization is confused with an “anti-nature” extreme organ-
ization where everyone is controlled and the process of ‘McDonaldization’ 
spreads to the production and consumption of images, visual culture and 
lifestyles (Ritzer, 1993). The new castes of this contemporary “Brave New 
World”, the ones that generate the most evolved beings, are now based on 
access to technology and first-level education. The protected organs of the 
original panopticon of the industrial process gave way to the cybernetic 
panopticon of digital capitalism that “produces docile minds locked in their 
screens” (Hand and Sandywell, 2002:204).
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The representations of these realities exist, not because an order is objec-
tively true, but “because believing in it enables us to cooperate effectively 
and to forge a stronger society”. A natural order is stable, otherwise gravity 
could cease to function tomorrow, but we continue to nurture the “imagined 
order” that depends on myths that disappear when people stop believing in 
them” (Yuval, 2017:134-137). 
In his book The Burnout Society, the German philosopher Byung-Chul Han 
(2014) presents hyper communication as a modality of positive society 
violence, this is linked to various excesses, particularly to a productivity 
overload and media stimuli. Because of the fragmentation and dispersion 
of perception and the technique of multitasking, associated with this dis-
persion, the deep and contemplative attention of cultural life has been 
supplanted by a “hyperattention” that gives place to an “alienating fatigue” 
(Han, 2014: 26).
The human need to control reality creates the “normotics of informational 
culture”. This “Normose” is the result of a set of beliefs, opinions, attitudes 
and behaviors considered normal. There is a consensus of normality that 
can have pathological and/or lethal consequences. Some examples of these 
norms are: food uses like sugar, use of agrochemicals and insecticides, 
drug use such as cigarettes or alcohol, the Newtonian paradigm and the 
subject-object dualism fantasy in science, the consumerism associated with 
the destruction of life on the planet (Weil, 2000:62). It is useful to remind 
Dostoiévski (2008: 34-36) in the defense that “it can be very fruitful for man 
to go against the normal interest, positive, secured by the arguments of rea-
son and arithmetic” (…). “Two and two are four for me is an impertinence 
(...). It can be much better two and two to be five?” 
Several authors advocate emerging theories that seek to counteract the ten-
dencies towards the standardization of beliefs. These defend, for example, 
that human rights advocacy in the 20th century should be extended to the 
non-human world (animals and nature) in the 21st century to ease the il-
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lusion of human control over nature and other forms of life on the planet 
(Cavalieri, 2002; Cullinan, 2011; Klein, 2014; Nash, 1989; Singer, 2009). 
By their “collective attempts to infuse new beliefs, norms, and values into 
social structures”, activism and social movements can create social and 
institutional changes depending upon framing processes, mobilizing struc-
tures, and political opportunities (Rao, Morrill and Zald, 2000: 239-242). 
Public Relations (PR) have a complicated relationship with activism because 
historically activism has justified the organizational investment in PR ser-
vices to avoid public criticism (L’Etang, 2016: 207). The operational area of 
media relations has been largely censored for creating a “hyperreality that 
leads to the conception of a hypercivilization that has no factual existence” 
(Holtzhausen, 2002: 29). However, postmodern perspectives on technology 
argue that the role of media relations in PR will be more sought after than 
ever. Digital environments will increasingly enable organizations to obscure 
their real intentions and produce fictional realities by providing “useless 
information” that can be seriously detrimental to some audiences and post-
modern PR professionals will necessarily have to adopt a critical attitude 
and vigilant of this “meaningless communication” to ensure that all audi-
ences are fully informed and participate in the discussions (Holtzhausen, 
2002: 30-38). The allocation of power and the dominant ideology can been 
seen through a critical view of the signs and symbols of a culture. “Public 
relations practitioners can be called symbolmakers if one considers their 
work is largely word and image” (Mickey, 1997:271). And it is also known 
that 50% to 75% of mainstream media content is provided or significantly 
influenced by Public Relations (PR) professionals (Macnamara, 2015: 118). 
So the same advertising, social marketing, and PR strategies that success-
fully established mass consumption in big screens as a way of life can serve 
to promote sustainable consumption as an alternative lifestyle (Muratovski, 
2013: 1). There are authors analysing the role of PR in the growth of general-
ized sustainable consumption (Tafra-Vlahović, 2012; Acaroglu, 2014: 19) and 
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this can be applied for analysing the image of social movements defending 
alternative perspectives of reality. 
In interpreting symbolic forms, individuals incorporate them into their 
understanding of themselves and others. The receivers are currently par-
ticipating in a structured process of symbolic transmission, and mediated 
communication is always a contextualized social phenomenon. “When hu-
mans use the media they are making networks of meanings for themselves” 
(Thompson, 1995: 11). Hence, individuals who occupy dominant positions in 
large institutions may have vast resources at their disposal, enabling them 
to make decisions and pursue goals that will have long-term consequences 
(Thompson, 1995: 12-14).
Human beings are called upon to make decisions on complex issues, even 
without having reasonable knowledge about them, which imposes an inter-
pretation of reality according to the partial, possibly naive, perspective of 
reality. Lippman argues that the ideas and impressions that we form about 
the facts depend on “where we stand and the habits of our eyes” (Lippmann, 
2008 [1922]: 22-84). Political or technological changes do not take place 
without cultural or institutional changes that depend on clarification and 
individual and collective capacity to reinterpret reality (Illich, 1971: 148-156). 
If societies do not have this culture, if citizens are not accustomed to being 
exposed, in the mainstream media, to content that defies the collective mis-
conception of what it is to be human and about life on the planet, the new 
social movements will not succeed only by the hypertechnological struc-
ture (Marchioni, 1991: 40).
Method of data collection and research questions
In our study, we have identified the TV news programs that made use of 
the words “activism” and “activists” aired on the four Portuguese free-to-air 
channels between 2015 and 2017. 
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The choice of these channels was based on the fact that their content is 
representative of the information produced in Portuguese newsrooms. 
Furthermore, these are the channels that reach a larger number of view-
ers, according to CAEM / GFK audiometry data. A significant part of the 
population considers that these channels offer “sufficient programs for 
the satisfaction of [their] informative and recreational needs” (Burnay and 
Ribeiro, 2016: 25).
The programs covered in our analysis are: RTP 1 – Bom Dia Portugal (from 
Monday to Friday); Jornal da Tarde (daily); Telejornal (Daily), Sexta às 9 
(Friday’s) || RTP2 - Euronews (from Monday to Friday); Journal 2 (Daily); 
|| SIC – Edição da Manhã (from Monday to Friday); Primeiro Jornal (daily); 
Jornal da Noite (Daily); || TVI - Diário da Manhã (from 2nd to 6th F); Jornal 
da Uma (daily); and Jornal das 8 (daily).
We intend to answer the following research questions: 
1. How many times information news programs of the Portuguese general-
ist television free-to-air channels mentioned the “words “activism” and 
“activists” between 2015 and 2017? 
2. How much airtime was given in 2017 to news pieces dealing with the 
concepts of activist and activism movements in Portuguese generalist tel-
evision free-to-air channels?
Results and analyze 
The first objective was to quantify how many times the words “activism” and 
“activists” were mentioned in the news information of the four Portuguese 
generalist free-to-air channels RTP1, RTP2, SIC and TVI in the period be-
tween 2015 and 2017. The following results were obtained:
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Graphic 1 - Number of references of the words “activism” and “activists” in the news pro-
grams of the Portuguese generalist television free-to-air channels between 2015 and 1017 
By Cision Ltd
In these three years the news programs of the Portuguese free-to-air tele-
vision channels mentioned the words “activism” and “activists” 582 times. 
It is possible to see that the references to these concepts have been increas-
ing in the news programs of all channels, with a high general increase 
between 2016 and 2017- total of 170 references in 2016 and a total of 263 
references in 2017. The continuation of the research is expected to provide 
the detailed analysis of the news content of the 2017 television news pro-
grams that referred the concepts of “activism” and “activists”. In any case, 
the significant increase in the references to these terms may be related to 
a global tendency, identified by some researchers, that is connected to the 
2016 election of Donald Trump as president of the United States. Some au-
thors argued that this election has created an urge for a new wave of active 
social participation and activist leadership in different areas of society since 
arts, education, religion and science to reinforce the defense of climate ac-
tivism, civil and human rights, and the value of science and progressive 
values (Marris, 2016; Yukich, 2018, Horsford, 2018). On the other hand it is 
possible to see that the Portuguese public television channel (RTP 1) was the 
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one that mentioned most these concepts - 241 times. This may be related to 
the discussion about the role of public television in stimulating participation 
as a space for informed citizenship (Brandão, 2010: 164). The substantial 
quantitative increase of the reference to these concepts in 2017 is, for itself, 
a phenomenon that inspires further investigation and reflection on the re-
lationship between contemporary activism and the production of television 
news. 
Table 1 – Broadcasts of news programs of the free-to-air generalist Portuguese channels 
with and without reference to the concepts of “activists” and “activism” in 2017
During 2017 the four free-to-air television channels (RTP1, RTP2, SIC, TVI) 
broadcast 3607 news programs and 263 of these contained references to 
the concepts of “activism” and “activists”. Despite 2017 having been a year 
with a high general increase of references to these concepts, only 7% of the 
total news programs aired these channels have referred to them. It is pos-
sible to see that the news program that most referred these concepts is the 
morning news “Bom Dia Portugal” from the public Portuguese television 
channel, with 22% of the programs broadcast referring to the concept of 
“activists” or “activism”. The morning news programs are, in general, the 
ones that mention more these concepts – Edição da Manhã (SIC); Diário da 
Manhã (TVI). But besides this, the percentage of references on the news 
programs of the four Portuguese free-to-air channels is reduced. In further 
research the objective is to better understand why these happens and how 
the interaction between PR and journalists is, or can be, connect to this 
phenomenon. 
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Conclusions
The adoption of the 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) represents a paradigm change in the international policies on devel-
opment cooperation but this can only be achieved with a strong commitment 
to go beyond the situations of paradigmatic invisibility. Journalists and PR 
professionals have a huge challenge in this process reconfiguring the coun-
terintuitive effect of messages and understanding that fear disables action 
(Acaroglu, 2014: 19). If publics are confronted everywhere with narratives 
about a world full of problems without solutions, and they believe it, the next 
step will be avoid this dramatic hyper-reality and assume that they have no 
power or choice to change it. Besides their useful function of warning about 
dangerous directions, dystopias can create additive systems about a world 
that is going to be even worse than the one we are living in, discarding the 
human capacity to mobilize and get out of these externalities. Otherwise 
historic rebellion would be a fraud only to be used by the brands of counter-
culture products. It is a case to say “get out of the Matrix” referring to the 
movie where in a dystopian future reality as perceived by most humans is 
actually a simulated reality called “the Matrix” (Andy Wachowski & Larry 
Wachowski, 1999).
If technologies have brought a new space of visibility to activist organiza-
tions that defend human, civil, environmental and animal rights, they have 
also made it possible for extremist organizations and totalitarian move-
ments to create virtual spaces that naturally undermine public confidence 
in elections, in the courts, in the traditional media and in science, with con-
spiracy theories, false narratives and ignorant perspectives on religion and 
race (Albright, 2018: 20-30). 
In this context, those who define and seek to influence what is reported 
in the TV news programs (journalists and PR), have a greater responsibili-
ty and interest to provide perspectives that allow us greater independence 
from the most varied attempts of “intellectual subjugation” inherent to the 
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production and dissemination of information (Tornero and Varis, 2010: 
24-26). On one side, this preliminary data analysis confirms an increase 
of the reference to the concepts of “activism” and “activists” between 2016 
and 2017 in news programs of the Portuguese free to air television channels 
and, on the other, indicates a reduced general reference (only 7%) to these 
concepts in the news of these channels in 2017.
The deep crisis of confidence affecting advanced industrial democracies 
that extends to the new and more recent democracies is creating a fertile 
ground for the growth of “populisms” that are offering to, increasingly dis-
contented citizens, a simplistic discourse in an accessible language, vulgar 
and particularly, “attractive and mobilizing” (Teixeira, 2018: 123-127). To 
counterbalance this state of things, it is important to present citizens with 
other possibilities for public participation with the capacity to assert a set 
of social “counter-powers”. A kind of “parallel system that, far from being 
undemocratic, presupposes a healthy relationship between governors and 
the governed”, based on the use of instruments of evaluation, control and 
accountability of the actions of the governments that, by consecrating im-
partiality, plurality and proximity, are capable of limiting the “absolutism” 
of the legitimized rulers by the consecration of the elections (Teixeira, 2018: 
123-127). 
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NETWORKED AUTHORITARIANISM IN RUSSIA  
AND ITS POSITION ON PUBLIC DEBATES 
IN SOCIAL MEDIA: THE CASE OF INSTAGRAM  
FLASH MOB
Daria Dergacheva1
Abstract: Countries with competitive authoritarianism 
are the most common among the autocracies of the 
world, more so than military dictatorships, monarchies 
or single party regimes (Magaloni: 2010 p. 751). Russia 
has long been cited as one of the examples of compet-
itive authoritarianism regimes (Levitsky, Way: 2002; 
Hale: 2010; Petrov, Lipman & Hale: 2013; Schedler: 2013; 
Golosov: 2015; Sakwa: 2017, Robinson and Milne: 2017), 
and the list of such countries is increasing every year. 
For some researches, now even the EU member states 
Hungary and Poland are close to fitting into this defini-
tion (Bustikova and Guasti: 2017; Mechkova, Lührmann, 
Lindberg: 2017). However, we know little about whether 
and how these regimes work with the new online envi-
ronments, including social media. This research seeks 
to contribute towards examining whether ideological 
conservative turn of the regime in Russia is being part-
ly promoted by the pro-government media and through 
social networks, using a case study of Instagram-based 
flash mob phenomenon. Russia is a hybrid regime of 
competitive authoritarianism, and like the majority of 
autocracies at present, there is a need to explain what 
mechanisms does this regime use to stay in power and 
support its hybridity. As a case study, I took news about 
1.  MA, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. dergacheva@yahoo.com.
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murder and rape of a young female student in Moscow in January 2018, 
and a following Instagram flashmob. Instagram did not prove to be a place 
where media accounts had an important say on the matter. Instagram in-
fluencers and bloggers were the ones with the most involvement on their 
posts. While appearing as a reaction to media publications blaming the vic-
tim, the posts with the most influence were not connected to the media 
themselves. The word usage in Instagram posts also had mostly a positive 
connotation. Some of the big media accounts are also gaining momentum, 
and were included in the most discussed posts on the topic in Instagram. 
Keywords: Social Media; Competitive Authoritarianism; Instagram; Government 
and Media
Competitive Authoritarianism in Russia
Steven Levitsky, Harvard professor of Government and one of the authors of 
the term ‘competitive authoritarianism”, has recently co-authored an opin-
ion piece in “The Guardian”, which is titled “This is How Democracies Die”. 
In this column, he is describing the most widespread ‘death’ of the democ-
racy that keeps occurring in the world now: the breakdowns of democracies 
not by military coup or foreign intervention, but by the elected governments 
themselves (Levitsky, Ziblatt: 2018). Since the transition is not immediate, 
people continue to believe they are living under democracy, while bit by bit, 
mostly by legal means approved by the legislation, press starts to function 
under self-censorship or is bought-off, government critics face legal prob-
lems, judicial branches are being subjected to executive control. Levitsky 
and Ziblatt call it ‘backsliding’ of democracies, and cite Georgia, Hungary, 
Nicaragua, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and 
Ukraine as the countries where elected leaders have at some point in the 
recent years subverted democratic institutions (Levitsky, Ziblatt: 2018). 
Hungary and Poland, members of the European Union since 2004, are 
largely defined as countries that are ‘backsliding’ from liberal democracy, 
with some claiming them becoming authoritarian states today (Bustikova 
and Guasti: 2017; Mechkova, Lührmann, Lindberg: 2017). Turkey is another 
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major example of the defeat of democratic principles of governance (Tansel: 
2018; Akyuz & Hess: 2018; Gunter: 2018). 
Moreover, a lot of journalists, among them Eduard Luce of the “Financial 
Times”, write about the overall ‘retreat’ of Western liberalism, which is 
bringing about nationalism and populism not only in former Soviet bloc 
countries or Turkey but also in the US and other Western democracies (Luce: 
2018). New York Times’ columnist David Brooks echoes with ‘degradation 
of democracy in the US’ statement (Brooks: 2018). Academic research on 
this issue is also emerging. However, it is already becoming clear that the 
electoral, or competitive authoritarianism is often substituting democracy 
in many countries of the world. 
Indeed, in the 1990s many post-Cold War countries blended authoritarian 
governments and democratic mechanisms. Among such entities, a lot of 
African (Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe), Latin American 
(Haiti, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru) and Eurasian countries are being named ( 
Albania, Croatia, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine) (Levitsky, Way: 2002). 
In the beginning of the twenty-first century, more and more autocracies 
start to adapt nominally democratic institutions which in many ways help to 
stabilize the current regimes. Indeed, the first decade of a century has seen 
roughly 70% of all the authoritarian states who went through the elections 
of legislative body and over 80% – with the executive elections. Moreover, 
the vast majority of these authoritarian states have also allowed multiparty 
elections (Brancati: 2014 p. 314). After the Cold War ended, the ‘multiparty 
autocracy’ has appeared to be the most common among the autocracies of 
the world, more so than military dictatorships, monarchies or single party 
regimes (Magaloni: 2010 p. 751) 
By the beginning of the 2000s, a notion of “competitive” or “electoral” au-
thoritarianism appeared. Diamond also calls it a ‘pseudodemocracy’, since 
only after the end of the Cold War the only ‘broadly legitimate’ form of the 
regime in the 2000s became the form of democracy under international 
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and domestic pressure. Thus ‘hybrid’ regimes are adapting and mimick-
ing democratic institutions, such as, in most cases, – multiparty elections 
(Diamond: 2002). 
Hybrid regimes use democratic mechanisms and institutions to stabilize 
and preserve the status quo of authoritarian government. They do so by us-
ing such mechanisms as multi-party elections and legislative bodies. They 
use them for several purposes, such as: signaling the possible opponents 
about the regime’s strength, acquiring information or managing social 
discontent, patronizing distribution to buying off the political elites, moni-
toring the dictator by the elites as well as the low-level regime elites by the 
dictator, and establishing credible commitment which suggests security for 
domestic and foreign investments (Brancati: 2014). 
The political science in the last decade has mostly used a four-fold regime 
typology with closed and electoral autocracies on the one end of the spec-
trum and liberal and electoral democracies on the other end (Lührmann, 
Tannenberg and Lindberg: 2018 p. 62). Such four-fold typology has been 
used both by Schedler (2013), as well as earlier – by Diamond (2002), 
Levitsky & Way (2002), and others. 
Levitsky and Way define ‘competitive authoritarianism’ as the one where 
formal institutes of democracy are considered the main modes of obtaining 
and using political authority. The rulers often and largely breach the rules of 
those institutions, thus the regime can not be considered democratic accord-
ing to minimal standards which apply to democracy. Some of the countries 
that have been existing under competitive authoritarianism include Serbia 
under Slobodan Milosevic, Russia under Vladimir Putin, Ukraine (note: 
before the 2004 revolution), Albania, Armenia, Ghana, Kenya, Malaysia, 
Mexico, and Zambia in the 1990s (Levitsky, Way: 2002). 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has undergone several 
stages of drastic political changes. A ‘bloodless democratic revolution’ which 
overthrew the Soviet regime (Sakwa: 2018) did not lead to the appearance 
of democratic mechanisms, since the first Russian president Yeltsin and his 
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team did not immediately announce national or regional elections but relied 
instead on the old elite and nomenclatura that has already been in place, 
especially in the regions (Golosov: 2015). In addition, Russia was declared a 
‘continuer-state’ after the USSR’s dissolution, and has not only assumed the 
responsibility of the former ‘Soviet Empire’ in the international treaties and 
acquired its nuclear arsenal but has also inherited the Soviet institutions 
and their elite. This continuity had its long-lasting impact and resulted in 
reproduction of the ‘neo-imperial’ aspirations; however, it was somewhat 
balanced by the adaptation of the liberal constitution in ...(Sakwa: 2018). 
Balzer in 2003 defined the beginning years of Vladimir Putin’s presidency 
as ‘managed pluralism’, referring to the regime’s attempts to both support 
and limit diversity, while being outside of categories of ‘pure’ authoritari-
anism as well as democracy (Blazer: 2003). In 2010, Lipman, Petrov and 
Hale called the Russian political order of the Putin’s second term onward 
an ‘over-managed democracy’, which, while being a hybrid regime, com-
bines central position of the state with partial destruction of democratic 
institutions. The latter still have some of their initial functions but never to 
the extent of challenging the current rulers (Petrov, Lipman & Hale: 2010). 
After 2010, practically none of the researchers used the term ‘democracy’ 
describing the Russian regime. Researchers have come to a number of con-
clusions that Russia under Vladimir Putin has demonstrated: “Outrageously 
unfair and fraudulent elections, the coexistence of weak and impotent po-
litical parties with a dominant “party of power,” a heavily censored (often 
self-censored) media, rubber-stamping legislatures at the national and 
sub-national levels, politically subordinated courts, arbitrary use of the eco-
nomic powers of the state, and widespread corruption.” (Gelman: 2014, p. 
503). 
At the same time, the regime in Russia of the latest decade has been defined 
as ‘competitive authoritarianism’ or ‘electoral authoritarianism’ by vari-
ous researchers (Levitsky, Way: 2002; Hale: 2010; Petrov, Lipman & Hale: 
2013; Schedler: 2013; Golosov: 2015; Gelman: 2015; White & Herzog: 2016; 
Sakwa: 2017, Robinson & Milne: 2017). 
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Although it has also been named as another form of authoritarianism by 
some, in particular, a ‘consolidated authoritarian regime’ (Kuzuo: 2016; 
Freedom House: 2018; ) or fascist political system (Motyl: 2016), these in-
stances of definitions are rather rare. The majority of academic works are 
focused on observing and defining the Russian political regime as ‘com-
petitive’, or ‘electoral’, authoritarianism, and this will be the case in this 
research as well. 
‘Cultural turn’ and the conservative rhetoric 
Since Russia is a hybrid regime of competitive authoritarianism, like the 
majority of autocracies at present, there is a need to explain what mecha-
nisms does this regime use to stay in power and support its hybridity. 
One of such mechanisms, according to Robinson and Milne (2017) is devel-
oping populism to explain democratic shortcomings. In Russia, this stage 
started during the third term of president Vladimir Putin, when populist 
rhetoric started to be used actively in his speeches, legislation and the me-
dia. The end of 2011 and the beginning of 2012 saw a series of opposition 
demonstrations against the election fraud in Russia. Elections that were 
held at that time were different from those that have been won by Putin 
and the government party, United Russia, in the two previous election cy-
cles. While the victory in previous elections (in 2003 and 2008) had been 
achieved with the promise of political stability, economic growth and the 
growth of living standards, all of those fulfilled or partly fulfilled (McAllister 
& White 2008), the 2011 elections did not follow suit. Recession of 2008 
has stopped or lessened the economic growth and with that, some of the 
voters (mostly urban middle class) started doubting in the economic model 
provided by the current regime (Robinson: 2013). These ‘urban dwellers’ 
went out to the streets to show their dissatisfaction with the election fraud, 
and thus undermined the regime’s legitimacy. Kremlin, and Putin in par-
ticular, responded by introducing populist rhetoric, framing the protestors 
as representatives of the ‘foreign’ values and creating what Richard Sakwa 
calls a ‘cultural turn’ in Russian politics. The main aim of this ‘cultural turn’ 
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included introducing social, political, and cultural conservative themes in 
official political discourse (Robinson: 2014). “Conservative-traditional val-
ues, argued Putin, were core popular values around which the Russian 
‘people’ could unite in opposition to the ‘other’ of cosmopolitanism and its 
domestic and international representatives. For Putin, Russia is an example 
of a ‘state-civilisation’ in which the state is underpinned by a particular set 
of values that make up a civilisation. In Russia’s case, these values are a 
common belief in traditional social values that unites the various religious 
faiths that exist within Russia” (Robinson: 2014). 
Other institutes of competitive authoritarianism – the media and the 
legislative branch, continued the trend. Introduction of the conservative- 
-traditionalist rhetoric in response to the protests of 2011-2012, has seen 
conservative mobilization against the liberal vision of gender equality by the 
Russian government, evidenced by restrictions on sexual and reproductive 
rights through law and policy, such as restrictions on abortion (2011), legis-
lation limiting the discussion of LGBT issues (the so-called ‘gay propaganda’ 
law, 2013) (Zdravomyslova, Temkina: 2014), and just recently – legislation 
partially decriminalizing gender-based violence (2017). The media have been 
a key social field where “traditional values” have been promoted in order to 
cultivate a brand of “virtual patriotism” aimed to rally the nation against 
supposedly Western values of gender equality (Simons, Samoilenko: 2015). 
“Discourses about the national interest, national identity and patriotism 
in contemporary Russia promote a specific brand of sexual conservatism 
as a shared value, as well as specific sexual and gender normatives which 
are constructed as ‘traditionally Russian’ (Stella & Narova: 2015 p. 18). In 
contrast with Europe, which is “downed in sins” of homosexuality, same- 
-sex marriages and feminism, Russia within its main discourse acts as the 
country where “morality” and “normality” prevail, and the authorities act 
as backers of those (Ryabov & Ryabova: 2014).
In addition, the current conservative ideology of the state involves “rallying 
the nation in the face of threats from an external enemy and an internal 
“fifth column”; a rejection of Western experience and culture; a search for 
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a “spiritual brace”; appeal to traditional moral values like order, the fami-
ly, and stability; a stronger government; the “empire”; and a growth in the 
influence of official Orthodoxy and clerical circles. The ideological agenda 
is now usually set by radical circles, while society itself is starting to ex-
hibit more noticeable forms of mutual aggression and intolerance.” (Byzov: 
2017, p. 1).
However, some studies suggest that the ‘traditional values’ discourse in 
Russia could also be a part of a larger discourse on morality and ethics, or 
good versus bad. As Elena Gapova notes, the countries of former Soviet bloc 
in the 1990s minimized the features of a socialist welfare state, diminishing 
protection of women, disabled and elderly (in “exchange” to their presumed 
individual freedoms), and replaced them with a ‘shock therapy’ of market 
liberal reforms. It soon became obvious that the groups mentioned above 
were the losers of the free market. The voting pattern, therefore, in many of 
these countries showed later on that the support went to leftist, socialist, or 
in some cases – authoritarian regimes (Gapova: 2016). 
 “As a way to legitimize this shift, the gendered issues of demography, abor-
tion, gender roles, child care, single-parent households, sexuality etc. began 
to be addressed in public debates on a permanent basis, as they can be eas-
ily “stretched” to involve social justice and thus serve as a displaced way to 
argue on behalf of protection.” (Gapova: 2016, p. 10).
Byzov doubts that this kind of ‘postponed’ reaction, an evident change in 
the ‘psychological atmosphere’ and evolution of a value system in Russia to-
wards conservative, which gained momentum in the last 15 years, marked 
by the deep polarization in the society, has not been ‘superimposed’ on this 
‘natural’ process by the Putin’s “meta-ideology”. (Byzov: 2017, p. 4- 5). This 
is not surprising, he continues, since starting from after the mass protests 
of 2011-12, the official state ideology becomes conservative, and Putin him-
self during his speech to the Federal Assembly in 2012 stresses that “Russia 
will be able to stand up against the erosion of moral norms and the “chaotic 
darkness of the Middle Ages” coming from the West.” (Byzov: 2017, p.8).
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Networked authoritarianism: how do states in competitive authoritarian-
ism deal with the online environment
‘Networked authoritarianism’ is the term describing controlling techniques 
used by the authoritarian governments on the Internet to limit dissent and 
opposition. These techniques include content censorship, legal restrictions 
of online speech, ban of certain sites, use of the Internet trolls. While net-
worked authoritarianism does not exercise a complete control over the 
Internet, allowing a degree of freedom of communication, the government 
puts in place systematic censorship, control and public opinion manip-
ulation (McKinnon, 2011). Under this approach, the main way to sustain 
legitimacy and stability of the regime, rather than completely suppressing 
the criticism online, is to allow some degree of freedom of communication 
on selected issues. 
The case of China shows in which way the authoritarian regimes can adapt 
to the Internet and strengthen the regime’s legitimacy through networked 
technologies (McKinnon: 2011). As noted in Hyun, Kim, & Sun, the use of 
social media, in the conditions of networked authoritarianism, can actually 
result in support of the regime and its articulated ideologies (Hyun, Kim, & 
Sun, 2014 ). The authoritarian countries can not shy themselves away from 
the technologies of the new media if they intend to develop socially and eco-
nomically in the world today; however, they also use the Internet as a way 
to strengthen the legitimacy of the regime and uphold societal stability (Li 
and Lee: 2015). 
While Russia is a country with competitive authoritarianism, there has not 
been a lot of research of its relationship with the new media and with social 
networks in particular. Does the regime engage in forming public opinion in 
the online media and in social networks? Does it do it on topics associated 
with the conservative cultural turn: gender issues, LGBT, traditional family, 
and Orthodoxy? In other words, can one find evidence of the competitive 
authoritarianism, getting involved in supporting the articulated ideologies 
through social networks? 
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Empirical Research: first results
This research was aimed at discovering whether the Russian government’s 
conservative traditional rhetoric is being promoted with the hefty assis-
tance of media and internet trolls in the social networks. In particular, 
whether sensitive issues which concern gender or feminism are seeing an 
increased activity of the pro-government media and views within the major 
social networks. 
While the larger research where I am going to analyse more social media 
campaigns on similar issue is still going on, here I am presenting some of 
the preliminary results of the content analysis of one of the campaigns in 
social networks around media presentation and social media discussions 
around gender issues on Instagram.
As one of the case studies, I took news about murder and rape of a young 
female student in Moscow in January 2018, and an Instagram flashmob 
#ThisIsNotaReasonToKill which followed. The research intended to discov-
er ways in which the pro-government media have covered an incident as 
well as the following feminist flashmob, and analyse in detail the media 
sources’ participation in this social media campaign. Another objective was 
to find out whether there existed patterns of answers and signs of organized 
participation of possibly hired commentators and trolls on this particular 
topic. And finally, I intended to discover the role of the activists, or who the 
most influential users in the campaign were. 
The first stage of the empirical research examined the media publications 
written in the two weeks following the incident, from January 23rd 2018 till 
February 7th, 2018. 
132 publications were published in various Russian-speaking online media 
during this period. Among the publishers, there were all the largest news 
outlets, such as the largest in Russia printed newspapers (“Komsomolskaya 
Pravda”, “MK”, “Izvestiya”, affiliated with the government through own-
ership), and the largest online-only media (Lenta.Ru, Gazeta.Ru which 
belong to GazpromMedia, Dni.Ru, whose ownership has been revealed 
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as also connected to the government (Malutin: 2017), Russia Today (a 
government-sponsored outlet for foreign-language broadcast) and other 
smaller publishers). I have allocated these publications to three semantic 
clusters: a) neutral publications (17) b) publications using ‘victim-blaming’ 
rhetoric (37) and c) publications supporting the flashmob/ the victim (2). The 
overall majority of publications in the major Russian-language media out-
lets present online was using a victim-blaming and anti-feminist rhetoric 
mocking the flashmob. 
Secondly, since the flashmob was initiated and carried out in the Instagram, 
I wanted to find out whether the overall trend of victim blaming dominant 
in the media would be also dominant in the social media. Instagram posts 
written from 23nd of January 2018 till 23rd of February 2018 were gathered 
and analyzed according to the search words and hashtags of the incident. 
In total, 3372 posts were published on the topic during this period. Among 
those, I analysed the involvement, or the most influential posts that were 
published during this period. Involvement in this case included the number 
of re-posts, shares, likes and comments a post has received. 











23.01.2018 28 22 07.02.2018 27 27
24.01.2018 322 306 08.02.2018 29 26
25.01.2018 621 573 09.02.2018 24 23
26.01.2018 738 658 10.02.2018 24 22
27.01.2018 464 414 11.02.2018 26 24
28.01.2018 258 209 12.02.2018 32 24
29.01.2018 151 128 13.02.2018 20 19
30.01.2018 108 83 14.02.2018 22 22
31.01.2018 78 63 15.02.2018 11 11
01.02.2018 68 64 16.02.2018 15 12
02.02.2018 48 44 17.02.2018 11 11
03.02.2018 50 40 18.02.2018 16 10
04.02.2018 43 35 19.02.2018 8 7
05.02.2018 35 33 20.02.2018 25 9
06.02.2018 31 28 21.02.2018 18 11
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Posts with most involvement (with the most number of shares, likes 
and comments) – each blogger 1 post: УМНЫЙ БЛОГЕР САША МИТРОШИНА 
(Instagram influencer, feminist and fitness blogger Sasha Mitroshina: sup-
porting the flashmob and the victim) – 41968 users involved; Ника Водвуд 
(Nika Vodvud: feminist blogger, supporting the flashmob and the victim) – 
22842 users involved; тётя надя,канада,правда 21
(Kalinkalol: Fashion blogger, feminist, supporting the flashmob and the 
victim) – 15798 users involved; eva gurari (Eva Gurari: Musician, blogger; 
supporting the victim and the flashmob. Post now deleted) – 14410 users 
involved; Alina|Travel|Now: Germany (Instagram beauty blogger. Post sup-
porting the victim and the flashmob) – 7379 users involved; Anna Bernadina 
(Model, Instagram blogger from the Ukraine, supporting the victim and 
the flashmob. Post now deleted) – 6755 users involved; Julia. Professor Of 
Economics (Instagram blogger. Her 2 posts were a warning to the flash-
mob participants of possible dangers posting explicit photos) – 6462 users 
involved; александрия василевская (Instagram blogger, supporting the 
victim and the flashmob) – 6283 users; and Катерина Ло | видео | фем | 
(Instagram blogger and feminist, supporting the victim and the flashmob) – 
4545 users involved.
None of the media accounts or posts with the victim blaming have been 
indicated as having the most involvement. However, if we look at the most 
discussed posts, or those with the most number of comments, the results 
are quite different. At least three posts of the media outlets in Instagram 
are indicated as the most discussed. Of those, there are two posts belonging 
to Life News, a resource, which has also covered the incident as the media 
outlet, using the victim blaming and mocking the flash mob. 
At this stage of the research, there was no possibility to code and group all 
the posts and comments to semantic meanings. However, I have made an 
analysis of the number of comments under the relevant media posts (229 
in one case; 212 in another), and analyzed most frequent words inside the 
topic. Top twenty most used words (translated from Russian) were: 1) girl; 
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2) murder; 3) people; 4) artyom; 5) photo; 6) reason; 7) flashmob; 8) rapist; 9) 
student; 10) murderer; 11) violence; 12) victim; 13) life; 14) human; 15) iskhak; 
16) law; 17) body; 18) world; 19) slut; 20) guy.
Of these, only one word, ‘slut’, had explicitly negative connotation; all others 
were either neutral or positive. This means that in the Instagram posts, the 
opposite discourse prevailed, other than victim blaming. 
Conclusion
This research with its preliminary results was limited to Instagram and 
media publications on the topic of gender, victim blaming and feminism. 
The media coverage was mostly negative, many of the outlets publishing 
victim blaming stories and mocking the flash mob. This attitude of the me-
dia goes in line with the official populist conservative rhetoric which was 
used as a government discourse for the last five years. 
Instagram did not prove to be a place where media accounts had an impor-
tant say on the matter. Instagram influencers and bloggers were the ones 
with the most involvement on their posts. While appearing as a reaction to 
media publications blaming the victim, the posts with the most influence 
were not connected to the media themselves. The word usage in Instagram 
posts had mostly positive connotation. Some of the big media accounts, how-
ever, are also gaining momentum, and were included in the most discussed 
posts on the topic in Instagram. The evidence that there was an organized 
participation of commentators was not found in this case. Further research 
on similar topics connected to a more large-scale issue, such that would in-
volve more media or public figures of the Russian politics, is needed. 
With all the limitations that it provides, Instagram is only one of many 
social media platforms, and any of the findings could not be extended to 
Twitter or Facebook. Thus the database should be extended by further stud-
ies which examine more data from other social media as well as other, more 
large-scale incidents, should be analyzed, and I am going to continue this 
work during further research. 
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Abstract: As a result of an exploratory research, we propose 
a typology of fake profiles on the Internet on three axes: the 
laugh, the derision and the reverse. Then, six of this profiles, 
created on the most popular social networking sites in Brazil 
(Facebook and Twitter), were deeply analyzed. The research 
foundations were the theories of the discourse and the cyber-
culture, on the perspective of Slavoj Žižek, Ernesto Laclau, 
Chantal Mouffe, José Luiz Aidar Prado and Eugênio Trivinho, 
as long as Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory of language and Algirdas 
J. Greimas’s approach on the discursive semiotic. The hypo-
thesis advocated here is that the profiles of the laugh and the 
derision, fetishized, occupy the position of nodal points of 
the discourse of cyberculture. They act as dispositives that 
shoot the subject into the ideological fantasy of cybercultu-
re, seducing him to seek the satisfaction of his impulses of 
connection in cyberspace. The fake profiles of the reverse, by 
the other hand, erode the ideological fantasy of cyberculture 
and expose its constitutive lack, by denying the primacy of 
technology as the motor of social development.
Keywords: Cyberculture, Social networking sites, Discourse, 
Discursive semiotics, Fake profiles.
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Introduction
In the late 1960s, we saw the emergence of an ideology in which global net-
working connections would liberate humanity from political, economic, 
ethnic-racial and moral constraints. Thus, it would promote the free flow of 
meanings: all the antagonisms, all the voices and opinions, should become 
compossible in the global village. This ideology guided practical actions, 
such as the development of technological equipments and the ways of using 
them. More than this, it became an hegemonic discourse, which articulated 
the performance of subjects in the world.
With the advent of social media, the emblematic pattern of interactive digi-
tal communication, online profiles have become one of the privileged spaces 
in which connected subjects perform themselves. In these websites, users 
from diverse countries and cultures build personal presentations, usual-
ly autobiographical and confessional. Nevertheless some unusual profiles 
emerge from the crowd: fictional or covert characters, popularly called 
‘fake’. By the analysis of profiles from three different categories – the laugh, 
the derision and the reverse – we sought to understand the reverberations 
of the hegemonic discourse of cyberculture in social networking sites and 
some social dynamics capable of dislocating its senses.
The global community
Since before the raise of the Internet there were lots of expectations related 
to a future when networking connections, expanded to global scales, would 
free humanity from political, economic, ethnic, racial and moral coercions: 
all the voices and opinions, all the antagonisms would become compossible 
in the web, and the myriad of manifestations composed by the social diver-
sity would be the basis for the construction of a global village (MCLUHAN, 
1972), of a communal society (BELL, GRAUBARD, 1997) or of a collective 
intelligence (LÉVY, 1999), as some very popular metaphors proposed. 
Those predictions related to technology, registered in publications such as 
the American Academy’s Commission on the Year 2000 reports, the books 
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from the Canadian philosopher Marshall McLuhan, the cyberpunk romances, 
and magazines as Mondo 2000 and Wired, among lots of other cultural texts, 
contributed for the construction of an idea called ‘cyberculture’. More than 
simple vehicles carrying information, these texts were (and are yet) performa-
tive agents – they organize social relations and articulate subject positions. 
Cyberculture is built then as a discourse, which is a way of distributing 
power in society (FOUCAULT, 2006). 
In line with Laclau and Mouffe (2004), we can assert that discourses consti-
tute and organize social relations. This perspective is endorsed by various 
conceptual streams of discourse analysis, especially those influenced by 
Foucault (2002, 2005, 2006) and Althusser (2001). Discourse, therefore, is 
practice, since the actions undertaken by people or groups are meaningful 
action (LACLAU and MOUFFE, 2004).
The notion of a cybernetic culture resulting from a widespread network, 
in which individuals could project themselves, developing knowledge, and 
also communicate more effectively than face to face, as ventured by the 
researchers of the 60s, guided the development of equipments that would 
make it possible – as well as the notion that people want (or should want) 
to be connected all the time, anywhere, guides the development of portable 
and mobile gadgets. More than that, the discourse of cyberculture also ar-
ticulates ways of being-in-the-world, performing subjects.
Judith Butler (1993) explains that the performance of a subject who ‘as-
sumes’ a certain discourse is not a set of actions, elaborations, meanings and 
procedures performed in accordance with this discourse; rather it is a set 
of actions mobilized by the normative effects of this discourse, which binds 
to the accumulation and dissimulation of references to it. “Performativity 
is thus not a singular ‘act’, for it is always a reiteration of a norm or set of 
norms, and to the extent that it acquires an act-like status in the present, it 
conceals or dissimulates the conventions of which it is a repetition” (Ibid., 
p. 12). The connected, creative, interactive subject identified as a model of 
success in cyberculture is, also, discursively constructed.
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At the same time that the computer-mediated communication, and the 
online communities were emerging, the imaginary around them also thick-
ened: the virtual connection was given airs of disembodiment, mysticism 
and magic. Erick Davis (1994) discusses the contribution of cyberpunk lit-
erature for the construction of an informational space notion that, in many 
aspects, reiterates the digital-technological determinism:
Far beyond Palo Alto and MIT, in the margins and on the nets, phan-
tasms hover over the technologically mediated information processing 
that increasingly constitutes our experience. Today, there is so much 
pressure on ‘information’ – the word, the conceptual space, but also the 
stuff itself – that it crackles with energy, drawing to itself mythologies, 
metaphysics, hints of arcane magic. (Ibid., p. 30).
Davis highlights the importance of three fantastic environments in the 
articulation of people and proposals around technology: ‘cyberspace’ by 
William Gibson, the ‘other plan’ by Vernor Vinge and the mystical notion of 
VALIS by Philip K. Dick.
The first of them appears for the first time in the novel Neuromancer, 1984. 
The term ‘cyberspace’ was the name of the allegorical environment ac-
cessed by the networking connection – a sort of collective hallucination 
of humanity. According to Davis, “Gibson’s work actually created a social 
space, organizing the desires and intuitions of people operating in the 
widely disparate fields of journalism, law, media, psychedelic culture, and 
computer science” (Ibid., p. 30). This ‘fantasy of information’ intruded the 
social practice, so that the computer-mediated interaction became discur-
sively constructed as a meeting in a ‘parallel space’.
In the novel True Names, 1981, Vernor Vinge describes the ‘other plan’ as a 
‘data space’ accessed by portals. The mystical space was full of elves and 
knights, spells, castles, reincarnations and a dense forest where everyone 
easily gets lost. Also the novel VALIS was launched in 1981 by Philip K. Dick. 
The title is an acronym of Vast and Active Live Intelligence System, com-
pared by the writer to a system of artificial intelligence or a mega-computer. 
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A demiurgic entity had the ability to create false worlds, pseudo worlds 
fabricated and delivered directly into the heads of individuals. The parallel 
worlds were like an hologram that human beings ‘processed’ in their minds. 
This novel and many of the ideas of Philip K. Dick found shelter in the New 
Age culture and influenced the technological beliefs that widespread within 
the cyberculture.
The mystical belief in networking connections reiterated the inevitability of 
a cybercultural future in which all mankind would be connected, inhabiting 
a parallel information and communication space called cyberspace. At the 
same time, the pioneering experiments of interactive communication in the 
Internet was a ‘sample’ of what would be the global village in the future. In 
the 90s, the discourse of cyberculture was experienced as a reality in ‘beta’3 
version. Connected people felt like privileged collaborators for the construc-
tion of the global community.
In the late 90s, BBS, IRC, chat rooms and other systems of interaction based 
on anonymity were replaced, in everyday practices, by individualized sys-
tems of message exchange like ICQ and Windows Messenger. In the first 
case, the user was identified by a number; in the second one, more detailed 
registration forms required information as ‘name’ and ‘surname’ as well as 
the ‘username’.
The desire to only chat with already known people is not enough to explain 
the change of model, since private conversations were also possible in sys-
tems such as IRC. The millennium turn can be seen as a maturation moment 
for the informational capitalism. After a wave of intense financial apprecia-
tion in the 90s, several digital companies faced insolvency or bankruptcy in 
2000. It was a time of discredit about the business model proposed by the 
‘dotcom’ business. This crisis of confidence has been known as the ‘dotcom 
bubble’.
3.  Beta version is an unfinished version of a software, still under development, but available for users 
to test and eventually report problems to the developers.
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After the crisis, some features became more and more prominent in 
tech-market: the development of complex databases on user behaviors, the 
tools to find out market trends and the social marketing emerged as a basis 
for the financial health of digital companies. Aligned to these trends, social 
networking sites become popular and gave impetus to the new business 
model.
The social networking sites soon became popular. Guidebooks and special-
ized websites offered to individual or companies tips to get the most out of 
these sites. Raised to the position of compelling, fundamental, necessary, 
social networking sites have become the tools that promote the connection 
of people with their friends and family, of workers with their jobs, of com-
panies with their customers, of consumers with the best products and the 
best deals. 
The social networking sites reiterate, in their own way, the discourse of 
cyberculture: the construction of a global community in which knowledge, 
creativity and opportunities can be expanded in a web of universal connec-
tion. Those who have not created their profiles on these sites will soon be 
integrated – from the point of view of the hegemonic discourse, the total 
integration of the planet is a matter of time. Meanwhile, the connected ones 
enjoy the benefits of the current technological setting, yet imperfect, but 
with the promise of constant improvement to the achievement of the imag-
inary technological future.
How to fake a profile
The discussions about the computer-mediated social interaction, and about 
social networking sites, often fall into the question of the “real” and the 
“true”. Investigating avatars, David Gunkel (2010, p.129) competently ad-
dresses this question and remembered that “when things in the virtual 
environment get confused or exceedingly complicated, advocates and crit-
ics alike often appeal to the relatively safe and well-defined world of what is 
now called in a curious recursive, discursive gesture, ‘real reality’ [in oppo-
sition to a virtual or technological reality].” A more detailed comprehension 
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about this concept is convenient to understand the construction of profiles 
in cyberspace. 
The real profiles is expected to be legitimated by the “material” proof of the 
world. Such conception of truth permeates all the philosophy history, in line 
with a metaphysical thought which dates back to Ancient Greece, and got 
amplitude with the works of Aristotle and his followers. This conception 
of truth is based into a ‘correction’, a correspondence between “measures” 
and the measured thing (HEIDEGGER, 2012, p. 111) and has become domi-
nant in the occidental imaginary. 
But, in the 20th century, critics to the Aristotelian metaphysics, to the 
Platonic idealism and to the Cartesian subjectivism contributed to a ‘linguis-
tic turn’ – the understanding of the world from and by the language. From 
this perspective, language is no longer seen as a ‘mirror’ of reality; it is un-
derstood as the foundation of the real. This idea was present in the works 
of Wittgenstein (1975; 2000; 2011) and John L. Austin (1962), as well as in 
Heidegger’s philosophy. Despite of the differences between these authors, 
they all ascribe to language a primacy in the construction of social reality. 
The expression ‘linguistic turn’ gained popularity after the launch of The 
Linguistic Turn: essays in philosophical method, in 1967, a collection of essays 
edited by Richard Rorty (1992). To emphasize the arbitrary nature of the 
definition of truth, the philosophy of language provide a political perspec-
tive: the true and false are related less to the ‘real’ of an extra-discursive 
world and more – perhaps exclusively – to the context and institutions that 
legitimize and reaffirm a particular conception of truth, relegating to its 
opposite the status of false.
The social networking sites, by assuming a specific profile that is denoted 
as ‘real’ or ‘true’, need to convince users to adopt a specific way of being 
in the Internet. This profiles are based on the acceptance, by the user, in 
providing personal data and letting his/her web-navigation to be monitored. 
That differs from the previous, anonymous chats, like IRC. With this goal, 
the sites project themselves as enunciators that help the enunciatary to get 
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what is the ‘best’ in computer-mediated communication: the users whose 
registration follow the rules established by the site will be able to recog-
nize and to be recognized by their friends, to be informed about dates and 
special events (as birthdays, marriages etc.), to receive personalized con-
tents – news and advertisement – related to their tastes and interests, to 
use applications that allow them to discover new music, new movies or new 
trip destinations that “combine” with them, ultimately, they will have full 
access to what is revealed as an experience of whole connection and socia-
bility online.
This call, in which the enunciator provides the ‘map’ that help the enunci-
atary to travel “between two symbolic points, in a time scale”, receives from 
Prado (2013, p. 10) the name of biopolitical convocation. The path starts in 
the actual social life of the user and helps him/her to get where he/she wants 
to, in terms of interaction, participation and – why not? – popularity. The 
target point is idealized, projected by a certain life conception, and might 
be achieved by the services and products that the website offers now, and 
will offer in the next years, once the system in constantly improved. The 
regimes of biopolitical convocation are a discursive elaboration that “mold a 
latent demand, expressing it as a cultural will” (PRADO, 2013). 
Internet users want a full experience of connectivity and sociability: this is 
the promise of the social networking sites. But the convocation is put as a 
previous degree: the very existence of social networking sites able to con-
nect people in innovative, dynamic and personalized ways tells people,who 
had not realize their daily sociability as a boring one, that they have “limita-
tions” in their disconnected lifestyle. They must recognize their own reality 
as incomplete and wish to be part of the cyberculture. The next step will be 
to create their own profiles in line with the rules of the site, in order to be 
considered a ‘real’ participant of the global community.
The discursive semiotic (GREIMAS; COURTÉS, 2008, p. 300-303) describes 
a set of manipulation strategies between the sender-manipulator and the 
receiver in the narrative structure of a text. This approach contributes to a 
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study of the performative feature of the discourse of cyberculture. The ma-
nipulation can be described as an “action of a man over another men, trying 
to make him execute a given program” (Ibid., p. 300). In the analysis of a 
semiotic text, it is sustained by a contract between a sender and a receiver, 
actantial roles assumed by subjects of the narrative: 
In effect, it is about a communication act (aimed to make-to-know) in 
which the sender-manipulator impels the receiver-manipulated to a po-
sition of lack of freedom (cannot not-to-do), close to being obligated to 
accept the proposed contract. So, what is at stake, at first view, is the 
transformation of a modal competence of the receiver-subject: if he/she, 
for example, unites the cannot not-to-do to a having-to-do, there is a prov-
ocation or intimidation; if he/she unites it to a wanting-to-do, there is a 
seduction or temptation. (Ibid., p. 301) .
Once the profiles in social networking sites must to be built according to 
the rules, it is the normative effect of these rules that legitimate what can 
be considered ‘true’ or ‘real’ – and what is not according to the rules is con-
sidered false or fake profiles. 
Laugh with me
Once we set the field the fake profiles emerge, it is time to analyze the profiles 
found in the social networking sites. We aimed to understand how subjects 
interact through them and produce meanings in cyberspace. The hypoth-
esis is that they are more than just talkative ones in the communicational 
mishmash of the web. The fake profiles sometimes act as a dispositive that 
throws the subject inside the ideological fantasy (ŽIŽEK, 1996; 1997; 2003) 
of cyberculture, and other times they deconstruct this fantasy by rendering 
visible its constitutive lack. And, if engendered in disparate processes, the 
fake profiles only can be so due to their diversity and ambivalence.
It is not possible to analyze the fake profiles unless from their linguistic 
manifestations and their inter-relations, as with other social texts, as with 
ideological trends in which they are inserted (and which they reproduce). 
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We used, then, a methodology that departed from the guidelines of discur-
sive semiotic based on Algirdas Greimas (1966, 1970, 1973, 1983), and we 
introduced some elements of the post-structuralist discourse analysis to 
understand not only the senses produced in the text, but how those texts 
are inserted into a context that extrapolate themselves, with political im-
plications related to the struggle for hegemony in the production of the 
meanings of cyberculture, and in the articulation of social practices and 
subject positions. 
As a result of an exploratory research, we propose a typology of fake pro-
files on the Internet on three axes: the laugh, the derision and the reverse. 
Then, six of this profiles, created on the most popular social networking 
sites in Brazil (Facebook and Twitter), were deeply analyzed. The first axis, 
the laugh profiles, can be associated to the burlesque, to carnival, to irony. 
Celebrities, famous people from media or pop culture, historical person-
alities, or even abstract entities are represented topsy-turvy, acting into a 
funny way. 
Two cases in which fake profiles gained wide repercussion and conquered 
social impact in Brazil composed a sample to be analyzed: we compiled 
biography and publications from Nair Bello on Twitter and Dilma Bolada 
(Cranky Dilma) on Facebook. The comic approach of Nair Bello and Dilma 
Bolada are their main attractive to conquer friends, followers, fans, likers 
and any other term that can be used as a synonym of links between profiles 
and/or pages on social networking sites. They are impertinent and prank-
ish, based in parallelisms and cultural inter-texts. 
The profile Nair Bello is ironic. It based into the opposition between the old 
and the new. Nair Bello, the locutor (the personage that assumes the action), 
euphorizes the elderly and tell her followers about her everyday fun: play 
card games, give food to birds, watch soap opera and make a ‘promenade’ 
from the living room to the kitchen. But it is clear that the enunciator (a 
projection of the subject writing the text) do not like this old-people life. The 
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enunciatary (the pressuposed reader) must to understand that it is a joke, 
that Nair Bello’s life is not funny. 
When it takes to Dilma Bolada profile, the enunciator proposes, and enun-
ciatary must understand, that the comical effect is constructed by the 
inversions of meanings related to the public image of Dilma Rousseff, 
Brazilian former president. Dilma Bolada tries to rule even the things out-
side her scope. In her management, Dilma Rousseff was criticized by her 
oppositors, who said that she was not able to run the country, painting her 
into a position of subordination to alien interests. But the enunciated-text 
denies that Dilma Rousseff obeys any external designation: denying the 
submission, the funny profile affirms the ascendancy of Dilma Rousseff 
over all and everybody. Her fault is to ‘rule too much’.
George Minois and Mikhail Bakhtin, both philosophers concerned about 
the humor laugh, depart from different perspectives to understand the pop-
ular culture – but they do recognize its ambivalence. While Bakhtin (2010) 
underlines the potential of the laugh in the suppression of hierarchy and 
codes of mores – even if only in the space and time of the party – Minois 
highlights the authoritarian and segregationist characters in it: “the medie-
val laughter is peremptory; unity is the rule” (MINOIS, 2003, p. 240).
Nair Bello and Dilma Bolada profiles appropriate and bring to new context the 
traditions of the laughter. If the uses of laugh to legitimize well-established 
powers and hegemonic discourses have so many historical records, the 
new fact here is the centrality of Internet in the elaboration and diffusion of 
the contemporary comical texts. This axis of fake profiles have conquered 
space, as an allowed exception, a ‘consented disobedience’. Websites as 
Facebook and Twitter elaborate strategies to keep them in the website by 
creating special registering models, or by authorizing the profiles that iden-
tify themselves as irony or fake in their autobiographic description. 
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From charivari to cyberbullying 
The link between laugh and oppression also follows the history of human 
civilization. In the Greek mythology there are many moments in which 
the enemies are mocked through the laugh. “The laugh humiliates and 
provokes. It is a doubtful weapon found in every conflicting situation”, high-
lights Minois (2003, p. 43). In many cases, the laugh is used to exclude the 
different, and reinforce the laces of solidarity within the group.
In Middle Age, the charivari had an important normative role: the villag-
ers mocked individuals whose behavior diverted from the moral patterns. 
“Charivari consists into a noisy group of villagers, among them some people 
wearing camouflage or beating cooking utensils; they meet in front of the 
residence of a person who is excluded by the group because of a reprehen-
sible behavior.” (MINOIS, 2003, p.170-171). The charivari was an instrument 
of self-discipline, of controlling the sociability and the marital habits of the 
villagers. It is pointed as “the tyranny of the group against the individual 
freedom” in that communities.
Nowadays, the cyberbulling profiles, with intimidation, racial or xenophobic 
offenses, recreate in the digital environment this derisory laugh of exclu-
sion. Two profiles from this axis were analyzed: Sophia and Samira, both 
created in the name of young beautiful girls, in order to disseminate biased 
opinions. The attacks against a supposed enemy – the northeastern people 
or the black people, in the Sophia’ case – as well as the recrimination and 
segregation of a member from the group – such as the Samira profile – are 
used to affirm the audience common values.
The enunciator, in this cases, is accusative and exposes his ‘accused’ to 
a popular jury formed by the audience – but the presupposition is an al-
ready-given sentence: the accused person is already convicted in the act of 
enunciation. This profiles get wide negative repercussion in the media vehi-
cles, due to its potential to cause social exclusion and psychological damage.
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In the first analyzed profile, the main opposition is between superiority and 
inferiority. Sophia, a fictional profile, advocates the white supremacy and 
mock from black people and foreign ones. Her followers reverberate the 
prejudiced opinion and promote racial segregation. The second profile was 
created in the name of a girl, Samira, pretending to be her. She is accused 
by the enunciator of being promiscuous. Samira’s profile enthusiastic tells 
to the public her sexual adventures, in a mocking way. The locutor assumes 
the values of promiscuity and amorality, configured into the exclusion of 
the social group. 
The axes of the laugh and the derision are opposed to each other. The laugh 
is beloved. At first sight, this profiles defy the coercive power of social net-
working site managers, circumventing the rules of users identification and 
creating fantastic, dissimulated or incoherent actors. But they became im-
portant components in the communitarian life: they promote the belonging 
laces that tie the subjects to the digital environment. When these profiles 
get famous, the creators get famous too. The fetish of the profiles of laugh 
put them in a highlighted position, the success stories of their creators are 
reproduced by the mediatic machine (CHARAUDEAU, 2006) as cognitive 
maps to the modalization of the creative-subject in the discourse of cyber-
culture. Their creators as celebrated as what people must-to-be in the digital 
era: innovative, creative, funny, and super connected. These profiles help to 
promote the active participation and the uncontested belief in values defend-
ed by the discourse of cyberculture. And, once the creativity is the fuel to 
contemporary capitalism, as affirmed by Sibilia (2008, p. 10), they replicate 
in terms of digital culture the actual system of production and consumption. 
The derision profiles are hated. They became the evident proof of the power 
of Internet: its capacity of causing ‘real’ damage to people. Cyberbulling were 
turned by media into an irrefutable proof of the technology dissemination 
and impact in social life. Digitalization is presented, then, as an unavoidable 
trend. The future of humanity is the future of the digital nets – inclusive 
when relating to the militancy for its regulation. This profiles helps politi-
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cians to justify laws to prevent digital crimes, which generally involves the 
prohibition of anonymity and other coercive measures.
The profiles of derision, besides being set in the place of a radical Otherness, 
become the model of what one must-not-to-be, also establishing cognitive 
maps that legitimate the regimens of biopolitical convocation that modalize 
the other users to adopt their ‘real’ identity in cyberspace. 
The laugh as a main feature of digital communication should not be seen 
as something that happened by chance, nor even as a ‘natural evolution’ of 
the world automation. These fake/false profiles assume and put in practice 
the discourse of cyberculture. We have already pointed that discourse is 
practice, once the actions performed by people or groups are significative 
actions. The perspective that cyberspace is the extension of the body and 
mind of human beings, and that everybody is, or should be, or will be in 
cyberspace, has a performative effect. The virtual community, the global 
village, set in place of the imaginary future (BARBROOK, 2009) to the one 
humanity is being conducted, modalize social practices in the present ac-
cordingly to that future. In this perspective, the Internet is not experienced 
as a net of computers and modems: this material and contingent features 
are abstracted. The Internet becomes, by the sliding of meanings, the com-
munity itself where life must be performed, played, lived.
The reverse
Finally, there are those fake profiles of the reverse, used to spread virus, 
spams, commercialize followers, and other equivalent practices. Those pro-
files may or not present themselves in consistent enunciations, depending 
on their programming. Big part of them is created electronically by robots. 
The contamination of a computer by a virus causes the débâcle in the fanta-
sy that supports the ideology of cyberculture. For a moment, users stop to 
feel as “a subject that got into the cyberspace” to realize s/he is just a user of 
a machine, in a net of technological equipments ruled by incomprehensible 
binary codes of programming. The phantasmatic support that creates the 
cyberculture (and the cyberspace) as a planetary community, in which the 
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social world would be lived in fullness, is deconstructed; the lack of this 
virtual space is traumatically evidenced, like a sudden irruption of the Real 
from the silicon and copper of processors crossed by electric pulses.
The fake profiles of the laugh and the derision are central promoters of the 
discourse of cyberculture; they are set into a privileged position, fetishized, 
seducing users to search for the satisfaction of their impulses of connection 
in the cyberspace by their cognitive maps. The profiles of the reverse, how-
ever, deny the primacy of technology as the motor of social development, 
because in these cases more technology is not synonymous with more 
personal interaction, nor with the expansion of professional, affective or 
any other kind of opportunities. They also deny the technical-technological 
domain as a vector of integration in the global village, since more aptitude 
for the use of these technologies does not translate into more social com-
munion. They make clear that the fantasy of full connection, of which all 
antagonisms are compossible in cyberspace, says more about society than 
is says about technology.
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COMMUNICATIVE SILENCES IN POLITICAL 
COMMUNICATION
Samuel Mateus1
Abstract: Traditionally, silence has been related to citizen 
disengagement and disempowerment. Indeed, at first light, 
the growth of silence is linked to deficits in democracy since 
silence is understood as passivity while action and speech 
are the dominant, and sometimes exclusive, modes of polit-
ical praxis.
But silence can mean different things to politics. It can 
assume a coercive dimension when it is imposed over mar-
ginalized groups (the powerless); nevertheless, it can also 
assume a form of resistance and empowerment when it 
condenses self-assertion and becomes a form to navigate re-
lations of power.
In this paper, we contribute to a politics of silence by examin-
ing how silence can be a factor of empowerment and liberty. 
Focusing on the notion of “communicative silences”, we posit 
that silence is not a dysfunction of political communication 
but a significant element of democracy. Far from being a pa-
thology, silence can also be another mode of communication, 
one that it is separate from speech.
Keywords: Political Communication; Silence; Democracy; 
Politics; Silent Citizenship;
1.  Madeira University, LABCOM.IFP; CIC.digital. samuelmateus@uma.pt.
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Introduction
We live in societies that do not tolerate well silences. We could almost say 
that we live in noisy societies where mutism is a threatened phenomenon. 
It has been suggested that the development of sound amplification is the 
most anti-social invention of modernity (Sim, 2007: 4). In effect, how can 
one express himself when he must hear all the time? Amplified sound and 
noise pollution can saturate the environment to the point the individual can-
not escape it and cannot be heard. Modern media exorcise silence trying to 
avoid it fiercely: internet never stops streaming as television never ceases 
to broadcast. As media discourses become omnipresent and uninterrupted, 
silence becomes harder to achieve and to guarantee. Our culture is commit-
ted to the expansion of communication and, consequently to the contraction 
of silent moments. 
Yet, silence has played a crucial role in human culture: they are critical in 
religion (ascetism), science (reflection) or the arts (silence as an artistic tool). 
The ability to be, to think and analyze and to create are dependent of a for-
bearance from speech or noise.  Silence has been seen as an absence, as a 
lack or deficient of communication. Those who mention silence envisage si-
lence as a threat to community, something akin to a failure or malfunction. 
“Silence is that which is imposed upon marginalized groups, for example, 
so it is easily assumed that silence must be overcome. Silence is indicative 
of miscommunication, so a model of community based on an image of lan-
guage as transparent communication must eliminate silence” (Ferguson, 
2004: 2). Silence is linked to the horror of lack of communication, of aporia, 
it has to do with the renouncement of the ties that unite fellow citizens.
To post-structuralism, silence can be fearful because it entails ideology 
as well as hierarchical and discursive orders (Foucault, 1971). The binary 
dichotomy speech/silence is a powerful tool to negotiate relationships as 
discourses produce their own silences. “There is not one but many silences 
and they are an integral part of the strategies that underlie and permeate 
discourses” (Foucault, 1990: 27). The famous adage: “Whereof one cannot 
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speak, thereof one must be silent” with which Wittgenstein concludes his 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus can perhaps express this dialectic speech/si-
lence. It is as an impotency of speaking but, mostly, as the recognition that 
there are limits to speech. Beyond those limits, it is the silence the stretch-
es its domain. However, silence is not inevitably a form of violence. It can 
contain also a space of dialogue and encountering. It can also be a meeting 
space of possible hospitality to one another (Derrida, 2000). Derrida claims 
that silence is not a lack but the very origin and source of all speaking. It is 
silence that “bears and haunts language, outside and against which alone 
language can emerge” (Derrida, 1978: 54). 
So, silence is not just miscommunication, it is not contrary to communication 
but may also be a form of communication. After all, there are meaningful 
silences (Glenn, 2004: 16). Silence is not the absence of meaning: there are 
silences that eloquently speak (Beville&McQuaid, 2012). Silence can, for in-
stance, become a statement, a refusal to accept, a defiant attitude.  It has 
some communicative functions that can be positive or negative: it can bond 
a group of people or divide them; it can hurt but it can also heal; it can reveal 
or conceal something (Jensen apud Sim, 2007: 14).
In this paper, we contribute to a politics of silence by examining how si-
lence can be a factor of empowerment and liberty. Far from being just an 
absence of something, silence is at the very core of communication. We pos-
it that silence may not be just a dysfunction of political communication but 
an important element of democracy. Far from being a pathology, silence is 
another mode of communication, one that is separate from speech.
We start by looking into the relations between silence and politics while 
underscoring three ways to conceive that relation (oppression, resistance 
and empowerment). Next, we discuss the vocal ideal of democracy (Gray, 
2015: 476) and the hypothesis of silence in citizenship. We conclude with 
a brief presentation of the notion of “communicative silence” and its main 
advantages to cope with three political challenges (abstention, political rep-
resentation and deliberation).
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Silence and Politics 
There are three main perspectives on how to envisage silence as a political 
act: silence as oppression, silence as resistance, and silence as empower-
ment. 
Opression
One of the most pervasive associations between silence and politics con-
sists in looking into silence as a tool of sociopolitical oppression and control 
(Jaworski, 1993). By silencing opposition or neglecting the free expression 
of political groups, the State can exert control over dominated groups. 
Clair (1998: 21) emphasizes how dominant groups impose silence to mar-
ginalized ones in a variety of ways: through coercion, hegemony, discursive 
practices, systematic structuring of institutions or informal impositions on 
conversations. The author is, thus, stressing, how silence is related to a pow-
er differential that is latent in every social interaction: those who speak and 
those who remain silent, those that makes other listeners and those who 
can just to listen. Whether consciously or unconsciously we inhabit silent 
spaces that could mean a variation on the distribution of political power.  
Political enforced silence is observed in various parts of the world and in 
different periods in history. Censorship is a traditional mode to superim-
pose silence on sensible topics and it is apanage in authoritarian regimes 
and dictatorships. It can be addressed to individual but also to social groups 
or journalistic institutions. Most totalitarian regimes refuse to allow oppo-
sition any political voice in the political agenda and sometimes even label 
them as rebels and insurgents in order to legitimize repression. “The myth 
is fostered in such instances that no opposition actually exists, which is 
very much to the advantage of the ruling elite in maintaining its hold over 
the populace” (Sim, 2007: 159). We can also testify this “art of silencing op-
ponents” not just in Islamic fundamentalism but also in western democratic 
countries. For example, in Silencing Dissent: How the Australian Government 
is Controlling Public Opinion and Stif ling Debate, Hamilton and Maddison 
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argue that the Howard Government in Australia, over ten years, “system-
atically dismantled democratic processes, stymied open and diverse debate 
and avoided making itself accountable to parliament or the community” 
(Hamilton & Maddison, 2007: 4). Southard (2007) contends that the National 
Woman’s Party members-  the “Silent Sentinels” - drew strength from re-
stricting ideological forces to constitute a militant identity while they fought 
for providing political voice to women. Paradoxically, these suffragists bat-
tled political silence and fought for women suffrage while essaying to gain 
political voice through silent protests. Silence was here a symbol to the lack 
of political rights and it conveyed beautifully the message that there was a 
social group being silenced and deprived of the possibility to influence and 
vote on political matters. Another example comes, for instance, from 1917 
and the Negro Silent Protest Parade where their silence was a means to 
silently resist the equilibrium of power between white and negro people.
Media are another key factor on the equation of silence and politics. Silencing 
the media is another ploy that governments resort to. China is known for 
having censors in Internet and to restrict or prohibit the broadcast of certain 
contents. Israel keeps a tight control over news coverage from the Occupied 
Territories and most often the military impose media blackouts (Sim, 2007: 
162). Norris and Inglehart, for instance, point to the impact of restrictive 
media environments on regime support and how dissention is erased or 
obliterated by suppressing or limit public voicing (Norris &Inglehart, 2008).
So, silence can function as a means of severing political autonomy and the 
revindication of alternative points-of view. We are describing silence as be-
ing enforced or imposed. It was a kind of compulsory silence that oppresses 
minority groups and bounds the political powerless. Thus, silence can also 
be observed in the voicing of public opinion. Noelle-Neumann’s (1993) spiral 
of silence – being the inability to publicly express, by the individual, his 
own political preferences in face of contrary public opinion - can be com-
prehended within this perspective that frames silence as an imposed (or 
self-imposed) restriction. Silence is, then, a symptom of an inegalitarian and 
powerless relation.
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Resistance
When trying to understand the relation between silence and power, one 
should not only talk about the silence of the powerless (silencing subordi-
nated groups) but also about the silence against the powerful (silencing as a 
deliberate act of fighting power). 
In contrast to the perspective of silence as something that restricts and im-
pairs political participation, we will now consider that silence can, too, be a 
tool of political resistance. These two silences acts get together to maintain 
hegemonic configurations of power (Jungkunz, 2012: 129). In fact, silence 
can be negotiated, not just superimposed. Suppression and refusal along 
with engagements and resistance work upon these relations of power. Just 
remember the political engagement of silent vigils, just like that ones oc-
curred in 1971 in North-America as a protest to Vietnam war. There are 
plenty of pictures, in Internet, portraying young women with posters “Until 
American stop killing and being killed in Vietnam”.
It is true that silence is traditionally conceived as a ceasing of participation 
or a withdrawal (from a conversation, political or business life). By cutting 
off external stimuli and inputs, silence offers a space of retreat that ulti-
mately states a form of disavowal. Linked to this withdrawal perspective of 
silence, there is a more overt refusal to participate. This refusal can assume 
a form of resistance and confrontation: in fact, by silencing one may not me 
giving up but, on the contrary, silence may be an active and confrontational 
attitude. Silence can, then, prove to be powerful, not only as a proactive 
isolation but also as a social function of resistance.
One easy and familiar example would be the individual whose silence 
serves to resist the authority of policemen whose power cannot force an 
answer. By refusing to speak, the individual is using a constitutional right 
but is, at the same time, resisting to participate in the legitimated use of 
violence that police and military forces assume. “Silence can serve as re-
sistance to any institution that requires verbal participation (as do virtually 
all). On a macroscopic political scale, states often require such participation 
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and subsequently employ a variety of means to compel it. The state-spon-
sored requirement to take an oath is a particularly overt form of obligatory 
speech” (Ferguson, 2004: 8).
Silence can become a form of resistance because silence is part of commu-
nication. By not engaging on conventional, ordered, regulatory or unitary 
discourses, silence can be an important way to disable disciplinaries dis-
courses (Foucault, 1971). By doing so, silence transforms itself in a defensive 
function allowing for practices of freedom that would be otherwise un-
attainable. As Jungkunz (2012: 134) synthetizes: “silence becomes a way 
to negotiate around and between and even is spite of a given regulatory 
structure”. 
In effect, many practices of everyday resistance and elusion to surveillance 
involve silence. Silences that resist are attempts to protest but they do not 
involve litigations nor are straightforward, vocal ways to make claims. 
Instead, silences that resist are practiced as forms of subversion: subverting 
the man, the government, the economy, the system (Jungkunz, 2012: 141). 
Silence as resistance involves a political intervention that is not convention-
al and, mainly, that subverts the configuration of discourses and narratives. 
The resisting silence displays the intention not to tell, not to consent, not 
to confess, not to answer. This kind of silence is insubordinate and, most 
often, it is based on practices of deliberate exclusion and silencing (refusing 
policies, injustices and decisions). In one word, resisting silences are insub-
ordinate in two senses: they highlight defiant and disobedient attitudes that 
aim to negotiate; and refuse or work around the control of social and polit-
ical expression.
Silences that refuse and resist are, thus, not attempting to enlarge one’s 
presence in the world: instead, these silences are about turning away a 
political world, a social life, an identity or a community. They silently pro-
pose the individual’s own absence. By deploying silent attitudes, individuals 
maneuver between engagement and disengagement allowing alternative 
ways to do (and to be in) politics. 
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In sum, silences that resist are a way to deal with power by gaining (another 
kind of) power: they do so my refusing to line up to what was supposed to 
say and to build a silent  symbolic statement. 
Empowerment
Silence can, likewise, be a form of power: it resists things said negotiation 
the contours of political life. Silence can, indeed, be a way of unsaying, a re-
fusal to speech and classification. From this perspective, silence is not just 
related with the powerless but with the powerful: there are silences that 
empower, silences that are about gaining access to the political, social, eco-
nomic, etc. “Silences that empower manipulate norms surrounding silence, 
speech, absence, and presence in order to bring attention to the detrimental 
consequence of silencing” (Jungkunz, 2012: 136). Those who use silences 
to empower are focused on the possibility of exclusion. In social and po-
litical contexts where speech is fundamental, silence calls attention to the 
relationships of inequality and to the break-downs. It can emphasize the 
inadequacies, differences, dissimilarities. In this case, silence is drawing 
attention to the dysfunctional relationships between subjects. 
Silence as empowerment and as a form of navigating  and negotiating power 
relations supposes an active, selective and protective practice. It relieves the 
individual from the compulsion to answer, to talk, and to self-disclosure. 
It is revealing that this same protective dimension of silence is also allud-
ed in the Discourse of Inequality of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1992). In the 
Second Discourse, Rousseau describes nature’s silence in the civilized state. 
According to him, silence does not entail apathy or an unreflective man. It 
is, on the contrary, a shield to the over-exposure of the self. Silence is the 
very state of nature: a nature without speech, therefore without its intrinsic 
oppressions. 
Silence can mean different things to politics. 
As we have pointed out, it can assume a coercive dimension when it is im-
posed over marginalized groups, but it can also assume a form of resistance 
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and empowerment when it condenses self-assertion and a form to negotiate 
relations of power.
So, we are starting to see that silences can be an important aspect of po-
litical life. But in order to examine the potentialities of silences to political 
communication, we should, first, consider the ways democratic theory has 
dealt with it. 
The next section discusses how silence has been depreciatively measured 
by democratic theories. This is the first step to fully evaluate the impor-
tance of silence in political communication.
Silence and Democracy –the vocal ideal and silent citizenship 
Silence can be ostensibly anti-democratic. 
We say those who remain silent are consenting something (portuguese ad-
age that can be translated in English as “silence gives consent”) (Cardoso e 
Cunha, 2005). This idea is already present in Plato’s Cratylus when he links 
silence into consent. “And since we grant this, Cratylus—for I take it that 
your silence gives consent (…) (435 b). Silence is treated as a way to cope or 
accept power. Defying the political tirant means to stop being silence and 
denounce his tyranny. Martin Luther King also says something similar. In a 
sermon in Selma, Alabama, on 8 March 1965, the day after “Bloody Sunday,” 
on which civil rights protesters were attacked and beaten by police on the 
Edmund Pettus Bridge, he said: “A man dies when he refuses to stand up 
for that which is right. A man dies when he refuses to stand up for justice. A 
man dies when he refuses to take a stand for that which is true.”. This line 
was popularized on social media as the following quote: “Our lives begin to 
end the day we become silent about things that matter”. Once more, we see 
this approach that equals silence into consent.
The hypothesis that silence can be a threat to democracy come from the 
fact citizens are less likely to vote (Franklin, 2004) but more important, 
from the fact they are less capable of influencing the agenda of politicians 
and policymakers (Bartels, 2008). Coleman (2013) and Urbinati (2014) both 
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draw attention to the growing deficits of voice in political decision-mak-
ing. Citizens seldom manage to have their voices heard by governments. 
Developing this, Gray (2015: 474), for example, posits that contemporary 
democratic citizenship is becoming a silent citizenship. 
Traditionally, silence has, at least in part, been related to citizen disengage-
ment and disempowerment. At first light, the growth of silence is linked 
to deficits in democracy. “Silence is primarily interpreted to be a private 
withdrawal from politics that contrasts with voice (…)- a normative vacuum 
in which citizens are excluded from democratic political decision-making 
through lack of resources, opportunities, information or articulateness” 
(Gray, 2015: 475). Democratic theory usually characterizes silent citizens as 
those who are apathic, inattentive or negligent on public affairs. Silence has 
been, thus, associated with indifference and detachment from public debate 
or deliberation, and it is not unfrequently related to an inability or willing-
ness to take action (electoral abstention).
Silence is understood as passivity (the realm of the powerless) while action 
and speech are the dominant, and sometimes exclusive, modes of political 
praxis. To be more exact, traditional democratic theory identifies silence 
with lack of speech. And since the creation and maintenance of community 
depends on communication, silence is viewed as being incompatible with 
community and society in general. Underlying this perspective, here is “a 
model which conflates community, communication and speech. Silence, 
whether that of a subaltern group or as perpetuated by institutional mech-
anisms, represents a threat to that nexus, and by extension a threat to 
politics” (Ferguson, 2004: 5).
Habermas’ theory of the bourgeois public sphere is a great example of a so-
cial theory envisaging silence as a shortcoming of political communication 
and, more, as a threat to politics. Politics would only be attainable on public 
domain by the exercise of collective reasoning and critical voicing that could 
influence political affairs. The public sphere was a place where private indi-
viduals articulate, voice and critically discuss public matters. It served as a 
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counterweight to political authority as individuals gathered in face-to-face 
meetings (coffee houses, theaters, public squares, etc) as well as through 
media such as letters and books. To Habermas, the vibrant and influent ac-
tivity of the public sphere was linked, not to silence, but with the strict and 
rigorous individual voicing and participation (Habermas, 1991).
Moreover, Habermas’ later approach to contend social power and equality 
in contemporary times, took him to suggest a Universal Pragmatics and an 
“ideal speech situation”. In fact, similarly to his theory of the public sphere, 
Habermas finds in the verbal encounter between individuals the solution 
to modern dilemmas. In Theory of Communicative Action (1984; 1987), and 
Between Facts and Norms (1996) he resorts to discourse theory and speech 
act theory to anchor core concepts like “communicative reason” or “com-
municative action”. Habermas is, then, reducing freedom and justice to 
the availability of speech (Ferguson, 2004: 6). His normative theory of 
communicative action is crucially based on a view on democracy that de-
pends fundamentally on speech, language and communication. Underlying 
Habermas’ social and political thought, there is this assumption equating 
silence to a menace. His approach grounds community, understanding and 
justice into a normative view on language. Silence is positioned at the side 
of inequality and oppression. If, to him, based on Universal Pragmatics 
and Communicative Action, community is all about language and speech, 
it is no surprise that silence is a prelude to indifference, lack, and social 
fragmentation.
Democratic theory had always the tendency to put words and speech as 
the only possible mode to communication. This view that puts silence as a 
political menace is deeply ingrained, popular and widespread. Voice is the 
metaphor to public argument realizing the deepest aspirations of democrat-
ic citizenship. The vocal ideal of democratic citizenship (Gray, 2015: 476) 
entails a conception where having a voice and standing for it is the most 
elevated means of empowering those affected by political decisions. Dahl 
is very clear on this when he comments: “Silent citizens may be perfect 
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subjects for an authoritarian ruler; they would be a disaster for democracy” 
(Dahl, 1998: 97). 
This attests how heavily democracy depends on political communication 
outside formal, governmental structures. But, most distinctively, it attests 
how political communication is averse to silences. Indeed, silence is being 
interpreted as an absence or failure of voice in politics, devoid of intent, 
content or meaning. According to this widespread perspective, “silent cit-
izens are politically undemanding: those who are silent either prefer that 
democratic politics operate in the background of their lives, or are incapa-
ble of meaningfully contributing to collective decision-making processes. 
Silent citizens are also politically unorganized: mostly because those who 
are silent disproportionately lack access to politically relevant resources for 
voice, including time, money and education and civic skills” (Gray, 2015: 
477-478). Because of these attributes, silent citizenship is thought as having 
negative effects on public opinion decreasing the diversity of voices being 
heard (Noelle-Neumann, 1993). In the same way, silence tends to tilt rep-
resentation towards particular interests (the already wealthy and powerful) 
in detriment of those with less influence who tend to follow particular voic-
es and, consequently, adopt conservative positions.
This dysphoric description is certainly well justified in some cases. But, at 
the same time, this vocal ideal of democratic citizenship (Gray, 2015: 476) 
can sometimes be overgeneralized within contemporary political theory. 
Because the assumption the links democracy and political communication 
to voice and public speaking is such speech-centric, the domain of silent 
citizenship has remained a field underexplored. Given that communication 
is immediately associated with speech, and that democratic citizenship has 
a vocal scope, studies on political communication tended to forget silence 
and its conceptualization. We agree with Gray when he advocates that “the 
vocal ideal fails to provide the tools we need to account for other motiva-
tions citizens might have for remaining silent, besides disengagement and 
disempowerment” (Gray, 2015: 483). 
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If we are to ponder on the significance of silence in political communica-
tion, we should broaden the specter of possible meanings and distinguish 
potential dimensions of silence beyond lack, absence, failure or apathy. 
A comprehensive and relevant way to look to “the silence debate” in po-
litical communication would not exclusively consider democracy from be 
speech-centric point of view. Instead, it would consider extrinsic forms of 
silencing (distortions, ruptures, disbelief, disregard) but also intrinsic forms 
of silencing (that ways silencing is an act of communication and a central el-
ement of political discourses and negotiations of power). In other words, we 
are interested in highlighting positive, constructive and euphoric aspects of 
silence in political communication by focusing, not on the powerlessness 
side but on the empowerment side. By separating extrinsic and intrinsic 
forms of silence, we are differentiating between silence as imposition and 
silence as a choice; between silence that disempowers and silence that em-
powers. While stressing intrinsic forms of silence, we open space to reflect 
the communicative dimension contained in it. In effect, we should include 
in our exam how citizens communicate preferences and judgments in deci-
sion-making processes and acknowledge that the choice of silence, in itself 
conveys little information about the preferences and political attitudes of 
individuals. The vocal ideal of democracy has, first of all, interpreted that 
silence as expressing a negative political attitude. However, that perspective 
does not necessarily register silence as a communicative act. It compre-
hends silence as denial or negligence without posing the possibility that 
silence, instead of evidencing lack of motivation, could, in fact, configure a 
certain kind of political motivation.
Beyond this vocal, speech-centric, rhetorical idea of democracy and polit-
ical communication, we encounter a crucial difference: the silence that is 
suffered due to lack of opportunities and capacities is qualitatively quite dis-
similar from the silence that, despite the existence of healthy and numerous 
opportunities, opt, decide and choose to abstain from voice. This is a silence 
of a radically new type: a communicative silence.
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Treating silence as a communicative function of political communication 
opens new possibilities for political theory to identify occurrences in which 
silence is not a symptom of deficit but, possibly, a symptom of enrichment 
and transformations of citizens’ political participation. 
Not all the silence is necessarily coercion or lack. A model of communica-
tive silence can indeed anticipate special situations where the refusal to 
speak manifests a communicative power to state certain political posi-
tions in developed, complex, 21th century democracies. By contemplating 
a communicative model of silence in political communication, democratic 
theory can go beyond its speech-centric matrix and comprise an expansive 
understanding of political expression. Silences can, then becomes, another 
possibility to disclosure choices, affirm political commitments and rein-
force political messages (such as distrust).
So, in the next section, we account silence as a distinct mode of communica-
tion separate from speech. By rejecting institutionalized pratices of power, 
communicative silence is not a detached or aloof gesture but possibly an 
exquisite and unexpected form of claiming a (outsider) role on political 
processes. Some types of silence, can, in this way, play a positive role in 
democracy.
Communicative Silences
In this section we suggest a renewed position on silent citizenship endorsing 
silence as a communicative event. Because traditional democratic theory 
identifies silences with absent voices or failed communication, it misses the 
motivations for political mutism or verbal discretion. They tend, so, to mix 
active and politically engaged attitudes with those that are not. 
Some degrees of silent citizenship have been already discerned and they 
vary according to their level of engagement. Gray (2015: 475) differentiates 
between awareness, ambivalence, aversion and disaffection. 
We will not dwell in the mapping of this attitudes behind silent citizenship. 
In alternative, we prefer to reflect on the general properties and advantag-
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es of considering silence as a positive outcome on political communication. 
Once silence is recognized as having a communicative intent - like speech 
- we can surpass those conceptions that see silence as an effect of inequality 
and asymmetric distributions of power. In contrast to this view, the hypothe-
sis of communicative silence supposes that silence is a form of practicing power. 
As such, silent does not directly mean exclusion or even seclusion. Perhaps, 
it is because silence can empower that we witness vulnerable citizens (such 
as gender or ethnic minorities) doing such an intensive and exhaustive use 
of silence (ex: the “Silent Sentinels”). It is at the moment they are vulnerable 
that citizens are empowered to use silence as a positive stance to wordlessly 
make their points they may start to feel they do have an impact (however 
small it may be) on public decisions and collective debates. It is true that 
they may not deliberate in the conventional sense; yet, silence does not 
unavoidably mean that they are not interested to discreetly make a point. 
Speaking is crucial in political communication but the growing prominence 
of silence and its variations (vigils, voting abstention, refuse to participate 
in political polls, silent protests, pacific occupation of public space, parades, 
marches, etc) should make us turn our heads into the realms of nonverbal 
communication.
We call “Communicative Silences” to those wordless political behaviors that ex-
press something with a clear objective and intentionality even if without verbal 
messages. They encompass the political attitudes that betray a given posi-
tion but that are expressed by silent or wordless forms of communication. 
Without entering the Palo Alto school (Watzlawick et ali., 1967) discussion 
about the intentionality of communication and its concomitant adage “One 
cannot not to communicate”, we put communicative silences as dependent 
of intentionality.Therefore, a silence has a communicative charge when 
he is intentionality used to convey certain meanings or when that silence 
is perceived to contain or evoke, implicitly or explicitly, an intention with 
communicative meaningful implications. For instance, Johannesen (1974) 
argues that in meaningful silences we have to assume that some thought 
processes are involved. And Jaworski (1993) signals that silence occurs and 
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is perceived as significant and meaningful when talk is expected and is inten-
tionally withheld. This possibility of meaningful silences is just now being 
extended to the domains of political communication, but it is well known 
for many years in interpersonal communication. Wong (2003), for example, 
has concluded that, despite cultural differences, different groups of people 
demonstrate experience of using silence to convey feelings and thoughts. 
Wong talks, then, of the use of silence as a means of communication.
Silence becomes communication when it is intentionally manifested. 
Communicative silences include intentions or goals and involve a manifesta-
tion of purpose. Communicative silences are, then, reflective activities; but, 
instead of being symbolically express through language and speech, they 
produce a non-verbal discourse on political issues. There is still a “voice”, 
but this is a paradoxical voice: one that cannot he hear and, yet, it screams 
a political position. 
We are, then, dealing with a metaphorical sense of “voice” when we say 
that communicative silences produce an unhear, wordless, mute voice. 
These kinds of silences lie beneath nonlinguistic elements and are, mostly, 
inferred. We are taking into political communication the intentional uses of 
silences to convey meaningful messages that people naturally use. What is 
interesting in silence is that it is socially constructed (St. Clair, 2003: 87). In 
every culture is exists with communicative implications. Although it may 
be an accepted behavior (as in Japan) or a behavior to avoid (most western 
societies), silences possess an extensive pattern of social and cultural use. 
Wainberg (2017) distinguishes between 15 types of silence including “politi-
cal silence”, “rhetorical silence” and “sacred silence”.
By acknowledging this variety, we are in conditions to accept communicative 
silence as a way that citizens have potentially at their disposal to transmit 
meaningful, even if subtle, political messages. It should be noted that by 
“political communication” we understand a broad field concerned with the 
spreading of information and its influences on politics, policy makers, the 
news media and citizens. It encompasses, among many other things, po-
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litical campaigns, media debates, social media posts or formal speeches. 
Bringing silence into political communication studies underscores how si-
lence can be an affirmative, planned and deliberated attitude to citizenship 
and democracy. We are not here dealing with silence in the sense as a rhe-
torical political strategy (Anderson, 2003). Nor are we referring exclusively 
to those particular silences who violates expectations that are held by the 
public as in cases of media blackouts, refusals to be give a public speech or 
denials to answer journalist’s questions. This type of silence is situated on a 
micro-level of political communication (ex: the president refusing to speak 
on a pressing issue) (Brummet, 1980). 
Instead, in this paper, we situate silence at the macro-level of political com-
munication: silence not as a singular, individual, specific act but silence as 
some collective endeavors whose effects are projected as part of the de-
cision-making process. So, we look to silences not so much as rhetorical 
maneuvers, used by politicians, to give emphasis, authority or denying 
importance and legitimacy; nor we focus on media coverage of silences af-
fecting the public’s perception of a political issue. Communicative silences 
include, in contrast, all the inferred meanings given by the different politi-
cal actors to silence as an intentional and active expression of behavior.
Political communication may take multiple forms in today’s democracies: 
by accenting silences as communicative constructs we give it a wider 
understanding. By on hand, we have direct vocal, rhetorical, linguistic ex-
pressions of political choice and decision-making (such as deliberations, 
campaigns, petitions, votes, political crowds, speeches and commentaries). 
By other hand, by taking into account silence, we have now at our disposal 
nonlinguistic forms of communication. In this sense, communicative silenc-
es are indirect expressions of political choice that must be interpreted and 
inferred. So, silence is a kind of supplement to voice: not an unavoidable re-
placement but a possible alternative to the clarification of political positions. 
Seen as empowerment, communicative silences stress, not exclusion (mar-
ginalized groups to whom silence is compulsory) but inclusion. Inclusion 
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because those social groups found alternative ways to make themselves 
wordlessly “heard”. Inclusion because the symbolic resources so be silent 
are incomparably more accessible and abundant that those required to pub-
licly speak. In communicative silences, we have political actors who freely 
choose to become (temporarily or permanently) silent in order to prove a 
point that does not require linguistic resources, opportunity or identity 
means. There is no vocabulary to attend, nor intellectual abilities to critical-
ly examine reasons.
By not speaking, citizens are still acting because that particular silence 
becomes a communicative form to express a perspective over an issue. Of 
course, we must condescend: what is expressed through silence has not 
the richness, meaning or complexity of verbal signs that are propositional. 
Still, silence exists in a given social and political context that, along with 
pragmatics, can orient the interpretations and inferences that silence ex-
presses including beliefs, expectations and projections. Most of the political 
communication studies dealt with political actors who voiced, spoke and 
critically reasoned. By incorporating communicative silences, political 
communication can now deal with silent actors that despite their subtlety 
could still be engaged in some form of politics. The major difference to other 
studies is that communicative silences are understood, not to entail a pas-
sive or negligent attitude towards politics but an active, although indirect 
and subtle, attitude to political issues.
Communicative silences could be dynamic, deliberate choices whose im-
portance to political communication lies precisely in the fact that they may 
reveal (at some degree) citizens’ dispositions, judgements and leanings. So, 
according to these assumptions, political communication can and should 
pay attention to the role of silences, and how they are used by citizens and 
political actors to politically communicate. These silences we call “commu-
nicative” are behaviors that ostensibly express a range of possible political 
meanings. So, it is not just voice that empowers political actors (as in tra-
ditional theories of democracy). Maybe silence has political significance 
beyond neglect and apathy. Silence can, in reality, be interpreted as an at-
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tempt to call attention to the necessity of mutual agreement on sensitive or 
complex issues. For instance, media blackout, also referred to as a silenzio 
stampa (literally press silence), refers to the specific situation a football club 
or national team refuse to give interviews or in any other way cooperate 
with the press, often during important tournaments often due discon-
tentment. They may feel that the media does not depict the club and their 
activities in an objective way and their vote to silence is a conspicuously 
form to express that very dissatisfaction.
Implications of Communicative Silences to Abstention, Political 
Representation and Deliberation 
To conclude these necessarily brief comments on communicative silence, 
we want to refer to three theoretical implications. These assumptions are 
logic consequences that follow the theoretical framework we have put forth. 
They lack empirical confirmation. Still, they may take us to review our own 
perspective on silence citizenship and political silences.
First of all, by conceiving positively silence (as empowerment) we may have 
a renew point of view into a dominant phenomenon on elections: abstention. 
We generally conceive abstention and silence as being related. Silence is 
here a symptom of unresponsiveness and lack of interest. But, what if, we 
put communicative silences in equation? If silences can be forms of expres-
sion, abstention must be considered at a new light. They would not be just 
effects of negligence or lack of interest but could also be treated as an alter-
native form to discipline political representatives. Abstention would, then, 
be a form of communicative silence where citizens passively answer to po-
litical agendas. Abstention could, thus, be an ostensive attitude of disfavor. 
It would mean discordance and disappointment. By looking into abstention 
(and its silent configuration) from a communicative standpoint, abstention 
would contain a range of possible meanings that contemporary politics 
could use to better get into citizens. 
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In this way, silence generates a great deal of information and enlightenment 
to the political process. Communicative silences assume a point of refer-
ence from which political actors can infer evaluative assessments that may 
direct, orient or influence their decisions. 
Not all silences are communicative. But that does not mean that all political 
silences reveal oppression or lack of interest. To political communication 
and democracy theory research, the true question is not to pass over si-
lences as minor faults of citizenship and politics. It is to take those same 
questions to a level where silences could be understood by what they are 
and not what the vocal ideal of democracy reasons they are.
Second, and following up the abstention topic, communicative silences raise 
new doubts about political representation. 
Because voting assumes such a central place in the communication between 
politicians and citizens, when these fail to show on the polls and do not use 
their right to vote, we immediately tend to think of inattention, inaction or 
apathy. But if  - at least some - silences empower citizens, the act of not vot-
ing could be viewed as a political attitude. Of course, it is difficult to discern 
what is the meaning of that: disagreement with political program; lack of 
identification with the candidate; democracy distrust? 
However difficult to apprehend that should not deter us to identify silences 
with certain kinds of motivations associated with political representation. It 
may point to a myriad of different things (maybe citizens think they should 
be more often heard…). Indeed, it could manifest a form of political expres-
sion that has nothing to do with voicing and speech but, still, it indicates a 
certain kind of preoccupations (and contestations). 
Third, communicative silences can also have important implications in con-
sensus and deliberation. 
Silences are key indicators of possible opposition or assent. Could not silent 
disagreement be a form of deliberation, in the sense of reflection or cogita-
tion? Deliberative democracy is based on discursive intercourse. But, what 
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if silences could be also be a form of non-verbal discursive practice? After 
all, silences can be eloquent. And to be eloquent we need a discourse. So, by 
contemplating the hypothesis of communicative silences, we could displace 
deliberation and consensus to other domains that are not exclusively verbal 
or linguistic. 
Once more, there are too many meaning nuances on silences. But that 
does not stop us to consider that some communicative silences function as 
alternative (minor or humble) forms of political deliberation. Silence may 
demonstrate genuine consensus (in a plenary voting, for example), but it 
can also evidence a conflict (ex: when political actors stop giving press con-
ferences). In fact, when a consensus is reached and is putted into voting, 
political actors can vote their opposition and disagreement; or they can si-
lently abstain to vote in a (not spoken) manifestation of dissent. 
There are plenty of motivations to silence. 
Our task here was not to exhaustively enumerate them nor proposing a 
typology. All we want was to consider silences as power mechanisms. We 
have briefly described communicative silences as positive and active expres-
sions of political attitudes. The implication of silences as communication 
on abstention, political representation and deliberation were indicated and, 
hopefully, they can open new perspectives on the study of the meanings, 
intentions and purposes of the political use of silence on communicative 
processes.
Conclusion
Throughout this paper silence has been approached, not as a deficit, impair-
ment or pathology of political communication but as an element we should 
pay attention since silence can also be a form of power in social relations.
This does not mean either that silence, even if it can have a communicative 
injunction, is considered as a virtuosity. Communicative silences have po-
tential to impact political communication at macro-level but silence is not 
necessary a good thing. What we wanted to discuss was the singular possi-
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bilities that transform silence, from a parasite of communication into a form 
of political communication.
To remain silent does not necessarily point to subordination and (imposed) 
lack of speech. It is also a right that may impose severe limitations to po-
litical affairs, it also a way to influence and (paradoxically) intervene. The 
effect of silence empowerment in democracies has been already suggested 
(Gray, 2015: 487). We took this possibility and claimed that some silences 
are intentional, have a political message and, as such, present a communica-
tive dimension. 
By talking in “communicative silences” in political communication we are 
not suggesting that speech-centric, vocal, rhetorical democratic theories are 
wrong. When we refer to “communicative silences” we do not, of course, 
criticize all the speech tradition of politics
We acknowledge those works and even say speech is central and essential 
to political communication. Speech enable a full reflection on matters and 
enables citizens to get together and recognize their identities. To Arendt 
(1958), for example, action and speech disclose to the world individuals own 
identities. They can reveal themselves as “who” they are, instead of “what” 
they are. Through speech we commit with ourselves and with others, gain 
refreshed perspectives and articulate our needs.
Instead, what we argued was that speech is not the exclusive mode of polit-
ical communication. In contrast with democratic theories that put speech 
above other forms of non-verbal communication, we tried to show how 
silence deserves to be studied according to a positive role in political commu-
nication. It takes two individuals to enact a silence as silence affect human 
interaction. Silence may be, in some cases, just another way to navigate 
asymmetrical symbolic resources or unequal influence and knowledge. By 
emphasizing communicate silences, we open to silence multiple meanings. 
So, silence is not necessarily an obstacle to democracy nor a deficit of polit-
ical communication. It is also not necessarily a virtue. 
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To sum up, we have put silence as a potential communicative element that is 
relevant to democracy since it can influence political praxis. We are adopt-
ing an extended perspective on silence that separates its disempowering 
and empowering facets. Is seems silence can be used in positive ways and 
in alternative (not replacing it) to speech. There are claims that demand to 
be heard. But this public voice is predominantly produced in silent, with-
out words or speech. It is other strategy: maybe a discursive strategy (cf. 
Foucault, 1990: 27) even if not a linguist, speech-centric discourse. 
One of the most important things political communication research could 
do is to look into these discursive pauses and mutisms and trace a theory on 
its implications to political processes.
Possibly, it could be asked: why citizens turn into silent forms of political 
participation and why they have chosen those instead of more direct, tra-
ditional form of engagement? Why some citizens or political groups may 
think it is costlier and more dangerous to overtly speak? How silence strat-
egies differ in its communicative intents? And is silent empirically effective 
or is it just a theoretical hypothesis? Do silence affect the perception of 
citizens about political actors in comparison with those that prefer verbal 
revindications?
There are many questions to ask that demand more hypothesis, observa-
tions and operationalizations. Only more studies could fully answer these 
questions. In this paper, we take a more modest goal and tried to ponder on 
the silent dimension of political communication.
Silence is a complex subject. But, its prominence in 21th century politics 
pushes contemporary researches to evaluate its limits and functions. The 
biased view on speech and silence must not prevent us to study the political 
implication of silence (and in particular its communicative forms). 
As Jungkunz remembers: “By illuminating the promise of silences as par-
ticipatory resources in our efforts to struggle for democracy as a way of life, 
we bring within our disciplinary field of vision practices and subjects who 
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have too often been placed at the margins of political science. Silences that 
empower, protest, resist, and refuse offer citizens, consumers, workers, 
friends, lovers, and thinkers ways to negotiate power dynamics beyond a 
one-dimensional emphasis upon speech” (Jungkunz, 2012: 149).
Silences can be drastically insistent as they become insubordinate, interpel-
lators, or affirmative. It is this very complexity that cannot be exempted of a 
careful analysis as a tool to fight for democratic change.  We must take into 
account silences and their inclusive ways to communicate different claims.
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FAHRENHEIT 451: THE TEMPERATURE AT WHICH 
DEMOCRACY BURNS
Bruno D. de Brito Serra1
Abstract: Ray Bradbury’s Fahrenheit 451 provides us with 
a vivid picture of a future where books are outlawed and a 
particularly ubiquitous mass media industry dominates indi-
viduals’ existence. The book, first published in 1953, makes 
some startling predictions about our contemporary exist-
ence, ranging from the more technical – such as flat-screen 
TVs, earbud headphones, and targeted advertising – to the 
more politico-philosophical. Regarding the latter, we intend 
to take a multidisciplinary approach to two key themes 
developed throughout Fahrenheit, which also represent es-
pecially pernicious pathologies of contemporary democratic 
societies: i) our constant exposure to – and dependence on 
– certain manifestations of technology (mass media, tech-
nological gadgets, social networking sites/apps, etc.), and ii) 
our increasing concessions to a degenerate form of political 
correctness which utterly rejects the prospect of potentially 
offending any particular interest group or minority.
By using Fahrenheit 451 as a sort of lens through which one 
might cast a critical view at contemporary democratic socie-
ties, we intend to illuminate both said pathologies and their 
danger to a society where, on the one hand, a multiplicity 
of technological stimuli demand our constant attention and 
where facts have been displaced by beliefs, and, on the oth-
er, the increasing establishment of “not being liable to offend 
any such group in any way” as the main criterion for litera-
ture, art, journalism, and intellectual production in general 
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threatens to render the latter completely sanitized – and thus utterly useless. That 
this poses a serious threat to the essence of democracy goes without saying, and 
certainly warrants further discussion. 
Keywords: Democracy; Mass media; Social networks; Political correctness
Ray Bradbury’s Fahrenheit 451 provides us with a vivid picture of a future 
where books are outlawed and a particularly ubiquitous mass media indus-
try dominates individuals’ existence. The book, which was first published 
in 1953, makes some very interesting and noteworthy predictions about our 
contemporary existence. In the technological realm, for instance, Bradbury 
depicts devices which can be likened – in both function and appearance – to 
things such as modern flat-screen TVs, earbud headphones, and targeted ad-
vertising. His predictions regarding our sociopolitical reality, however, are 
perhaps even more startlingly accurate and thought-provoking. Throughout 
this paper, we intend to focus on two such predictions, which not only rep-
resent two of the key themes developed throughout Fahrenheit 451, but also 
two especially pernicious pathologies of contemporary democratic societies: 
i) our constant exposure to – and dependence on – certain manifestations 
of technology (mass media, technological gadgets, social networking sites/
apps, etc.), and ii) our increasing concessions to a degenerate form of polit-
ical correctness which utterly rejects the prospect of potentially offending 
any particular interest group or minority. Both issues are undeniably crit-
ical towards the continued sustainability of truly democratic societies and 
yet – particularly in the case of the second one – the amount of controversy 
they tend to instantly generate have often caused us to shy away from se-
rious discussion about them. Our intention in what follows is precisely to 
contribute to that much needed discussion, employing Bradbury’s novel as 
a sort of critical lens through which these problems – and their implications 
– can be more easily perceived.
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1. Life in the fast lane: the consequences of ubiquitous technology in every-
day life
Fahrenheit 451 begins in media res regarding the state of affairs that provides 
its sociopolitical backdrop, and appears to be deliberately cryptic through-
out concerning the reasons behind how the latter came to be – indeed, a 
significant feature of that state of affairs is precisely the fact that almost no 
one really knew why or how things came to be how they were, nor much 
cared to find out. Besides the occasional flashes of understanding provided 
by certain literary crumbles left to excite readers’ imaginations, the criti-
cal moment of exposition regarding this mystery is provided via the novel’s 
most personalized antagonist, Captain Beatty. The latter, being a veteran 
and savvy fire chief, is clearly privy to a knowledge of the situation’s origin 
and evolution that few others outside of the political elites shared. It is thus 
through his voice and intentional torment of the novel’s protagonist – Guy 
Montag – that Bradbury paints a picture of the issues mentioned above, as 
well as their genealogy.
In illuminating the first of those pathologies, Bradbury starts by depicting a 
society not only dominated by technology, but where the latter’s prowess is 
geared towards one crucial goal: entertainment. In this world where books 
have been abolished, facts, truth, and critical thinking appear to have fol-
lowed suit. Movies and television programs have been reduced to mindless 
and politically innocuous drama; living rooms, covered by interactive walls 
of picture and sound, are where denizens lose themselves in the daily dra-
ma of their virtual “family”; commercials are ubiquitous and target unwary 
individuals; and even information has been geared towards entertainment. 
Underpinning this process, as Bradbury saw it, was a gradual transition 
from “conventional” media to mass media. As population increased and 
everyday life accelerated, people no longer had the time – or inclination – 
for books and all else that could be dismissed as the “high culture” pursuits 
of snobbish intellectuals. Thus, as Captain Beatty tells us:
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“classics [were] cut to fit 15 minutes radio shows, then cut again to fill 
a two-minute book column, winding up at last as a ten- or twelve-line 
dictionary resume. I exaggerate, of course. The dictionaries were for 
reference. But many were those whose sole knowledge of Hamlet […] 
was a one-page digest in book that claimed: now at last you can read all 
the classics; keep up with your neighbours.” (Bradbury, 2012, p. 52)
This simplification of culture, now intended to suit not “the cultured” but 
the mass audience, assured a sort of level playing field where everyone 
could be equal to their neighbor, a perfectly “democratic” process with 
all with but one minor problem: that leveling was made at the expense of 
whatever made cultural production substantial and significant. Alongside 
this phenomenon, and working almost symbiotically with it, the pace of 
quotidian life gradually accelerated and became increasingly instantaneous 
– that is, both focused on the instant as the main time unit around which 
life is organized, and (consequently) concerned with instant gratification. 
Understandably, this latter process contributed to deepen the problem; as 
a result of it, “school is shortened, disciplines relaxed, philosophies, his-
tories, languages dropped. […] Life is immediate, the job counts, pleasure 
lies all about after work. Why learn anything save pressing buttons, pulling 
switches, fitting nuts and bolts?” (Bradbury, 2012, p. 53).
In reading Bradbury’s descriptions of these phenomena, it becomes almost 
impossible not to think about our current debates regarding the growing 
distaste for substantial literature (for those works considered classics of 
world literature, for instance) and increasingly shortened attention span of 
young generations today. Granted, some of that debate may be rightfully dis-
missed as the customary exaggerated disillusionment of older generations 
concerning those that follow them, but much of it arises from a legitimate 
concern regarding the implicit education being imposed upon individuals 
today by a culture increasingly dominated by expectations of immediacy 
and instant gratification – towards which the growing technologization of 
human relations has undoubtedly contributed. 
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As a whole, however, any situation that seeks to establish the kind of social 
uniformization mentioned above inevitably faces certain hurdles to over-
come in order to become sustainable – from a sociological standpoint – in 
a modern westernized society. After all, the need to perceive themselves 
as unique, free, and autonomous has become something of an essential 
psychological necessity for the post-Enlightenment individuals that consti-
tute the political citizenship of such societies. Thus, a clear need arises for 
what the famous French philosopher Blaise Pascal termed divertissements, 
provided in a steady and sufficient dose2. In the words of Captain Beatty, 
“life becomes one big pratfall, Montag. Everything bang, boff, and wow! […] 
Empty the theaters save for clowns and furnish the rooms with glass walls 
and pretty colors” (Idem).
 In the context of the novel, these divertissements come from fairly familiar 
sources: television, movies, broadcasts of sporting events, and so on pro-
vide the much needed (and entertaining) distraction from an increasingly 
dehumanized existence – in a phrase, panem et circenses. Translating the 
situation to our contemporary reality, we might even add a few more to 
the list, such as smartphones, social networking apps, dating apps, etc. But 
perhaps the most telling concrete example of this growing need for con-
stant entertainment that seems to have become the hallmark of our time 
is the gradual progression from information to infotainment that we have 
witnessed in the last two decades or so.
In this regard, an interesting illustration of the phenomenon is provided by 
the standing of satirical news programs such as The Daily Show, The Colbert 
Report, Late Night with Seth Meyers, and so on. That such programs were 
rapidly ascending to the level of conventional news programs in terms of 
viewership and perceived reliability as news sources is something that had 
been noticed as early as 2004, when a Pew Research Center poll showed 
2.  Pascal’s argument regarding divertissements (“diversions” or “distractions”, in the English transla-
tion) bears a complex relationship with his understanding of human beings’ inherent and inescapable 
unhappiness regarding the human condition, but is perhaps best surmised for our current purposes 
as follows: “However unhappy we are, if we can be persuaded to take up some distraction we will 
be perfectly happy for the time being. […] Without entertainment there is no joy. With it there is no 
sadness” (Pascal, 1999, p. 48). 
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that 21% of under-30 years old respondents relied on programs such as The 
Daily Show for political information, while 23% of respondents in the same 
age group reportedly relied on conventional news programs for the same 
purpose – a meager 2% gap that clearly shows the perceived equivalence be-
tween both kinds of programs among viewers seeking to inform themselves 
about key political matters.
Perhaps even more revealing is the fact that a 2007 study by Julia Fox, Glory 
Koloen, and Volkan Sahin was able to employ a content analysis approach 
to demonstrate that The Daily Show (at the time, hosted by Jon Stewart) was 
roughly the equivalent to the evening news programs of the main television 
networks in terms of substantial news content – a conclusion reached by ex-
amining the amount of actual news footage (video and audio) displayed by 
either type of program. Ultimately, this statistical equivalence was largely 
attributed to the fact that both adopted an infotainment-based approach to 
news coverage – a diagnosis which should come as little surprise to any 
who today cast a critical glance at the programming of television networks 
such as CNN, which were once renowned for serious journalistic standards 
and an almost exclusive attention to hard news.
Now, faced with evidence of this kind concerning the viewing habits of 
politically-involved individuals who ultimately constitute a substantial 
piece of the electorate, some have chosen to take the optimistic approach, 
by viewing it as a reassurance that the growing reliance of voters in 
non-conventional news sources does not necessarily threatens to subvert 
the democratic process – insofar as the substantial news content of those 
source seems be (potentially) equal to that of conventional ones. There is, 
however, also a pessimistic interpretation of the facts at hand that is at least 
as valid as the former, and which would express dire concern at the fact 
that the journalistic standards of purportedly “hard news programs” has 
seemingly dropped to the level of entertainment shows.
In the years since 2007, the tendency to rely increasingly on non-conventional 
news sources has quite evidently only been accentuated by the near om-
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nipresence of things like smartphones permanently connected to social 
networking sites/apps, which cause individuals to be ever immersed in the 
flow of infotainment, increasingly influenced and sometimes consumed by 
it. The recent prevalence of the concept of “fake news”, which became a 
journalistic and scholarly hot topic in the wake of Donald Trump’s election 
in 2016 and the role played by social networking sites such as Facebook 
and Twitter in the latter, provides a clear illustration of this – just as the 
subsequently successful electoral campaigns of Lega Nord/Movimento 5 
Stelle in Italy or of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil. As a whole, it amounts to a sort 
of cultural shift in our relationship with (political) news and our expecta-
tions regarding the reception of the latter – they must now be “quick and 
easy”, both immediately grasped (synthesized in short slogans/headlines) 
and instantly engaging (delivered to us via an entertaining medium). It is, 
ultimately, a shift that justifies Bradbury’s concerns regarding the serious 
and evident threat it poses towards the democratic process.
2. Tocqueville 2.0: Tyranny updated for the 21st century
Following his treatment of this first issue, Bradbury turns his attention to 
the second pathology mentioned above – which, in many ways, is intimately 
connected with the first – and that can be seen as a cautionary tale regard-
ing what came to be our complicated relationship with the notion of political 
correctness.
Before we delve into that problem, however, let us introduce a brief cave-
at about the overarching theme of Fahrenheit 451: although it has widely 
been assumed that a book about the burning of books must intend to alert 
us to the dangers of censorship – and rightly so – Fahrenheit 451 is not a 
novel about censorship understood in the traditional manner (something 
that Bradbury himself confirmed in some of his later interviews). Indeed, 
Fahrenheit is almost unique in the way in which it portrays the roots of 
censorship as a politically motivated phenomenon. What we mean to say by 
this is that if one looks at some of the most culturally significant dystopian 
novels where censorship plays a crucial role – Orwell’s 1984, for instance – 
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one finds that the latter is consistently depicted as an instrument of political 
and social control, employed by those in positions of power to enforce their 
agenda and political will. Thus, understood in this fashion, censorship must 
undeniably be viewed as an attempt at political coercion that proceeds top- 
-down – i.e., from the powerful to the masses.
Bradbury’s novel, on the other hand, completely inverts this logic and 
chooses to portray the rise of censorship as originating in a sort of bottom-up 
motion. In Fahrenheit 451 it is not the government or the powerful that pave 
the way for the descent into dystopia, but the people. To fully understand 
what we mean by this, let us once again turn to the words of Captain Beatty, 
who lays out the genealogy of the novel’s status quo to its protagonist:
“Now, let’s take up the minorities in our civilization, shall we? Bigger the 
population, the more minorities. Don’t step on the toes of the dog-lovers, 
the cat-lovers, doctors, lawyers, merchants, chiefs, Mormons, Baptists, 
Unitarians, second-generation Chinese, Swedes, Italians, Germans, 
Texans, Brooklynites, Irishmen, people from Oregon or Mexico. [...] 
You must understand that our civilization is so vast that we can’t have 
our minorities upset and stirred. Ask yourself, what do we want in this 
country, above all? People want to be happy, isn’t that right? Haven’t you 
heard it all your life?” (Bradbury, 2012, pp. 54-6)
From which logically follows:
“Colored people don’t like Little Black Sambo. Burn it. White people 
don’t feel good about Uncle Tom’s Cabin. Burn it. Someone’s written a 
book on tobacco and cancer of the lungs? The cigarette people are weep-
ing? Burn the book. Serenity, Montag. Peace, Montag. Take your fight 
outside. Better yet, to the incinerator.” (Bradbury, 2012, p. 57)
Thus, at the end of the day, the situation portrayed in Fahrenheit “didn’t 
come from the Government down. There was no dictum, no declaration, 
no censorship, to start with, no! Technology, mass exploitation and minor-
ity pressure carried the trick, thank God!” (Idem, p. 55). An undeniably 
controversial point, this reference to minority pressure is nevertheless con-
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vincingly explained by Bradbury, and thus warrants further discussion. In 
a multicultural and multifaceted society, the number of minority groups 
increases almost exponentially. If one establishes “not being liable to offend 
any such group in any way” as the sole criterion for literature, art, journal-
ism, and intellectual production in general, the former will necessarily see 
itself censored until it becomes completely sanitized – and thus utterly use-
less. It is a point that, on the one hand, allows us to fully understand what 
it meant above by bottom-up censorship – which, unlike top-down censor-
ship, is an almost exclusively democratic kind of pathology, inasmuch as it 
is born chiefly out of a shared concern for social justice and equality. On 
the other, it is also a problem which, described as it is in Bradbury’s novel, 
should lead us to consider a very widespread and often heated debate in 
contemporary societies: the debate about political correctness.
From the very onset, political correctness is a complicated subject, because 
the term itself has a dubious history and ambiguous meaning. It was per-
haps first used in its most literal sense, to represent political views that 
were “correct” in light of the orthodoxy of a given party or political ideol-
ogy. Later, it appears to have come to be used in a mostly ironic manner, 
a way of simultaneously referencing and criticizing that first usage – thus 
being employed as a colloquial safeguard against overbearing orthodoxy (in 
the sense of one who sarcastically states “You better be careful with what 
you’re saying; that’s not very ‘politically correct’”). In the 1980’s, howev-
er, and particularly after the publication of Allan Bloom’s highly influential 
The Closing of the American Mind, political correctness gradually came to 
represent the excessive relativization/neutralization of sociopolitical ideas 
and values that Bloom denounced as being increasingly pervasive in the 
American academia, and which posed a severe threat to the proper civic 
and general education of students. And although Bloom himself shied away 
from employing the phrase “political correctness”, his book nevertheless 
saw him touted as a standard-bearer for those who regarded political cor-
rectness as representing widespread a process of increasing social and 
cultural sterilization. Curiously enough, Bloom was a self-confessed pro-
ponent of the so-called “Great Books Education”, and many of his concerns 
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regarding American students at the time – namely, the fact that they large-
ly ignored the classic works of world literature, lacking both the taste and 
the inclination to ever read them – echoed Bradbury’s own descriptions of 
events leading up to his dystopian future.
Tracking the issue of political correctness to present day, we may realize 
that the latter retains much of its ambiguous nature, often split between 
representing a legitimate concern and being employed as fuel for conspir-
atorial ideas intended to inflame certain political sentiments (weaponized 
in so-called “culture war” of the 20th and 21st centuries). Before we go any 
further, it is perhaps important to clarify our stance regarding the first of 
those understandings – that is, the view of political correctness as a legit-
imate concern, embodied in the perceived necessity to remove inherently 
and objectively unacceptable expressions and practices in the context of a 
pluralist and multicultural society. That such an understanding of political 
correctness holds both political legitimacy and social worth seems, to us, 
absolutely undeniable – despite whatever discussion might (and certainly 
will) arise regarding the objective criteria that could be employed to render 
sound judgment on such matters. It is, however, blatantly obvious that to 
delve into that issue with any acceptable degree of depth and consequence 
would entail theoretical and methodological demands far exceeding the 
scope of the present work. As such, we will choose to focus instead on oppo-
site other side of the equation – precisely, the one that we can connect with 
both Fahrenheit 451 and The Closing of the American Mind – which has to do 
with the consequences of a sort of degenerescence of that legitimate form of 
political correctness, causing the latter to overstep its bounds.
While it may be difficult to define exactly the bounds of what might con-
stitute a “degenerate” or “exacerbated” form of political correctness, one 
may presently find many instances which are almost intuitively acknowl-
edged as examples of this, examples that all but mimic the concerns voiced 
by Bradbury in Fahrenheit 451. They range from simple things – such as 
the impropriety of the use of male pronouns when writing in the English 
language, or of the use of the capitalized “Man” to represent “Humanity” 
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– to more complex issues, such as the reticence in acknowledging some-
one’s racial and ethnic background (particularly striking are the anecdotal 
examples of the boxing commentator who will exhaust all other possible 
distinguishing features before two boxers before employing the most obvi-
ous one, or even the case of the flustered American tourist that refers to a 
black man in Britain as “African-American”). 
Especially relevant to this discussion on the exacerbation of political correct-
ness is also the rise of a something we might dub a “culture of the offended”, 
that is becoming prevalent in universities and amplified by social network-
ing sites/apps such as Facebook and Twitter. It is a phenomenon that has 
recently manifested itself in strange and often counter-intuitive – if not out-
right paradoxical – ways, causing conservative pundits to be barred from 
speaking at American universities that normally champion free-speech, 
provoking significant backlash for health professionals who publicly state 
that being overweight is unhealthy, leading to firings based on seemingly 
innocuous Facebook posts later deemed “politically unacceptable”, etc. And 
in the journalistic field, there are also those – such as William McGowan 
(Coloring the News: How Political Correctness has Corrupted American 
Journalism, 2003) – who have expressed concern at how this culture of 
the offended and exacerbated political correctness may illegitimately skew 
news coverage, causing reporters to self-censor news stories out of fear of 
offending some percentage of their audience – and thereby possibly exclud-
ing critical points of view.
Alexis de Tocqueville, who presented his critical view of the burgeoning 
democratic process in the New World in 1835 book Democracy in America, 
famously expressed his concern regarding what he called the “tyranny of 
the majority”, an exclusively democratic phenomenon that he (and John 
Stuart Mill after him) described as the danger posed by a misguided politi-
cal majority that behaves despotically towards individuals and minorities, 
forcibly imposing their will upon the latter. While the situation described by 
Bradbury and reinforced by the aforementioned degenerate understanding 
of political correctness does not totally reverse that logic – one cannot right-
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fully speak of a “tyranny of the minority” as such – it adds to it a degree 
of subtlety that might possibly render it even more democratically danger-
ous than the phenomenon originally identified by Tocqueville: it remains 
a tyranny of the majority de facto, but one which is de jure justified and 
legitimized via a purported concern for the well-being of the minorities; it is, 
in a sense, a tyranny of a majority of minority interests, reflected in a mis-
guided general will which believes to be following the only available course 
to preserve such interests. And as Tocqueville and Stuart Mill accurately 
perceived, this poses a much greater threat to democratic polities; after all, 
when society itself becomes the tyrant, “it practices a social tyranny more 
formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since […] it leaves fewer 
means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and 
enslaving the soul itself” (Stuart Mill, 2008, pp. 8-9).
This diagnosis by Stuart Mill leads us to yet another danger of the degenera-
tion of political correctness, one that might possibly be even more damaging 
than the direct effects of the latter in itself: the reaction against it. Indeed, 
when individuals who are citizens of a democratic polity feel stifled by what 
they perceive to be exacerbated form of political correctness, they come 
to resent the later as representing the heavy-handedness of a societal or 
institutional repression that borders on censorship. As a general rule, their 
natural reaction – habituated as they are to the principal notion of individu-
al liberty – is to rebel against this heavy-handedness; in doing so, they will 
not only reject “exacerbated” political correctness, but political correctness 
as a whole – dismissing both its degenerate and its undeniably necessary di-
mensions. And if democratic politics has taught us anything in recent years 
it is precisely the painful fact that when such an outright rejection of politi-
cal correctness takes place, those who embrace it usually play right into the 
hands of demagogues and populists who “tell it like it is” and publicly (and 
proudly) reject the “politically correct orthodoxy”3.
3.  Bear in mind that, virtually in every instance, this fact is not view as a circumstantial aspect of a 
given candidate/candidacy, but rather as a key defining feature of the latter, and his or her platforms; 
that was the case with Duterte, Orbán, Trump, Salvini, Bolsonaro, etc.
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Viewed in this way, it become clear that such an exacerbated political 
correctness ultimately has an erosive effect on the democratic process; 
much like the story of the boy who cried wolf, it is important for the sake 
of political correctness – of its legitimate and necessary dimension – that 
its advocates are able to accurately ascertain which causes are truly worth 
fighting for, and which ones are not. To espouse all as if the future of the 
polity hinged on each is not only unreasonable; it is actually counterproduc-
tive. For with every issue championed by advocates of political correctness 
that the latter’s critics are able to demonstrably and plausibly portray as 
blatant exaggeration, the general public acceptance to consider truly critical 
problems in that arena will decrease substantially. By progressing in this 
fashion, eventually all social issues that can be collected under the epithet 
of “political correctness” – even those whose social and political importance 
can hardly be overstated, such as enduring instances of actual racial and 
gender discrimination (salary inequality comes to mind) – will be liable to 
be dismissed by a society exhausted by pointless claims of political incor-
rectness. This, in turn, will open the door for the proliferation of the kind 
of demagogy mentioned above, increasing permeability to it not only on the 
part of the kind of voters who would already be more susceptible to political 
extremism, but also on the part of otherwise politically moderate voters, 
who have simply lost patience with the demands of “political correctness”. 
Ironically, then, it becomes entirely possible that this new form of tyranny 
of the majority, disguised as an advocacy for the right of minorities to not be 
“offended”, may in fact ultimately lead us to a tyranny in the classical sense.
At the end of the day, it seems clear that there is certainly a virtuous bal-
ance to be sought regarding the issue of political correctness, one which 
allows us to achieve a situation in which minorities aren’t silenced or per-
petually targeted by insidious prejudices, but which does not degenerate 
into a kind of self-censorship, creates new and unwarranted taboos, and 
ultimately ends up diminishing the quality of our political existence and 
discourse. The lesson to be learned from Fahrenheit 451 in this regard is 
that, if we let ourselves be consumed by the immediacy of our lives and the 
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plethora of technological divertissements of our time, we may very well miss 
the moment when our lack of attention to crucial phenomena such as the de-
generation of political correctness robs us of a truly democratic existence. 
In the end, after all, one might realize that a tyranny of the misunderstood 
needs of the minority may be just as dangerous to democracy as a tyranny 
of the majority.
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SCANDOLOGY: VIEWPOINTS, PUBLIC DISCOURSE 
AND MEDIATED CONSTRUCTION
Hélder Prior 
Abstract: The following essay seeks to analyze the media 
reconstruction and the social representation of the political 
scandal as a media event. We will examine aspects of the me-
dia communication that convert scandal into a media event, 
that is, into a selected event, framed and constructed by the 
media. The first part of this research amount to a theorizing 
effort about political scandal. The empirical illustration will 
seek to assess the use of linguistic, rhetorical and significant 
resources inherent to scandal as a media artifact. 
Key concepts: Political Scandal; Personalization; Meaning 
effects. 
Introduction 
In the last decades the public life has been marked by 
a succession of political scandals in many liberal de-
mocracies, particularly in Brazil with allegations of 
corruption widely mediatised in the national and inter-
national press. It may be possible, in fact, to talk about a 
culture of political scandal or about a politics of scandal 
in the contemporary public sphere. The problem of polit-
ical corruption and its media coverage and its effect on 
public confidence in the functioning of the political sys-
tem are often associated with scandal. However, if the 
political scandal often reveals situations of corruption, 
abuse and perversion of the exercise of power, in other 
cases the role of the media in the research, publication, 
setting, framing and construction of media narratives 
about the social and political events stands out. These 
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narratives influence decisively the social representation of the phenomenon 
in shaping the “public opinion”. 
We must not forget that the media are a “device” of social construction 
and, therefore, the media events are a reality in “second hand”. Based on 
crystallizing procedures of experience and using cognitive schemes typical 
of journalism, the media events adhere to pre-existing narratives formu-
las that make informative reality be a process of social construction in 
which routines, typifications, and rhetorical codes typical of the manufac-
turing process of information intervene. This way, the media scandal does 
not escape to a construction and configuration logic inherent to symbolic 
mediation devices. In the narrative machine of the media, the events are 
mediated by communication schemes that frame, shape, configure, “fable” 
(Vattimo, 1992) and, in some cases, deform reality, because to scandal is 
inherent an artefactual logic and of makeup characteristic of the discursive 
strategies and media interests. There was a Watergate that preceded scan-
dals as the Irangate or Monicagate, in the same way there was a Mensalão 
which preceded the Paulista Trensalão or the recent Petrolão. 
During this process, the journalism evokes rhetorical procedures and struc-
tured enunciative strategies at the level of the speech that express certain 
narrative conventions and professional practices that become visible in the 
configuration of the media event. Therefore, it is an illusion to think that the 
media enable us to experience the world as it is, the mimetic experience of 
reality. Any event reported is mediated and rebuilt by the media schemas 
and moulds. Thus, reality is for us a mediated reality, (Innerarity, 2010), 
which refers to observations, symbols and fictions, even if the constructed 
reality elicits the nostalgia of an “authentic reality”. As Luhmann says, “all 
information relies on categorizations which mark out spaces of possibility 
within these spaces a selective range is prestructured” (Luhmann, 1996, 
p. 38).
Therefore, the configuration of the media scandal is not only related to the 
severity of a transgression or reprehensible behaviour of a political leader, 
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but essentially depends on the flow, nature, prominence and the resonance 
of the informative coverage (Entman, 2012; Thompson, 2000; Nyhan, 2014). 
Otherwise, the media scandal is often configured by the role played by 
political parties willing to obtain some electoral benefit. Party-political in-
stitutions, together with groups of interest and pressure connected to them, 
often use scandal as a “political weapon”. This is what in American politics 
became known as dirty tricks or negative campaigns. The 2014 Brazilian 
elections were fertile in this type of strategy, with Dilma Rousseff’s oppo-
nents, particularly Aécio Neves in the second round, to use the electoral 
schedule to disseminate messages against corruption at a time when the 
Operação Lava Jato (Car Wash Operation) affected, above all, the Workers ‘ 
party. 
The Anatomy of Political Scandal 
The study of political scandal represents a privileged opportunity to un-
derstand the interface between the spheres of communication, politics and 
justice in contemporary liberal democracies. On the other hand, Scandalogy1 
will make it possible to uncover the pragmatic, discursive and symbolic 
dimension, as well as the effects of sense that are carried out in the re-
configuration of scandal as an analytical object. Although it constitutes 
an extremely current event, the scandal has a secular tradition, moreover 
proved by the very etymology of the concept derived from the sacred writ-
ings. According to the meaning which can be drawn from the Septuaginta, 
the Greek translation of the Hebrew Old Testament, the word skandalon was 
used to indicate an “obstacle”, “an error falling moment for the weak”, or “an 
occasion of stumbling”. In theological meaning, skandalon refers, therefore, 
to a sinful behaviour, a “stumbling stone” that can lead someone to the fall, 
to the ruin. According to Saint Mark, the scandal is an outrage resulting 
from an occasion of sin that deserves a “divine punishment”. It is “an indig-
nation produced by bad examples”, as it can be read in the Grande Dicionário 
1.   Scandology is a subdiscipline of Political Science first proposed by Anthony King in “Sex, Money 
and Power “(1986). The study of scandololy was developed by Andrei S. Markovits and Mark Silverstein 
in The Politics of Scandal: Power and Process in Liberal Democracies, 1988. 
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da Língua Portuguesa. However, with the emergence of Romance variations 
during the Middle Age, as the words scandalum, “escandre”, escandalho, and 
escandêlo2, scandalo and escándalo, the religious meaning ended up eventu-
ally by being progressively mitigated and the phenomenon has acquired a 
meaning far beyond the Judaeo-Christian tradition.
Therefore, from a sociological point of view, the scandal can be interpret-
ed as a societal provocation, as the derogation of values socially shared by 
individuals. In a classic text, originally published in 1954, Eric Dampierre 
considers that the scandal involves the “existence of values shared by a par-
ticular social group and the existence, or the possibility of the existence of 
an audience” (Dampierre, 1954, p. 330). In accordance with the reading that 
can be surmised from Dampierre’s text, the scandal involves the transgres-
sion of certain social, political, religious or moral values or codes, and, on 
the other hand, the transgression publicizing and the existence of a public 
that recognizes it, that feels offended by it and that publicly expresses its in-
dignation or disapproval in the public sphere. This way, the scandal implies 
the existence of a transgression that, when individuals who are not direct-
ly involved in this transgression, when it is publicised know it, it creates 
feelings of disapproval, it generates the manifestation a certain accusatory 
and simultaneously moralising speech. It is for this reason that from the 
moment we witnessed the publicizing of a transgression, the scandal asso-
ciates illocutionary and perlocutionary values, to the extent that it happens 
when it is enunciated and by the fact that it is enunciated, awakening effects 
of disapproval or widespread indignation. In a way, it is about speech turned 
into action and an action turned into speech that highlights a certain per-
formative character. Through the movement of speech acts, the “occasion of 
stumbling” becomes public, that is, it offers itself to the meanings and rais-
es a specific reaction. Besides, as Molière stresses: “it is the public scandal 
that offends; to sin in secret is not to sin at all”. 
2.   In the General Chronicle of Spain there are records of the use of the Portuguese words “escandalho” 
and “escandêlo”, in the 13th and 15th Century, respectively. Cf. Dicionário Etimológico da Língua 
Portuguesa, Lisboa, Livros Horizonte, 1995, p. 439. 
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In this sense and as the playwright himself recognizes, without the trans-
gression publicizing, there simply cannot be a scandal. That is why that 
authors as Apostolides and Williams suggest that “the scandal must be 
understood as the transgression publicizing of a social norm” (2004, p. 3), 
emphasizing the visibility and publicity value to understand the phenom-
enon. So, we know that the public sphere today is guided by the visibility 
and transparency principles claimed by the Enlightenment philosophy that 
has incorporated the publicity principle in the democratic political theory, 
in opposition to the secret /havens and arcane rei publicae characteristic of 
the traditional doctrine of the State reason. “Everything must be shown, 
exposed and enlightened”, declare Diderot and D’Alembert in Encyclopédie 
(Starobinsky, 1979, p. 304). And, as it is known, it was the illustration spirit 
that allowed the establishment of a kind of tribune, the press, according to 
which “it is difficult to hide anything and it is impossible to diminish”, as 
stressed by the Marquis of Condorcet, considered as the last of the illumi-
nated (Condorcet, 1970, p. 117).
Therefore, the principles of transparency and visibility in the political field 
erected as a mainstay of the liberal democracies, as something “good and 
fair”, opposed to the closed and secret policy of cabinet specific of the mo-
narchical absolutism (Cf. Schmitt, 2008, p. 80). Therefore, if the scandal 
has become a prominent feature of the social and political life today, such 
cannot be dissociated from the demand for the transparency principle of 
the government acts. That is why that authors as Markovits and Silverstein 
consider that scandals can only emerge in liberal democracies (1988, p. 5), 
precisely because these grants extreme importance to the visibility of the 
political power given, in large part, by institutional or parliamentary mech-
anisms of control, and by politics environment monitoring done by free and 
independent media. “Fundamentally, we believe that political scandals can 
only occur in liberal democracies. In no other political arrangement is the 
separation of the public and private realms so essential to the vitality of the 
political system” (Markovits & Silverstein, 1988, p. 5). As Theodore Lowi as-
sures “since the public exposure is a crucial element of the political scandal, 
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we can say, as if it was a theorem, that the society will have little or no scan-
dals if there is no of institutionalised means of exposure” (Lowi, 1988, p. 10).
On the other hand, we know that the media are always ready to “disqualify” 
or discredit the political sphere, pointing out their possible dysfunctions and 
denouncing their abuses or deviations before the public opinion. Actually, 
the watchdog role still remains as one of the ethos characteristic values of 
the journalistic profession, but if the supervising and vigilant approach of 
the press before the political sphere helps to explain, in part, the profusion 
of political scandals, we must not forget that the scandal “adds drama” to 
journalistic stories and therefore it attracts the public attention. “The scan-
dal attracts the attention, it offers readers and audiences to the media and 
therefore it helps them to achieve economic gains” (Dagnes, 2011, pp. 4-5).
Thus, and once that political scandal does not happen spontaneously, it is 
essential that the transgression of the prescriptive procedures that govern-
ing the exercise of political power gets the attention of media organizations 
that, in order to convert the phenomenon into something that can be un-
derstood by the public, configure the event in a media narrative that gains 
plots and subplots as the scandal develops and unfolds. By converting itself 
in a media event, the political scandal acquires a configuration marked by 
the particularities of the media forms of communication. As Thompson sug-
gests: “The scandal develops, literally, in the media; and the professional 
activities and the media organisations play a crucial role with its practices 
and specific working rhythms,” (Thompson, 2000, p. 75). Many times, the 
political scandal is a complex event that unfolds on primary and secondary 
plots. The research and publication of the initial transgressions that are at 
the origin of the outbreak of a scandal can lead to revelation and conse-
quent media exploitation of “second order transgressions” which, in some 
cases, keep a tangential or superficial relationship with initial transgres-
sions, giving origin to sub-scandals or larger scandals that can even eclipse, 
especially from the media point of view, the “first order” transgressions 
(Thompson, 2000, p. 25).
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In spite of this, it is reductive to consider that the scandal depends exclusive-
ly on the existence of an infringement committed by a political leader and 
the necessary public response of indignation. The scandal conformation in 
the public sphere is decisively marked by the news about the event and the 
political elites’ role in the establishment of the media agenda. Indeed, we 
must consider the existence of strategic actors and networks members and 
political elites that contribute to promote or, on the other hand, to silence 
scandals. That’s why, according to Robert Entman (2012), political scandal 
denotes, therefore, individual transgressions committed by presidents or 
candidates to public offices that are publicised by the media as a serious 
problem to the political sphere, a problem that must be investigated and, 
somehow, remedied (Entman, 2012). 
Thereby, to label an event as a political scandal, we should take into account 
three aspects in particular: the media coverage duration; the coverage 
prominence and its resonance. The coverage duration is a good indicator 
about the scandal penetration in public awareness and in the production of 
feedback and responses from political actors and journalists. Otherwise, 
the event should be visible and prominent in the headlines, in editorial texts, 
on television programmes of information and political comment. The scan-
dal will not be able to hatch without the necessary “media amplification” 
and without the information that works as a “game of mirrors”. Finally, the 
scandal should be framed as such, that is, through a language with a strong 
symbolic and liturgical meaning, using cultural and moral expressions, 
images that connote involved individuals as guilty or responsible for behav-
iours ethically reprehensible that cause a certain poverty and depletion of 
politics. At the bottom, the event should be framed with a moralising speech 
on the part of the media, a speech that will strengthen the norms and the 
values violated meanwhile, contributing to societal homeostasis broken 
in the meantime. Controlling the media coverage duration, prominence 
and resonance, the organic agents of the media system, the so-called gate-
keepers, as well as political elites and pressure groups that influence these 
agents, contribute to emphasise, mediatise and increase the scandal impact 
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or, on the other hand, to silence, block or minimise the consequences of a 
political scandal through certain editorial and strategic interests inherent 
to the media groups. 
This way, we can argue that the media scandal potential is not only related 
to the transgression severity or to the reprehensible behaviour of the politi-
cal leader, but depends essentially on the context created by the news flow 
published on the subject and by the political elites and political parties role 
before this behaviour. About this, Brendan Nyhan identifies two independ-
ent variables of the transgression which are particularly important in the 
creation of an environment favourable to the media scandal development: 
the image that opposition parties have about the involved political leader 
and the news publication about other issues that end up diverting attention 
from the event (Nyhan, 2014, p. 439-440).
In fact, media coverage is the barometer that indicates the existence (or 
absence) of a given political scandal (Waisbord, 2004, p. 1079) and our per-
spective is that the scandal is the result of a co-construction process which 
involves the press, political leaders, pressure groups, police and judicial au-
thorities, media elites and opposition parties, that have always something 
to gain by using scandal as a political weapon. When these entities promote 
an allegation about a deviant behaviour, political scandal tends to hatch. 
Indeed, the political scandal can be interpreted as a socially constructed 
process that emerges when political leaders’ public or private behaviour is 
interpreted, by the press, by the political sphere, by the judicial authorities 
and by the public opinion as a behaviour that offends moral, social or insti-
tutional norms and hence should be sanctioned or condemned. Our view 
is that, in order to organize the inherent complexity of the phenomenon, 
the communicational devices of symbolic mediation insert the scandal in 
the order of discursive facts, selecting, cutting out, framing, shaping and dis-
seminating the events that are the basis of a phenomenon that bursts in the 
public sphere. It is at this point that the linguistic devices specific of the 
media field operate an event reconfiguration or re-figuration, appropriating 
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the event to convert it into a media object that can be, independently of its 
complexity, easily interpreted by the reader at the moment of its reception.
The pragmatic nature of media scandals
Analysing the political scandal configuration operated by the journalism 
field, we realise that, in most cases, scandals are narratives that are devel-
oping and unfolding in episodes in the media as hypothetical transgressions 
are known, as the dramatis personae are identified and positioned and, in the 
case of particularly complex scandals, as new revelations or new reports are 
discovered, the so-called “second-order transgressions” (Thompson , 2001), 
that cause the original scandal become other scandals or sub-scandals. As 
it is known, the narrative machine of the media device of information gives 
enunciative marks to the events and the scandal configuration in the media 
does not escape the logic of framework, configuration and reconfiguration 
inherent to symbolic mediation devices.
Indeed, the scandal develops itself, literally, in the media by a mise en récit 
process, “tessitura of intrigue”, that is, through the succession and framing 
of the events and actions performed by journalistic characters, transform-
ing the phenomenon into an intelligible “story”, into a story seized and 
experienced by the receiver. This means that the narrator organizes facts 
and events, or pseudo-facts or pseudo-events, with the aim of building a 
meaningful totality, and therefore, creating sense. It is the narrativity that 
orders the scattered events of the world of life that determines their con-
nections, linking heterogeneous events and elements. As Paul Ricoeur notes 
on Temps et Récit, “the issues “who”, “what”, “how”, “why” and others are 
already contained in the narrative intelligence” (1985, p. 35) and, in this 
way, the events understanding and explanation is done through narrativity. 
Therefore, it is the narrator-journalist’s competence to organize the story 
background, to contextualise the transgression, to position individuals who 
find themselves at reports epicentre, recompose the seriality, the episodes, 
the sequences of the scandal, bringing closer, naturally, the media recon-
struction of the phenomenon to reality, to the absent referent.
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The journalistic text is a linguistic recreation of the events and the media 
scandal, for being a disruptive and complex event with a temporal structure 
which can be quite long, follows a structural organisation plan character-
ised by the events succession in a chained mode and naturally according to 
enunciative strategies that organise, contextualise and establish the events 
that are or have been at the base of its outbreak. In the “technical civilisa-
tion” society occurs what Gianni Vattimo calls “fabrication of the world” 
where the mass media configure the events as a “fable,” an intrigue woven 
and figured by language games that are inherent to journalism and that 
more than merely representing the reality, arousing fact effects, frame it 
under certain angles, shape it, configure it, establish it, by attributing them 
in a selective way peculiar singularities and characteristics. For Vattimo, 
the reality principle suffers, indeed, certain erosion, deterioration, a certain 
rarefaction, because the communication field no longer tends toward auto-
transparency, directing instead to fabrication, to a hermeneutic logic. Thus, 
we live a second-order experience, an experience where the reality of the 
world of life mingles with fiction. The media statements do not summarise, 
thus, to a pure state of affairs or mimetic state, but assume a certain plural-
ity, a certain artificiality. The journalistic narratives such as the historical 
narratives or other are simply the result of what the narrator-journalist con-
figures as a perception object, as discursive event. 
Therefore, when a particular scandal becomes a media event, a complex 
communication process is constituted that consists of a list of subsequent 
revelations, accusations, defence reactions, which have an essential fea-
ture: the events are shaped by journalists and the stories are created and 
reported having into account certain “narrative codes” (Canel & Sanders, 
2007, p. 50). Now, one of the “narrative codes” or “expressive resources” 
(Prior, 2016) of the media scandal anatomy that we intend to highlight is the 
personalisation or figuration mode of the characters involved. As Tzvetan 
Todorov referred, the characters cannot exist outside the action and, on the 
other hand, there cannot be action without characters (Todorov, 1970, p. 
120), as the characters are the ones who perform certain actions in the rec-
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reated storyline, making the narrative progress. Let’s take the example of 
the journalistic coverage of the former Brazil President’s testimony, Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, to the judge Sérgio Moro responsible for Operação Lava 
Jato (Operation Car Wash) made by the two Brazilian magazines, Veja and 
Isto É.
Fig. 1. Revista Veja, 10/05/2017. Revista IstoÉ 05/05/2017
The event is imagery and discursively established by the conflict category 
between two characters somewhat antagonistic: on one side the judge Sérgio 
Moro, figuring as a symbol of a Brazil that fights against corruption; on the 
other side, the defendant, Lula da Silva, central figure of the Operação Lava 
Jato (Operation Car Wash) Through linguistic resources (“payback”, “face- 
-to-face meeting”) and iconic settled on the metaphor of the fight, boxing 
in the IstoÉ magazine headline, Mexican wrestling in the case of Veja mag-
azine, the narrator-journalist configures the event as a fight between the 
public life moralisation and the endemic corruption that affects Brazil social 
and political life. A certain politics judicialisation is also glimpsed, because 
the judge, who was supposed to be referee in the process, is presented as an 
adversary of the defendant, as a direct antagonist, the hero responsible for 
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the purification of the Brazilian policy. Thus, in the case of political scandals 
media coverage, this simplified figuration creates heroes and villains, good 
and bad, transgressors and “purifiers”, guilty or innocent people, most of 
the time before the sentence and due to the fact that the media, almost al-
ways, anticipate to the judicial inquiry, providing true public opinion trials. 
Yet, the former President is the target of a highly negative coverage, build-
ing an imaginary situation through imagery representations, caricatures, 
which affect the reader’s attention, showing Lula da Silva as guilty even 
before the sentence. 
Fig. 2. Revista Veja, 04/11/2015. Revista IstoÉ, 09/09/2016.
But it is important to refer that the characters that comprise fact narratives 
about scandals are always a semantic construction, a product of enunciative 
ruses and linguistic stratagems that allow the reader, consciously or un-
consciously, to build a particular personality about these characters. They 
are dramatis personae, linguistic constructions, social representations re-
stricted to mere adjectives, incomplete and reductive descriptions, in some 
kind of rudimentary mimesis (Mesquita, 2002, p. 126) guided by credibility 
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criteria that most of the time creates stereotyped characters. The charac-
ters that embed media narratives about political scandals are thus semantic 
construction, figures produced by the speech that they only keep a tangen-
tial relationship with the real person. 
Another aspect that matters to show, although it seems obvious, is the fact 
that the journalistic language does not recreate exactly the world of life, 
the real. It can only recompose this reality, producing a credible speech, 
an effect of reality. This real effect is made possible by a series of linguis-
tic resources and language indexical devices such as adverbs of time and 
place that fix the journalistic discourse here and now (Motta, 2013, p. 199), 
propositions, testimonies and quotes which give veracity to the speech and 
other reference strategies aimed at anchoring the journalistic reporting in 
the real. 
However, we also intend to stress here is the production of aesthetic sense 
effects that the media scandal demonstrates. The scandal is a highly dra-
matic phenomenon and the intrigue composition turns out to be strongly 
pervaded by subjectivity, either at the enunciation moment, or in the re-
ception act by the reader/viewer, even if the journalistic enunciation is, 
naturally, characterized by the speaker’s expressive authenticity. Thereby, 
it should be added that the narrative configuration of media scandals is 
strongly marked or characterized by pragmatic contexts and the narrator’s 
claims when sewing the event. Thus, the narratives about political scan-
dals are not, in fact, naïve or built randomly, but they are characterized 
instead by the speaker’s argumentative attitude, by the connections that the 
narrator establishes between the events, by their purposes, interests and 
communicative intentions and, of course, by the effects of sense that the 
language ultimately evokes in the receivers. 
To capture the reader’s attention, journalism uses a multitude of language 
resources and figures of speech that produce symbolic effects, leading the 
reader to subjective interpretations and allowing, at the same time, a cer-
tain aesthetic fruition. 
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Fig. 3 and 4. On 16/03/2016 edition, the magazine Veja illustrated the headline with a meta-
phor between the mythological figure of Medusa, who had snakes instead of hair on her 
head, and the former President Lula. Caravaggio painted Medusa in 1597. It should be not-
ed that the expression Bothrops was uttered by Lula himself when he was arrested for 
questioning: “If they wanted to kill the bothrops, they didn’t do it right, because they didn’t 
hit the head, they hit the butt, because the bothrops is alive,” said the former President. On 
the headline, the former President is portrayed with an anger or fury expression, in an icon-
ic cover that illustrates the alleged Lula’s attempts to escape from prison. 
In fact, it is interesting to determine how the media narratives about scan-
dals are heavily impregnated with language games, meaning effects that 
arouse a certain aesthetic experience at the time of its reception and sei-
zure, regardless the necessary approach of the discourse produced to the 
objective reality, a benchmark. This means that any version about the real, 
about the event, is an interpretation of it, and any version can betray be-
cause it is a version among other possible versions: it is not the fact in itself 
“(Motta, 2013, p. 40), it is just its crystallisation through artefactual, artifi-
cial schemas. Using reference strategies, the medium seeks to awaken in 
the receivers the real effect in order to convince the reader that what is 
narrated is related to reality. However, and since the political scandal is, by 
itself, an event that activates the dramatisation devices, adapting easily to 
the narrative machine that produces aesthetic effects aimed at capturing 
and retaining the public attention, the journalistic language often uses pro-
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duction strategies of poetic sense effects that invite the reader to subjective 
interpretations and that, on the other hand, awaken the reader’s interest 
and curiosity in following a disruptive plot that alters the flow of normality, 
that breaches the balance of the political system and, why not to mention, 
of the journalistic field, its routines and, often, its ethical assumptions. 
Consequently, the journalistic speech turns out to be based on a strong 
subjective aesthetic and pleasant charge, that; nevertheless, lets the reader 
apprehend the message using conceptual frameworks, or frames, which he 
is properly familiar with.
Fig. 5. Examples of the use of intertextuality, a technical or artistic mean that journalism 
uses to arouse the so-called effects of aesthetic sense and the necessary emotional involve-
ment of the audience. Intertextuality in journalism is characterized by the appropriation of 
texts or elements from other genres, for example, literary or cinematic. It is about the 
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establishment of a conceptual framework that can be intuitively apprehended by the view-
er, since it uses certain stereotypes and mental schemes previously instituted. In the 
examples mentioned, Lula da Silva is, for example, compared to the protagonist of the film 
The Godfather, as if he was the “powerful big boss” or the godfather of the corruption 
scheme investigated by the Car Wash (Lava Jato). In Visão magazine headline, political 
leaders are compared to criminals from the film Reservoir Dogs, by Quentin Tarantino, in a 
report on the financing scheme of municipal campaigns in Portugal. 
Final considerations
The media culture is a manufactured reality, it is a reality in “second hand” 
and the scandal does not escape to the makeup and artefactuality logic, in 
Jacques Derrida’s words, specific of the media field. The world of life reality 
is mediated by communication schemes that select, frame, shape and, in 
some cases, deform reality itself, replacing it. Through a range of hierarchi-
cal selective and artificial procedures, the texture of the journalistic speech 
about scandals is, not only formed, but also deformed by news narratives 
that often convert the fictional in news and consequently, in reality.
Nevertheless, with this excursus, I did not mean to treat all the issues raised 
by the media scandal configuration operated by the media device of infor-
mation. My intention was more unpretentious and aimed only at drawing 
attention to some aspects and analytical clues that are interesting to ob-
serve in the configuration, refiguration and framing of the media scandals. 
I highlighted aspects mainly related to personalisation and with the drama-
ticity of scandal, as well as some production strategies of reality effects and 
effects of aesthetic or poetic sense. 
Any narrative needs characters and the media scandal has, necessarily, 
its dramatis personae. The characters carry out certain functions in the 
plot, functions that are important in the action progression. In the case of 
media scandal, it is predictable to view a division between offenders and 
informers, between major and minor characters, protagonists or antago-
nists, purifier heroes and transgressor villains, individual or collective 
characters. Perhaps it is appropriate to point out that the scandal becomes 
a representation, with plots and subplots, with major and minor characters, 
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where a recreational and aesthetic dimension is also visible, allowing to en-
joy the visual event, which allows spectatio. 
However, it will be interesting, in other works, to analyse the seriality of 
media scandals, its unfolding in episodes, the temporality or time expe-
rience, as well as other issues raised by the intersubjective experience of 
poetic journalism and that, in our view, is also part of the anatomy of the 
media scandal.
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In the last decade, from a communicative point of view,  a lot of novelties and 
changes shaped the traditional public sphere,  Donald Trump's election in the 
United States of America,  the Brexits, the rising of  the several xenophobic and 
ultra-nationalist threats emerging in different geographical and political contexts, 
the  populism phenomena, as well as the te debate on Cyber surveillance, 
counter-information, and the so-called "fake news" has drawn attention to some 
dystopian portrays conceived in the 20th Century which is now being considered 
an appropriate depiction of democracy and political communication's new 
pathologies. The book joins together researchers from Communication Sciences 
and related areas (Political Science, Political Theory, Political Philosophy, Political 
Sociology, Arts, and others), with particular emphasis on those interested in 
political communication around a unifying common axis: the pathologies and 
dysfunctions of democracy, in media contexts, in different aspects of their 
involvement with the media such as the media representation of these 
pathologies and dysfunctions;  the impact of the media in the functioning of 
democratic institutions; the interference of political agents in journalistic 
information; the relationship between media and political institutions in the 
processes of public opinion building. Particularly, on this volume one addresses 
to the topic of surveillance.  Within digital social networks and infotainment, 
invisibility, the right to be forgotten, and the reserve of a private life acquire an 
almost subversive nature in an age defined by hiper-communication. 
Simultaneously, the media staging of power mobilizes protagonists to a reality in 
which rationality and public responsibility are confronted with multiple risks of 
scandal arising from a permanent state of collective scrutiny. "Scandalogy" is a 
concept already used to project the study of image crisis’ phenomena, 
increasingly emerging due to the opportunities of political exposure.
